Tracing Cold War In Post-Modern Management’s Hot Issues

Stream 6: The Cold War and Management

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Motto:

“Totalitarianism was an ideological notion that sustained the complex operation of taming free radicals, of guaranteeing the liberal-democratic hegemony, dismissing the leftist critique of liberal democracy as the obverse, the twin of rightist Fascist dictatorship” (Slavoy Žižek, 2002, 3)

“I urge that we turn Kuhn on his head and demonstrate that a paradigm is nothing more than an arrested social movement. This inversion entails that we regard inquiry as an especially focused form of political action. Whereas a paradigm-based approach to knowledge would declare politics to be vulgar metaphysics, a movement-based approach treats metaphysics as inchoate politics. Thus, a stable body of knowledge is simply what political action becomes once the public space for contestation has been restricted.” (Fuller, 2000, 402)

Abstract:

Tracing Cold War in post-modern managerial science and ideology one encounters hot issues linking contemporary liberal dogmas and romanticized view of organizational leadership to the dismantling of a welfare state disguised as a liberation of an individual employee, empowerment of an individual consumer and a progressive, liberal and global development of a market/parliament mix. The concept of totalitarianism covers fearful symmetries between three modes of paying the bills for western modernization; liberal, communist and the emergent “egalibertarian” (1), while the ideologies of organisationalism and globalization testify to a search for a post-Cold War mission statement. Messiness of re-engineering the enlargement of the European Union testifies to the hidden injuries of Cold War, not all of them caused by a class and class struggle.

Key words:
Managerialist ideology, romanticized view of leadership, paradigm, empowerment, hidden costs of modernization, totalitarianism, liberalism, organizationalism, egaliberty, Cold War

1. Tracing Cold War in ideologies and sciences of management

On April 16, 2003, delegates of 15 member states of the European Union and of the 10 states aspiring to membership, had signed an agreement in Athens, deciding to formally expand the European Union eastwards and southwards. They were abolishing territorial divisions imposed on the continent by a wartime conference of western allies and the Soviet Union in Yalta (1943). The latter has been regarded as the beginning of the post WWII splitting of the European continent into two sides of the “iron curtain”. The one west of the river Elbe was dominated by the United States as the world’s largest nuclear superpower defending
parliamentary democracy and market economy. The one east of Elbe was dominated by the Soviet Union as the communist superpower promoting state controlled economy under dictatorship of a single party, which, in turn, controlled the state. “Eurotop” in Athens came as no surprise. Erosion of political power, economic decline and breakdown of the Soviet-dominated side of the “iron curtain” became clear in August 1980. The emergence of a Polish mass social movement “Solidarity” against the communist power elite in Gdansk shipyards was not countered with a Russian military intervention. Crisis management was entrusted to the local communist power elite. The unsuccessful “perestrojka” introduced by Gorbachev trying to reform the Soviet system resulted in a peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union and withdrawal of Russian armies from central and eastern Europe. Cold War’s “iron curtain” melted down, most visibly in Berlin, where the Wall separating West Berlin from GDR has been spontaneously breached and dismantled by German citizens. The latter have become citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany overnight, with East German communist power elite offering no resistance. German re-unification was a cold fusion, an inter-state merger and a multi-corporate acquisition. Similar processes of peaceful power transfer occurred in the other communist countries of central Europe (with the exception of Romania). The “round table” negotiations between members of the Polish communist elite and “Solidarity” opposition in 1988 resulted in the first free elections east of Elbe after WWII and a gradual transfer of power to a democratically elected parliament and president. Czechs enacted a sequence of street demonstrations, “velvet revolution”, and catapulted oppositional intellectuals into seats of power abandoned by communists, and so did the Hungarians.

The fall of the Berlin Wall (in the fall of 1989) triggered European integrating processes, of which the agreement signed in Athens was the latest acknowledgement. Cold War has officially ended. Soviet Union broke down, Germany re-united. NATO includes Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and invites Russian military observers. Former communist apparatchiks have graduated from MBA schools and run business companies. What is left of the Cold War? Has it left hidden injuries in contemporary managerial ideology and practices?

When reading handbooks on management used by business schools, one is bound to notice numerous traces and hidden injuries the Cold War left on the ideology of managerialism, which was implicitly embraced by the academic communities of knowledge in the west and explicitly by their eastern counterparts. What is a contemporary ideology of managerialism? In its simplest form it can be reduced to a set of two basic assumptions; that all successful human activity involves hierarchic dependencies (expressed in organizational forms) and that knowledge should be geared to the needs of those on the top of the hierarchies, since from there it can be implemented an disseminated trickling the benefits down to everybody (and thus research programs in managerial sciences should reflect these priorities). What are traces left by the Cold War? Mutually reinforcing organizational learning across the iron curtain reinforced the implicit ideology of managerialism, while the fall of communism erased “the footnotes” obscuring the traces of mutual borrowings. Ideological training of the communist party cadres has often been criticized as “brainwashing”, but tacit ideological training of MBA
students in managerialism has rarely been subjected to a comparable sort of criticism.

Let us listen to what an average US and western European handbook of management (which reflects the sciences of management, trying to accommodate ideologies of managerialism) has to say about who managers are and what managers think that they do when they manage (which reflects the ideology of management trying to legitimise itself with the sciences of management).

Here is an example from a chapter on leadership in an introductory course on business management published by the American authors in the USA:

“At one time, managers were called bosses, and their job was to tell people what to do and watch over them to be sure they did it. Bosses tended to reprimand those who didn’t do things correctly and generally acted stern. (...) Today, progressive management is changing. Managers are being educated to guide, train, support, motivate and coach employees rather than to tell them what to do. (...) Most modern managers emphasize teamwork and cooperation rather than discipline and order giving.”(Nickels et al., 2002, 204-5)

The above passage implies that there is a sharp difference between an unspecified period (“at one time”) and the present. Second, it implies that some of the authoritarian characteristics of individuals in power positions within hierarchically structured organizations have disappeared, or at least became less pronounced than before. Managers “were called” bosses, they “tended” to reprimand subordinates, they used to control and act “stern”. This past period of errors and deviations belongs to the museum and not to a corporate boardroom, because contemporary managers are “being educated” to coach their subordinates, not to oversee them. Managers are expected to motivate subordinates, so that the latter voluntarily increase their commitment and input, not to whip them and keep them disciplined with fear of punishment or job loss. Managers are becoming employee’s best friends, not scourges. Not all of them, though. “Most” modern managers understand they have to change – but this implies that there are at least some, who do not. Progressive management “is changing” – but this change obviously has not been completed yet (has it been completed, then the authors would have spoken of significant changes, which had already taken place). Teamwork and cooperation are being stressed by modern managers – not discipline and order giving. This, however, implies that these managers do have a choice – they might have chosen to stress order giving and discipline. The claim that they do not is being used to enhance their image and exhort their modern values and attributes in the eyes of a broader public and presumably of all those employees who will come in touch with them. When asked to identify properties, which made him a successful CEO of General Electric, Jack Welch answered that any of his management team colleagues could have done his job, but what made him unique was that he believed in corporate values formulated in mission statement (though he modestly added that these company commandments are not supposed to last longer than 10-15 years).

The passage quoted above is clearly a very strong and obvious ideological message. However, it is not openly presented in ideological terms and context. It
is not a self-enhancing public speech of a CEO of a large organization in a top academic institution (Jack Welch spoke at Harvard Business School). This is the text of a chapter on leadership in a general introduction to business management, meant to teach students how to understand business, business companies, managing, leadership and managerial skills. It is supposed to be an objective, value-free judgement expressed by professionals, experts in the field of managerial sciences. It is published by an established publisher, supplied with teaching materials, recommended to and disseminated among business school students. It reflects the current ideology of managerialism, the way managers are supposed to be and the way they should be perceived be the non-managers.

The analogy between this passage and ideological documents of the communist parties in former central European countries is striking. After each crisis, let us say in 1956, 1968 or 1970, representatives of the communist power elite spoke of the errors and deviations of the past. They assured their audiences that the communist party and the secret police might have turned their predecessors into bloodthirsty monsters – but this was “at one time”. Krushchev deplored Stalinist crimes, but promised never to return to Stalin’s methods of exercising absolute power and to stress individual consumption rather than collective armaments (nevertheless kept secret police and censorship as useful management tools). Brezhnev deplored Krushchev’s folksy improvisations abroad and promised never again to loose face in foreign expedition (but he more than matched Budapest intervention and Cuban missile adventure with a surgical strike at Czechoslovakia in 1968 and a doomed intervention in Afghanistan). They might have deplored the fact that a large-scale terror and a network of concentration camps were needed to subdue the population, but – again – they were convinced that a modern party bureaucrat is changing, becoming a true friend and coach of a simple citizen and employee. They might have agreed that maintenance of a rigid hierarchy was unpleasant and harmful, but they added that it is teamwork and cooperation, which now matter. After the Gdansk strikes of December 1970, bloodily suppressed by the former communist leader, Gomulka, the new leader, Gierek, promised to be a team player and to “consult” some of his decisions with the employees of large industrial centers (where employee unrest was potentially most dangerous for the regime and where therefore a token democratic institution of “public consulting” was supposed tom placate them). However, although Gierek did promise vague consultations, he never mentioned independent trade unions or a relaxation of party control – very much like the abovementioned fragment never mentions those features of a more democratic and egalitarian workplace, which would emerge bottom-up as an initiative of employees rather than managers and would not depend on managers’ good will and “progressiveness”. It took the breakdown of Berlin Wall to turn all former communist parties in central Europe into social-democratic ones (with the notable exception of the Russian communist party, which still openly refuses to condemn Stalinist genocide and to reject the contaminated name). “At one time” they did not embrace democracy, but they do so at present. “At one time” they were authoritarian, but now they are participative and democratic.

What makes this comparison between the two ideologies of managerialism so interesting? The one disseminated by handbooks written by the representatives of the sciences of management can be compared to the ideology of the communist
managerialism exercised by a party elite of the former communist countries (their handbooks also deserve some attention and should be systematically studied, as well as astonishing ease with which the young members of the communist elite assumed entrepreneurial responsibilities in privatised economies). Particularly interesting is the fact that in both cases ideology is used to obscure the workings of a system and in both cases it serves to legitimise the power holders. It does obscure the fact that no amount of talking about teams and brainstorming can diminish the class barriers between top managers and most employees. In terms of income inequalities, which increased dramatically in the 1990ies, one can hardly disguise enormous differences in – let us say – salaries of Nike top managers and the salaries of Nike’s Vietnamese female employees, or a salary of Jack Welch and “hourly people” in General Electric. In terms of unchecked power, which led to a number of spectacular scandals, of which Enron is the best known, one can hardly argue that a hierarchy of a business company is being replaced by a loose network of self-managed teams breeding emotionally rewarding communities of practice. In terms of the persistence of managerialist ideology in the media, one can hardly claim that more people have access to Hardt and Negri (cf. Hardt,Negri,2000), Noble (cf. Noble, 1986), or Wallerstein (cf. Wallerstein,1999) than to a middle of the road view of the inevitability of a western model of a hierarchic business company led by enlightened mangers. This marginalization of a leftist critique has recently been demonstrated by a relatively weak and late critique of the ideological campaigns launched by the managerial class – the last example being “privatisation” (i.e. standardization of managerial controls in public sphere, at the expense of politically motivated egalitarianism) and “globalization” (i.e. the abolishing of the last pockets of resistance against the capitalist world system after the meltdown of the iron curtain).

It is also useful to note that this handbook text has been written in the period of a gradual dismantling of a welfare state (first in Britain and then in the rest of Europe), the weakening of trade unions and loss of job security – none of which had been directly reflected in the above passage, though the following one does offer an ideological apology for a loss of job security, hailing it is an enlargement of individual freedom:

“In the past, a worker would expect to work for the same company for many years, maybe even a lifetime. Similarly, companies would hire people and keep them for a long time. Today, many companies don’t hesitate to layoff employees and employees don’t hesitate to leave if their needs are not being met.(Nickels et al., 2002, 204-5)

While this sounds true, the authors do avoid asking the question about the relative imbalance of bargaining power in case of most of the employees (those who offer a useful appearance of a symmetry in the above statement belong to relatively narrow communities of professionals and top managers). Sociological studies on a relative difference between corporate employees (as described by Whyte in his “Organization Man” in 1962) and their children (interviewed in the 1970ies and 1980ies), certainly confirm a different, less stable, predictable and less single-company bound career pattern. “The New Individualists”, who had been traced and interviewed by two members of their own generation in the 1990ies (cf. Leinberger, Tucker, 1991) do confirm that from the point of view of career paths, an “organization man” has,
Indeed, been changed into a “spider woman” (the term introduced by Rob Swigart - cf. Johnson, Swigart, 1994), i.e. career paths have become less predictable and employment less secure. However, their conclusions about personal consequences of this shift are ambiguous at best, and certainly do not simply validate ideological claim about symmetry and fairness in a social distribution of the costs of flexibility and accelerated change (lost trust, uprooting, loss of community, individual atomisation):

“The decentering of organizations in which distinctions like large-small, inside-outside, and even manager-worker are effaced is, like post-metropolitan suburbs, providing for the organization offspring yet another example of permeable boundaries, shifting nodes of power, and relational systems, in which stability is continually deferred. (…) The accelerating penetration of the organization offspring’s lives by these highly mobile and decentered systems – showing up in everything from art to popular entertainment to residential patterns to organizational structures – ineluctably draws personal artifice closer to social artificiality, rendering even more irrelevant and unsatisfying the generation’s highly psychologized brand of individualism. Moreover, as long-term changes in the social and occupational structure, long term economic stagnation, and the closing down of choice bring the search for self-fulfillment to a close, authenticity and the life of personal artifice lived in its name are being transformed. This unmooring of the generation’s individualism, coupled with the proliferation of concrete social phenomena in which identity is difference, is bringing into being among the organization offspring a new American social character; the artificial person.”(Leinberger, Tucker, 1991,350-1)

This analysis by the children of Whyte’s “organization men” is important, because no amount of mourning the loss of social capital can replace an analysis of its causes and triggering mechanisms. No amount of theorizing about diminishing trust and a slow death of spontaneous associations replaced by “bowling alone” (cf. Putnam, 2000) can replace actual analysis of the social costs of a maintenance of systematic inequalities – i.e. of both hidden and not-so-hidden injuries of a class. The power of an ideology in general, and the power of a managerialist ideology in particular depends crucially on social effect, on a general perception of a modern workplace as essentially a fair place, in which managers and employees strive for the common good in the best possible (most supportive, non-partisan) environment. Margaret Thatcher’s famous “there is no other way” sums up the overall effect a properly working ideology should have. It should present a worldview, in which tacit assumptions make managerial hierarchies appear natural and superior to any alternatives. Ideology has to convince employees deprived of the trade union protection and job security that a shock therapy (employees may be laid off any time but they are also free to leave any time) is perfectly symmetrical – namely the very same managers who lay them off also suffer, as a matter of fact managers undergo an even more revolutionary shock therapy, and have to cope with an even more difficult situation, stress and uncertainty (and they are not only laying others off – they themselves can be laid off on a short notice as well):

“Managers must earn the trust of their employees, which includes rewarding them and finding other ways to encourage them to stay in the firm. In general, management is experiencing a revolution. Managers in future are likely to be working in teams, to be evaluated by those below them as well as above, and to be assuming completely new roles in the firm.”(Nickles et al.,2002,205)
This prediction is based on an ideological view, which tends to overemphasize the egalitarian and communitarian aspects of social interactions within a contemporary business organization, while underemphasizing the authoritarian and formal aspects of employee supervision and control. In a sense, this ideological view resembles a Potomkin village, or a propaganda view of the communist society; managers are brothers and fellow-employees, friendly coaching and discreetly guiding, working arm in arm with the lowest employees. This view, in turn, is based on theoretical visions and assumptions expressed in critical, usually postmodernist studies of organizations and management (self-managing teams in loosely coupled networks coached by benevolent managers). However, these deals and visions of a more democratic and open-ended future are now being presented as “really existing organizational realities”. An organic, flexible, network-like, learning, virtual organization is perceived as an almost palpable, highly desirable alternative to the traditional, large, bureaucratic corporation. According to the theoreticians of organization, its features are already emerging from the clutter and dust of history, and “the future is ours” (that is, the future belongs to the enlightened, coach-like managers and their supportive researcher and think tanks in managerial sciences).

Intellectual capital and knowledge management are investigated and presented as being more important for competitive advantage of firms today than a financial capital (a view, incidentally, which has led many “dot.com” companies to a mass suicide when the eBusiness hype wore thin in 2001). The reason for this shift can be found in managerial studies (Drucker’s theories are a case in point), scientific journalism (Toffler has illustrated changes and shifts in a dramatic and media-tective way) and important academic contributions to the managerialist ideology in the digital age. Castells writing on a “network society” or “internet galaxy” persuades not only sociologists, Boisot writing on “information space” and “knowledge assets” appeals not only to economists, Sennett analysing the role of “respect in a world of inequality” interests not only public administrators, and Wallerstein writing on “world systems” commands not only historians’ attention. All of them try to pave the way for a more dynamic, mutable, evolutionary, partly indeterminate, open-ended, edge of the chaos view of organizing and managing. In case of Sennett and Wallerstein, they are also trying to move research communities along more critical lines, deconstructing the managerialist ideologies and their hidden injuries in local communities subjected to welfare programs (Sennett) or in systematic generation and maintenance of global inequalities (Wallerstein).

Their views, and those of many other representatives of critical management studies, are already traceable in some handbooks of management. A slightly more critical European author from the UK has this to say about leadership in a handbook on organizational change, when criticizing models of management incompatible with the empowerment policies and learning organization:

“Western thinking is still more likely to veer towards the idea that there is still one best way to lead. However, instead of trying to find a set of characteristics to describe what a successful leader is, these ideas concentrate more on how a leader ought to behave in order to be successful.”(Senior, 2002, 229)

Notice reservations about a possibility of finding “best way” and a critical suggestion that a majority of handbooks are still written from the point of view assuming that
such a way exists and can be identified. Notice also that she questions a tacit assumption that in order to have a functional organization - there must be a manager in charge, while the task of a scientist is not to question power relations or hierarchic organizations, but to provide a list of the most desirable and useful attributes for a corporate “kings”, “princes” and “barons”. The task of a scientist, suggests Senior, is to offer a set of guidelines, enabling anybody, who happens to be managing, to survive and succeed. She reflects a popular view, which corresponds to a transition comparable to a shift from Hobbes’ “Leviathan” (attributes of legitimate state power) to Machiavelli’s “Prince” (do-it-yourself manual for ambitious upstarts trying to win a throne) in political philosophies of the Renaissance. Her critical and dynamic views are based on a body of critical studies, repeatedly making their way in managerial sciences of the past twenty-five years (e.g. Weick, Burrell, Morgan, Harvey, Boje) Most of these authors were fascinated by Maturana’s and Varela’s concept of autopoiesis or Prigogine’s outline of the sciences of complexity. Most of them have also attempted to overcome the limitations of scientific methodologies bestowed by the neopositivist tradition, which assume linear equilibria and time-reversibility, obviously violated by evolutionary development of complexity, not only in organizational and social domains, but even in the natural sciences. A number of scientists and scholars have expressed their interest in methodologies allowing them to deal with complexity; suffice it to mention Marion’s model of an organization as a transitory construct “on the edge of chaos” or Alicia’s Juarrero’s studies of intentional behaviour as a complex system (cf. Marion, 1999, Juarrero, 1999), Olson’s and Eoyang’s or Beer and Nohria’s investigations of facilitators of organizational change (Olson, Eoyang, 2001, Beer, Nohria, 2000) and Alvesson’s studies of leadership and management in knowledge-intensive companies.(cf. Alvesson,1995,1996,2002) Intuitive search for variety and diversity, as safeguards against evolutionary cul-de-sac’s in organizational development had originally resulted in a limited adaptation of a hierarchic organization to the requirements of increasing diversity within. As a Canadian (female and critical) author, writing on women becoming leaders in business corporations, puts it:

“Companies chose to include women among their leaders, not simply so that they could work with women clients, but so the organization could benefit from diversity, by combining women’s and men’s perspectives into more innovative and effective business strategies. Whereas in the past, the women who fit in – who thought and acted like men – were most valued, now companies valued women who thought and acted like themselves.”(Adler, 2002, 248)

Women are promoted to the upper echelons of managerial hierarchies not only as token females for PR purposes – but also because they add to the diversity of organization, to the “ideas generating pool”, increasing its chances for survival and success in a complex and turbulent environment.(cf. Alvesson,Billing,1997) Gareth Morgan has summed these intuitions up in a title of his contribution to a collection of critical papers on organizational behaviour – “Organization as flux and transformation”. This sudden growth of interest in complexity and chaos theories and in the autopoiesis as an underlying mechanism in internally generated change and a view of organizations as self-producing systems coincided with the breakdown of the Soviet sphere of influence and the fall of communism in the years 1980 (emergence of Polish “Solidarity”) –1989 (the fall of Berlin Wall) – 1991 (formal dissolution of Soviet Union). Why was the growth of interest in open-ended complexity and flux
theories stimulated by the collapse of a stable partner of the western world on the other side of the iron curtain? Because disappearance of an ideological spectacle of the communists on the eastern side of the iron curtain mean that a show going on the western side of it also has to be changed:

“It is widely thought that the collapse of Communism in 1989 marks a great triumph of liberalism. I see it rather as marking the definitive collapse of liberalism as the defining geoculture of our world-system. Liberalism essentially promised that gradual reform would ameliorate the inequalities of the world-system and reduce the acute polarization. The illusion that this was possible within the framework of the modern world-system has in fact been a great stabilizing element, in that it legitimated the states in the eyes of their populations and promised them heaven on earth in the foreseeable future. The collapse of the Communism along with the collapse of the national liberation movements in the Third World, and the collapse of faith in the Keynesian model in the Western world were all simultaneous reflections of popular disillusionment in the validity and reality of the reformist programs each propagated. But this disillusionment, however merited, knocks the props from under popular legitimation of the states and effectively undoes any reason why their populations should tolerate the continuing and increasing polarization of our world-system.” (Wallerstein, 1999, 1-2)

Fearful symmetry of Cold War propaganda wars was based on a simple ideological-geographic vision separating a “hell” of the other side (“evil communist empire” to the east, ”evil capitalist imperialists” to the west, neutral and non-allied countries to the “south”) from a purgatory with chances for heaven on “our” side. With “hell” disappearing, with “south” and “west” partitioning what is left of the “east”, an ideological vision of heaven had to be adjusted, adapted and upgraded, re-engineered. A new, horizontal, transparent, networked, learning organization led by new change masters, had to be invented, turned into an ideology and disseminated by academic representatives of the sciences of management among managers and would-be managers (e.g. MBA students).(cf.Kanter,1983,1989)

2. Fearful symmetries and the concept of totalitarianism

Fearful symmetries of the Cold War period included the clash of ideological civilizations: the one of a communist east (“let’s abolish inequalities generated by capitalism and construct a classless society”, “rise, wretched of the earth”) and the one of a liberal west (“let us protect individuals and continue delivering growing and modernizing economy and an increasingly participative democracy”, “liberty, equality, fraternity, property and the pursuit of happiness”). The ideological juxtaposition of the western side of the iron curtain to its eastern counterpart went hand in hand with a double strategy of globally waged wars by proxy and a gradual mutual accommodation (especially with respect to restraint in political use of a nuclear threat as a result of a “mutually assured destruction”). What were the main ideological differences between the liberal and communist ideologies and how did the end of the Cold War influence the victorious, liberal one? The first and foremost difference was the invention and subsequent discarding of the concept of totalitarianism. Conceived in the service of the “western” world, threatened first by the Nazi’s, then by the Communists, it was quietly discarded in the course of the Cold
War (its discarding coincided with the wave of social and political unrest in the late 1960ies, suppressed on both sides of the iron curtain).

The second was a difference in composition of those groups, which had to foot the bill for the post-WWII modernization. In the case of the Soviet empire the heaviest price for modernization had to be paid by peasants, who had to become industrial workers or state farm employees in one or two generations. Nations forced to develop a Soviet-styled political and economic system were paying only part of this price. Large-scale terror in people’s democracies after WWII was relatively mild compared to the Bolshevik one in Russia after WWI. Unfair terms of trade with Soviet Union were less devastating than mass terror would have been. For ideological and military reasons their populations could not be exploited as harshly as Russian peasants were. In the case of the western sphere of influence the role of those who were footing the bill for modernization and industrialization was played originally by peasants, independent rural producers, who had been eliminated as a class, coerced to leave their small farms and enter the ranks of wage labour (though this process took centuries rather than decades). Increasingly, the price was also paid by native inhabitants of colonies and semi-colonies and later on by immigrants from peripheries or marginalized regions in the world. A process of continuous immigration, especially to the USA and to Western Europe is still going on, in fact, it forms a stable pattern of migration (increased and tightened border controls stimulate illegal traffic in human beings). High standards of living and lack of totalitarian and authoritarian repression form the main reasons for this global migration towards the USA and western Europe. These regions of the world got rid of the totalitarian states with the breakdown of communism. It is not unusual, however, to see totalitarian states in Asia (North Korea, Burma, China under Mao), South and Latin America (Haiti and Panama until recently, Cuba), or in Africa (Libya, Zimbabwe) and in the Middle East (Iraq, Syria, to a certain extent Iran).

The concept of totalitarianism has been introduced by Hannah Arendt, who relied on a number of thinkers linked to the critical theory of the Frankfurt school (e.g. Fromm, Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse) but it was politically and ideologically honed by Friedrich, Brzezinski and many other authors (including writers of the so-called anti-utopias: Zamyatin, Huxley, Orwell, who succeeded in communicating the dangers of surveillance technologies to broader audiences). As a result of these developments, a concept of totalitarianism acquired considerable aesthetic and moral significance. Arendt tried to forge a philosophical category allowing her to understand the horrors of Nazi Germany and, to a lesser extent, of Communist Russia. At the same time she continued a critique of modern technology in service of a ruthless state (echoing Heideggerian critique of technology, hardly surprising in his former student and intimate friend), whose power elite evades control of civil societies exercised through legitimate institutions (echoing Rousseau’s critique of progress in sciences and arts, which strengthens the state but does not improve individual quality of life measured in friendships rather than in material possessions). Her successors, most notably Friedrich and Brzezinski, however, were less interested in historical background and more in a theoretical “umbrella” covering Soviet Russia after 1917, Nazi Germany after 1933, People’s Republic of China after 1949, and satellite regimes set up by the Russians in central and eastern Europe after 1945. They wanted an ideological weapon for a hot period of the cold war (from Churchill’s Fulton speech in 1947 to death of Stalin in 1953). Some critics go as far as to suggest that:
“The CIA is said to have financed the Congress for Cultural Freedom in order to spread the critique of totalitarianism and thereby close off any temptation to seek a third way that would avoid the polarities of the cold war.”(Howard, 2002,104)

A standard definition of totalitarianism has thus become linked to a concept of a modern state, with a single dominant ideology (reducing all explanations to a single mechanism – for instance class or race struggle), single mass party (mobilizing the masses for public displays of support), and an individual (Stalin, Mao, Hitler) or collective (political bureau of the communist party) dictator. The ruling party in a totalitarian state controls all domains of social life – economic activities, political institutions, repressive forces (police, secret police and the military), and culture (communications, traditions, education, etc.). Due to modern technology – “big brother is watching you” – these modern dictatorships differ from historically earlier ones. They have a much higher chance of suppressing all dissent and efficiently controlling the masses – they have, in other words, a chance of being truly totalitarian. The lot of their subjects differs from the lot of western citizens – the latter are not controlled to the same extent in their daily lives by secret police or party officials, they can exercise many more rights and legally question judgement of elected officials, they are not forced to express political support for a single party and can freely choose whether to do so and in what way, they are protected by the legal system and enjoy a much more efficient economy. This concept performed a very useful role in the first period of direct confrontations of the Cold War, from the end of WWII to the first “thaw” after Krushchev’s secret speech denouncing Stalin in 1953, a popular revolt in Hungary and Poland in 1956 and a beginning of a peaceful competition and coexistence (1956-1960). However, it clearly outlived its usefulness with the emergence of a mature phase of a stabilized and somewhat moderated Cold War. In this stage of the Cold War, it became clear that:

“Although justified as an unavoidable fight to death between the crusading, mutually exclusive universalist ideologies of communism and capitalism, the Cold War developed into a self-interested super-power charade, a cosy condominium for which both the Soviet Union and the United States were prepared to settle.”(Pearson,2002,192)

This de facto settlement between the superpowers did not abolish an ideological competition for hearts and minds of individuals both in their and their enemy’s camp. Neither did it diminish the difference between the pace of knowledge development and implementation in both superpowers, visualized in their space and defense programs. As the history of Silicon Valley clearly indicates, odds were in favour of the USA at the expense of Soviet Union, which could only secure a rough parity in military industry (and only up to a point, before the last generation of smart weaponry was being developed), and could not detect, stimulate and implement innovation and change, particularly with respect to the spill-over of the results of military research into non-military areas (missing, for instance, the entire information and communication technology revolution, or the computerization and internetization of society). However, this space and armaments race and its symmetry in a worlds of two superpowers did render the concept of totalitarianism less useful and tempting for ideologues and PR specialists of all sorts of campaigns. A contemporary standard encyclopaedia states that:
“By 1960s there was a sharp decline in the concept’s popularity among scholars. Subsequently, the decline in Soviet centralization after Stalin, research into Nazism revealing significant inefficiency and improvisation, and the Soviet collapse may have reduced the utility of the concept to that of an ideal or abstract type. In addition, constitutional democracy and totalitarianism, as forms of modern state, share many characteristics. In both, those in authority may have a monopoly on the use of the nation’s military power and on certain forms of mass communication; and the suppression of dissent, especially during times of crisis, often occurs in democracies as well. Moreover, one-party systems are found in some non-totalitarian states, as are government-controlled economies and dictators.” (The Columbia Encyclopaedia, 2002)

Thus already in the 1960ies, the concept has become less popular, especially in view of the mass repressions against large scale student and anti-war demonstrations and the abuse of modern surveillance techniques revealed, among others, in the Watergate affair. Moreover, the all-pervasive politicisation of all spheres of life and the subjection of individuals to an equally omnipresent state control and surveillance appeared to generate a political apathy not dissimilar to the apathy generated by the privatisation, individualization, and atomisation of a mass consumer society. The latter, contrary to the brief interlude of the late 1960ies (student and youth protests did shatter the established political parties in the USA, France, Italy and Germany, but did not damage them, neither did they reclaim their entire constituencies), is supposed to have generated behaviours incompatible with the logic of collective action. With the collapse of the eastern side of global political stage divided by the iron curtain, the concept of totalitarianism, quietly laid to rest in ideological arsenals, became a potentially dangerous weapon. Similar to the leaking containers with radioactive waste left in the production process of nuclear weapons, it is threatening with explosion among other critical concepts in social sciences, as soon as analogies between totalitarian controls of the totalitarian states and bio-political controls of firms, companies, organizations or institutions in non-totalitarian states become exposed. This fact did not go unnoticed among the authors of the post-communist left in critical social studies:

“When, in the midst of cold war, the concept of totalitarianism was introduced into political science, it only touched on extrinsic elements of the question. In its most coherent form the concept of totalitarianism was used to denounce the destruction of the democratic public sphere, the continuation of Jacobinist ideologies, the extreme forms of racist nationalism, and the negation of market forces. The concept of totalitarianism, however, ought to delve much more deeply into the real phenomena and at the same time give a better explanation of them. In fact, totalitarianism consists not simply in totalizing effects of social life and subordinating them to a global disciplinary norm, but also in the negation of social life itself, the erosion of its foundations, and the theoretical and practical stripping away of the very possibility of the existence of the multitude. What is totalitarian is the organic foundation and the unified source of society and the state. The community is not a dynamic collective creation but a primordial founding myth.” (Hardt, Negri, 2000, 112-113)

“Capitalism and totalitarian ideology have a common source, they share a foundation: that dynamic, mobile history that carries the constant threat of the new. On the other
hand, we do not understand yet why and how really existing totalitarianism comes into existence. We know that its seed (or ideological possibility) is born with modernity and the capitalist revolution, but we don’t know what revolution is needed to overcome and eliminate capitalism.” (Howard, 2002, 117-118)

If the abovementioned authors are right (and they are basically repeating a more cautious and neutral comment made by the authors of the entry in the Columbia encyclopaedia, albeit with on a more critical note), the main danger of applying the concept of totalitarianism today is linked to the universalization of the principle that “Big Brother is watching you” in all modern organizations (because it might reveal the Cold War lessons learned on the western side of the iron curtain from their eastern counterparts) and to the increasing visibility (and ability to articulate their demands) of those groups, which are footing the bill for a social development and change (because it might demonstrate the Cold War lessons learned on the western side of the iron curtain in stimulating and managing learned ignorance about those, who bear the real costs of modernization – by rendering them as silent and invisible as, for instance, fresh waves of immigrants). Awareness of the first danger allows us to detect efforts at the control of an employee through trust, commitment and motivation rather than (though often coupled with) through external surveillance and to increase a level of voluntary participation and input of employees.

Attempts to apply the concept of totalitarianism to the degree and scope of control of every individual in a contemporary consumer society often lead to surprising discoveries about “silent takeovers” of the world by multinational corporations, about the dictatorship of the “company logos” on screens, pages and billboards, or about the colonization of the “Lebenswelt” by imperial armies of “markets” and “states” (cf. Habermas, 1981, 2002). Some authors note advances made by the western consumer society towards an almost “total” domination of an individual’s social environment (similar to the one visualised in “Truman Show” and theoretically developed by Herbert Marcuse in “One-dimensional Society”, a cult book of the 1968 generation). According to some authors, we are totally dominated by a “market populism” (cf. Frank, 2000) and move around in an impoverished social world. This social world has been macdonalized, malled and lasvegasified (these terms have been introduced by G. Ritzer, 1996, 1999, 2001) – and its inhabitants systematically denied a freedom of choice and deprived of meaningful alternatives. While the situationist critique and Debord’s “The Society of the Spectacle” might be considered the first warnings against totalitarian “show” run on the western side of the iron curtain, some of the latest exhortations to break the velvet and glass cage of individualized consumption appear to express a growing uneasiness of intellectuals (mostly professionals, and mostly academic) in the western, capitalist part of the world stage, on which the iron curtain suddenly melted down. This western part of the stage had turned into a dominant world order after the breakdown of the most significant “Other”, i.e. institutionalised, not entirely converge-able, socialist counter-project of modernization:

“Because global capitalism is now its own Other – due to the trans-national displacement of its major corporations – its domestic politics soon display a paranoid combination of elite distance and populist presence that undermines citizenship and civic politics.(…) In the name of an absent capital god we are being asked to break the civic covenant, to fragment our communities, to exit from the city in order to
reconnect in an abstractive, vertical union with our global other in the world’s finance, film and fashion houses.’ (O’Neill, 2002, 83, 87)(2)

The new ideological twist is that these demands are voiced in the name of an increasingly rapid organizational change, which is romanticized into a countercultural social movement. A metaphor of a long march through the institutions consciously alludes to the original “long march” of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army led by Mao Dze Dong, and to the use made of this historical process by the young student demonstrators of 1968, who were also calling for a “long march” of the New Left through the institutional politics of their respective societies. This march has sometimes bore fruit; an evolution of Joshka Fischer from an angry radical leftist demonstrator on streets of Frankfurt through a deputy for the Green party to a provincial parliament in Hessen to a position of Germany’s foreign minister in a government based on an alliance between social democrats and the “greens” – is a case in point. Nevertheless, this double hint – at the old left’s historical process and new left’s ideological metaphor, demonstrates the attempt to romanticize the apology of a major restructuring and a successive modernizing wave of the western market economies:

“Like community organizing, organizational change is a numbers game: a few early enthusiasts to carry the message, then a building of critical mass until even avoiders can no longer remain in denial. There are always holdouts, there is always pushback (Is she serious? Will he fold?), so maintaining the momentum for the long march makes a difference. When changemasters are successful, what started as a rogue initiative – an opportunity that one person seized – becomes a real option, then the norm, and ultimately embedded everywhere.” (Kanter, 2002, 283)(3)

This ideological use of the radical leftist idiom in the publications of the mainstream authors in the sciences of management (Rosabeth Moss Kanter quotes Giddens, who, in turn, advises Tony Blair) is coupled with a fairly elitist view of the corporate meritocracy needed by business companies. This corporate meritocracy – romanticized as “talent wars” - is presented as a generational populism: the ideal new employee is free of constraints imposed by his or her age, gender, race, class or geographical roots, is perfectly mobile and adapts to a flexible, mutable organizational forms. He or she is a perfect “artificial” creative person, freely re-engineering himself or herself within changeable organizational context and flexible individualism. Leinberger and Tucker were discovering these new individualists among children of “organization in grey flannel suits”:

“An Interim Services/Harris poll found that the new-breed employees are more concerned with gaining new experiences and having opportunities for mentoring and growth. Traditional workers, in contrast, are more concerned with job security, stability and clear direction. (….) Autonomy and freedom to roam are Internet Age values.” (Kanter, 2002, 199-200).

Kanter is probably unaware of the fact that her ideological arguments echo those of the French revolutionaries, who claimed that abolishing the hereditary offices and aristocratic privilege they were offering a chance for talented individuals from lower social classes for an open, often brilliant career, or at least an upward social mobility. (4) She is probably even less aware of the fact that her mantras about
communities in cyberspace testify to the romantic ideal of a lost paradise of a humanized organization. This true organizational community should somehow be magically reconstructed due to the power of modern technology and it should be able to go together with an increasingly “total” experience of life and work in changing business companies:

“The mental boundaries of community can be stretched to encompass more people in more places. That builds the cosmopolitan sensibilities and awareness of multiple audiences needed for the innovators and collaboronauts.”(5)

Is experience of a total closing of a true workplace community, and of the ultimate uprooting of the mobile workforce, which should prefer a challenge of change to a security of stability an indicator of a totalitarian temptation on the winning side of the former iron curtain? Awareness of this totalitarian danger is necessary if we want to see the possibility of counter-mobilization of those, who are forced to pay the real costs of an economic development and change, of those, on whose underpaid and overburdened shoulders successive phases of rejuvenation and reengineering had been brought to a successful end; peasants, immigrants, women, refugees. All of them conduct a war for recognition (cf. Honneth, 1992), and their failure may signal to us the proximity of a totalitarian danger in our modes of organizing and our ideologies of organisationalism, which are being modified in the course of the new waves of conflicts.

Often termed the war for recognition in the political institutions (a recognition of a systematic discrimination, for instance) and for a subsequent redistribution of wealth (along the lines already tested by the ecologists, anti-racists or feminists), these new social and political conflicts are increasingly assuming a form of a demand for a full citizenship in a global community or of a demand for a more transparent democratisation of business corporations (it is no coincidence that a serious increase in top managers’ salaries in the 1990ies was accompanied by a demand of social democrats to make salaries and bonuses of all managers known to all employees). Neither such citizenship nor such democratic community exist at present – but turning the concept of totalitarianism against a particular mix of economic, political and cultural driving forces behind the recent ideology of “privatisation” and “globalization” has already started, both theoretically (cf. Lash, Featherstone, 2002) and practically (in anti-globalist demonstrations against “corporate totalitarianism” in Seattle, Genua, or Washington, and also in a search for a political articulation of demands for democratisation and identity in Asia, Africa, Middle East and South America). Corporate response can be measured in gradual introduction of corporate codes of ethics, stakeholder analysis and social audits – all of which are being much more prominently present in handbooks of business management after the fall of communism. Even if most of them are still left to the discretion of top managers, there is a growing awareness that some organized stakeholders may make it difficult for corporations to avoid damage to their reputations as a result of unethical actions:

“Is there any way to measure whether organizations are making social responsibility an integral part of top management’s decision making? The answer is yes, and the term that represents that measurement is social auditing.(…) In addition to the social audits conducted by the companies themselves, there are four types of groups that serve as watchdogs regarding how well companies enforce their ethical and social
responsibility policies: socially conscious investors (...), environmentalists (...), union officials (...), customers.”(Nikels et al., 2002,110)(6)

The above quotation demonstrates an interesting ideological argument. According to the author, business companies’ top management has decided to make “social responsibility” part and parcel of an integrated decision-making procedure. That this claim comes at the time of a widespread unemployment resulting from corporations’ quest for cost reduction and globally competitive strategies, is not mentioned, neither are direct (benefits) and indirect (social disruption, pathologies) costs of this unemployment for a society at large. Presumably the social audit testifies to a wise pre-emptive action on the part of the corporations and their leaders. Likewise, emergence of “watchdogs” outside of the companies themselves is being mentioned as a complementary addition to the voluntary decision on the part of top management. Managers audit themselves, but they do not oppose those, who want to audit them without a pro-company, in-group bias. Needless to say, this presentation reverses the chronological sequence for ideological purposes: in reality, the emergence of those watchdogs preceded and caused the adoption of the so-called social audits by managers of large companies. These audits are not a reversible form of charity, but a rational choice and pre-emptive action. Nike had to suffer as a result of negative publicity generated by watchdogs screening the labor relations in Vietnam and in the Philippines, in order to undertake a preventive action. General Electric had to suffer as a result of environmental activists protesting the pollution levels of Hudson river by a GE plant in order to introduce pre-emptive checks and balances. Tommy Hilfiger had to suffer as a result of allegedly racist marketing strategies in order to notice the necessity for observing the rules of an equal opportunity employer. McDonald’s had to face publicized law suits because of unfair anti-trade union policies and negligence in observing the environmental standards in waste disposal in order to start evolving. Predicting future strategies of pre-emptive action on the part of top managers can thus be better facilitated by critical studies of managerial behaviour under the influence of external “watchdogs” than by listing codes of corporate conduct and procedures for a social audit.

In case of Europe, predictions concerning future strategies of top political management of the European Union can be seen as attempts to understand an emerging economic and political multi-state corporation, whose top management also proclaims an equivalent of a social audit in decision making, but is also spectacularly unsuccessful in combating unemployment and tackling the problem of immigrants, in spite of the fact that ideological fears of a huge wave of migrant labour from the former communist countries failed to materialize and immigrants from Asia and Africa find it increasingly difficult to settle in Europe.

3. Egaliberty, hidden injuries of Cold War and Europe’s enlargement

Hidden injuries of Cold War can be detected by tracing a sudden shift of focus in political debates after the Cold War. The end of the Cold War meant the end of a choice, either for those in the east, in the west or in the south. Before 1989 one could choose (at least theoretically and sometimes politically) between state socialism and anti-colonial struggle for national liberation or state capitalism and anti-totalitarian struggle for democratization. After 1989 all states were left with capitalism and democracy. If there is no meaningful choice to be made between the authoritarian...
communist and the liberal capitalist systems any more, then what is there to choose between? Nothing, said neoliberals in their quest for privatisation of public assets. There is no other way. The only choices must be made within the only surviving system, namely the liberal capitalist one. This has led many ideologues of the “west” to a conclusion that history conceived as a blind and chaotic search and struggle waged by human societies for a relatively competitive mix of political and economic institutions has ended. Thus the economists, consultants and investors descended upon the former communist countries with the first package of “shock therapies” designed to construct a neoliberal version of market economies. Thus Fukuyama announced the end of history exhorting the ultimate victory of a market economy/parliamentary democracy mix of the present “west” over all the “rest” of known and imagined mixes.(cf. Fukuyama, 1992) From now on, according to Fukuyama, there will be no fundamental struggle about such mixes, since only one has survived, clearly outliving and outperforming its rivals. It does not mean that there will be no wars – but they will be pre-class wars, wars about values, God and glory (for instance a clash of a Christian and a Muslim civilization, or a war on drugs or against terrorism). In other words, breakdown of state socialism makes the world safer for the ruling class in the capitalist system. Only neoliberal projects count. Those, who would like to side with the underdogs and to construct a counter-system or counter-movement more conducive to egaliberty, have yet to construct a viable alternative. This is true both with respect to the left ideologues and leftist social scientists, or even those representatives of the academic communities, who’s sense of fairness prompts them to look for egalibertarian solutions. In view of persistent inequalities, ideologues of the “postmodernist left” complain:

“Could we have stumbled upon one reason why class is invariably named but rarely theorized or developed in the multiculturalist mantra “race, class, gender, sexuality”?“(Brown,1995,61)(7)

Social scientists do not offer an unequivocal answer. Most of them would agree with a representative of critical social sciences, who concludes that:

“Capitalism has continually transformed itself to the point that we no longer have a viable alternative to it. Indeed capitalism is now victorious not only in the West, but also on a global scale. In this context, the demise of a revolutionary politics that could realize an alternative system seems to be marked by: the decline of socialism as an alternative systemic doctrine, the collapse of communism, the decline of the working class as a numerical and political force, the increasing disconnection between class and politics, the rise of social and cultural movements, including ecology politics and feminism, whose political claims are reformist.(…) Nevertheless, class still does structure lives, as we may see clearly when we explore the inequalities of major western cities.”(Barker, 2002,175)(8)

This meant, among others, that the only strategy for healing the wounds Cold War had left on the European continent was to incorporate former GDR into the Federal Republic of Germany, re-building Berlin as a new capital, more centrally located than either Paris or London, and carefully preserving picturesque scars left by the wall and partition) and to incorporate the former Soviet satellite countries into the European Union and NATO. The latter has been perceived as a post-Yalta healing process and as a rebuilding of the ideal Europe constructed on a fundament of the Greek
philosophy, Roman law and Christian religion, secularised by political revolutions, industrialization and urbanization. The difference between the two processes consisted of the fact that in the former, a single state designed a special agency for privatisation of the dissolved state’s assets (Treuhand), extended its bureaucracies eastwards, but within the same national borders and included new citizens in political processes. In the latter case, the eastward expansion of the European Union included not only a preliminary process of privatisation of former state assets, and went beyond simple adjustment of legal and political systems of relevant nation-states to the EU norms. It also involved an ongoing adjustment and re-engineering of the European Union itself and dealing with the learned ignorance about new candidate states in the older ones. The Cold War stereotype of poor, enslaved, totalitarian societies under the evil spell of a Soviet empire has survived the meltdown of the iron curtain – and has been resuscitated by the media, which played on subconscious fears that the new member states’ unemployed form a threat to the stability and welfare of the older EU members. While a repetition of the French defeatist slogan from 1939 – “on ne veut pas mourir pour Gdansk” – is impossible due to the NATO obligations, a considerable number of citizens in western European societies does not want to contribute to social benefits of Gdansk citizens either (on ne veut pas payer pour Gdansk).

The paradox of these negative stereotypes, which form scars of the Cold War in social consciousness of the Western European societies, consists of the fact that they can only be tackled by the political elites acting to prevent future European conflicts. For instance by changing the educational contents of history handbooks, along the lines practiced by French-German and Polish-German commissions (so that history cannot be used for nationalist populist mobilization). For instance by more extensive exchange of media contents between older and new members of the EU (so that learned ignorance of the Cold War can disappear). However, political elites do not necessarily have to be interested in egalibertarian solutions, since this could undermine their privileged status. They are much more interested in expert consulting and in managerial sciences, which provide quantifiable advice, not in a broader, more humanist, more multi-paradigmatic context of contemporary social sciences. What do they need, if they are to respond to their constituencies in a sensitive way? What do they need if they are to confront hidden injuries of Cold War, of which negative bias towards citizens of the former communist countries is the most serious one? What do they need if they are to construct an egalibertarian framework for an enlarged European Union? A critical voice from research communities? An advice from scientific communities, in which representatives of social sciences and of managerial specialties communicate and collaborate in spite of paradigmatic differences would certainly be much more useful than an expert report limited by bureaucratic frameworks and a consultant’s project limited by client’s demands. Is it possible to find a scientific community, which views its role as a social movement in social sciences and is able to furnish above type of advice in spite of serious paradigmatic, ideological and other divisions?

It will be difficult to find one among research communities in the sciences of management. The latter are still biased and usually follow an old ideological strategy from the Cold War period. It prompts them to design such research programs in the “west” that can measure consumer satisfaction or even, in most ambitious cases, the level of happiness or individual and collective corrections to remedy “the loss of happiness in market democracies”.

It prompts them to design such research
programs in the “east” or “south” that can measure the distance, which the “rest” of human societies has to cover to begin approximating the “western” societies (tacitly assuming that the western societies are either neutrally waiting for the rest to catch up or even assisting them, never slowing this catching-up process down or keeping it in a low gear).

In the case of the European Union, there is at least an institutionalised procedure and a political process, which can lead towards a gradual inclusion of the former communist states in the EU and can guarantee a degree of assistance (although even here the “intermediate” measures guarantee the spreading of a catching-up process over 10 to 15 years and a less than full member status for the newcomers). However, in the case of the USA, the hidden injuries of the Cold War assume a more subtle form among academic representatives of social sciences. Some scientists and ideologues look for an ideological justification of systemic global inequalities persisting in spite of the neo-liberal programs and try the strategy of “blaming the victim”. Lawrence Harrison and Samuel Huntington are a case in point. Having decided that competitive ideological and scientific explanations of the growing gaps between richer and poorer nations, between democracies and non-democratic political systems cannot be any longer explained with the “traditional” concepts of “imperialism”, “dependency” or “racism” (they do not explain why, but a reader may conclude that a breakdown of a rival system, whose ideology was based on a class analysis of the capitalist democracies, invalidates the scientific premises of defeated ideology), they focus on another possible explanation of these differences, namely “cultural values”. These collective cultural softwares of human societies are allegedly responsible for some of them accelerating their economic growth and raising living standards to the western levels and for the others’ failure to do so. Huntington and Harrison invited – among others – Inglehart, Landes, Porter, Sachs and Fukuyama to a conference entitled “Culture Matters” at the Harvard University and duly published the proceedings of it. Comparing South Korea and Ghana in the 1960ies and 1990ies, Huntington opens the proceedings by contrasting similar levels of economic performance displayed by South Korea and Ghana in the 1960ies and enormous differences among the two in the 1990ies:

“No such changes occurred in Ghana, whose per capita GNP was now about one-fifteenth that of South Korea. How could this extraordinary difference in development be explained? Undoubtedly, many factors played a role, but it seemed to me that culture had to be a large part of the explanation. South Koreans valued thrift, investment, hard work, education, organization, and discipline. Ghanaians had different values. In short, cultures count.” (Harrison, Huntington, 2000.XIII)(11)

In short, South Koreans had a proper cultural software and were admitted to the close circle of the most advanced economies, while Ghanians failed to work hard enough, because their cultural software did not exert sufficient motivating influence upon them. They were lazy, corrupt and inefficient. (They also had no communist-dominated Ghana neatly separated by an iron curtain and were not close to either Russia or China). This ideological approach in cultural inferiority of economically less developed nations is a very widespread common sense belief of most of the middle and low class Western Europeans facing the central and east European nation-states ascending to the European Union. Nobody mentions the Marshall plan, the wartime destruction or the inefficient centralized economic system imposed on
citizens of the states in central and Eastern Europe. Psychologically, it is much more comfortable for the majority of the population in Western Europe to attribute economic disparities to cultural softwares and to virtuous behaviour influenced by them (or a lack thereof). Public opinion is not easily mobilized in support of the enlargement of the EU, which remains to a large extent a work of the political elites in nation-states. Harrison’s and Huntington’s view reflects a popular belief, polished into an ideology and legitimised with a research program into honesty in the advanced economies and corruption in the least developed ones. Unfortunately, there was no critical response from within an academic community. Is this perhaps due to the fact that “professional science” with managerial hierarchies and paradigmatic consensuality has overshadowed “citizen science”(12) and tends to be dogmatic and authoritarian? Should we take heed of emergent social and intellectual movements, for instance critical management studies, and see them as;

““flexibly organized cognitive praxes” that produce knowledge for enabling and disabling certain transformations of social life”(Fuller,2000,403)

Should we start viewing the European integration as a chance to network these movements in alternative patterns of meaningful cooperation? Shouldn’t we pay more attention to historical analogies noticed between Rostow’s hot Cold War ideological manifesto “Stages of Economic Growth”, Kuhn’s cool Cold War ideological manifesto (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions) and Fukuyama’s post-Cold War “The End of History and the Last Man”(13)? Perhaps we could thus contribute to an unravelling of a messy knot of the hidden injuries of Cold War in the period of European integration and would not be condemned to wonder, as Huntington does in a foreword to “Culture Matters”, quoting Robert Klitgaard, why, in spite of fundamental role played by cultural matters, there are no mature theories of culture with advanced empirical research programs and managerial procedures for developmental work on a global scale?

Notes

(1) Contrasting liberals and democrats in the European political history between 1848 and 1968, Immanuel Wallerstein writes that the latter “have traditionally argued that there can be no liberty except within a system based on equality, since unequal persons cannot have equal ability to participate in collective decisions. They have also argued that unfree persons cannot be equal, since this implies a political hierarchy that thereby translates itself into social inequality. This has
recently been given a conceptual label of egaliberty (or equaliberty) as a singular process.” (Wallerstein, 1999,96). He adds, however, that “few of the self-proclaimed left have been ready to make egaliberty their theme of popular mobilization, out of the very same fear that has made liberals insist on process and competence; fear that the people, given full rein, will act irrationally, meaning in a fascist or racist fashion.” (ibid.)

(2) O’Neill continues: “Meanwhile, the sweatshops, the refugee camps and the prisons, do not close; exploitation and violation do not cease, hunger does not abate. We are asked to close our minds, to harden our hearts and not to cry out.” (op.cit...p.87)

(3) Prophetic praise of the forthcoming chameleon-like form of business organization continues with the internet-supported eBusiness as the refrain: “Effectiveness online is backed by strong relationship offline.(…) The best businesses involve this new individualism, operating more like communities – with fluid boundaries, voluntary action, stakeholders who feel like members, a shared identity and culture, collective strength, and community responsibility.(…) The challenge is social evolution: to develop shared consciousness of the human community.” (Kanter, 2001,287)

(4) One can compare the neoliberalist arguments, which the underlie Kanter’s romanticized arguments about the new work force, to the ones expressed by liberals piggybacking on the French revolution and announcing “la carriere ouverte aux talents”. Wallerstein, who noted this analogy, noticed elitist consequences of waging a revolution in the name of the whole “people”, but rewarding selectively a much more definable and manageable group – of those with talent, to whom career path will be opened.(cf. Wallerstrein, 1999,91)

(5) “Organizations need to become more like communities. But they should not do that at the expense of the rest of community life. We need to nurture the places where families bond, children go to school, amateur sports teams practice, artists create, religious rituals and personal milestones are celebrated and people meet outside of their work roles and help each other.” (Kanter, 2001,299)

(6) Interestingly enough, recent revival of interest in George Orwell is based on a recognition of the latter’s simultaneous taking sides with the underdogs of imperialism, fascism and Stalinism. “By staying true to what he had won by way of his colonial experience, and to the way he had confirmed it by his sojourns among the empire’s internal helots (…), Orwell was in a stronger position to feel viscerally as well as intellectually about the modernist empires of Nazism and Stalinism.” (Hitchens,2002,5)  

(7) This fragment has been quoted by Žižek in his essay “Class Struggle or postmodernism?”, where he claims that “The problem of today’s
philosophico-political scene is ultimately best expressed by Lenin’s old question “What is to be done?” – how to reassert, on the political terrain, the proper dimensions of the act? (...) This resistance against the act seems to be shared across a wide spectrum of (officially) opposed philosophical positions. Four philosophers as different as Derrida, Habermas, Rorty and Dennett would probably adopt the same left-of-the-centre liberal democratic stance in practical political decisions. (...) What if there is an unacknowledged proximity between them? And what if the task today is precisely to break with this terrain of shared promises?” (Žižek, 2000, 128-9)

(8) While radicals and representatives of the new left mourn the neoliberal excesses, they meet representatives of the academic establishment, who moved towards the liberal centre, but occasionally respond to their ideological sympathies. Thus, for instance, Habermas, when commenting on Herbert Marcuse’s inspiring role in 1967-1968, mourns the fact that “we can no longer tell whether the democratic conception of a society that realizes itself through the will and consciousness of its united citizens has come to resemble an endearingly old-fashioned utopia, or a dangerous one. In league with a pessimistic anthropology, neoliberalism makes us daily more familiar with a new world order where social inequalities and exclusions count as facts of nature once more.” (Habermas, 2001, 162). A representative of the postmodern left academics in the USA comes to similar conclusions: “If Marxism had any analytical value for political theory, was it not in the insistence that the problem of freedom was contained in the social relations implicitly declared unpolitical – that is naturalized – in liberal discourse?” (Brown, 1995, 14)

(9) Some researchers express their passionate protest against this academic isolationism of managerial sciences: “The separation of business subjects from social science, of management from the human and behavioural sciences, of organization theory from sociology, has created a lesion which has virtually lobotomised whole areas of intellectual endeavour. Philosophy, art, literature, history and cultural studies have all become disconnected from the analysis of management. These disciplines are not often classified as social sciences anyway but the contemporary schisms within the social sciences have allowed business teachers to escape without any real sensitivity to the issues raised by the humanities.” (Burrell, 1997, 185)

(10) This is the exact title of a study by Robert Lane, a political scientist from Yale, who echoes Rousseau in seeing the increase of material prosperity as a factor eroding solidarities, communities and – generally speaking subjective well-being. Not surprisingly, his suggestions are limited to an individual economy of time; each individual should increase the amount of “quality time” building relationships at the expense of a rat race for material welfare. (cf. Lane, 2000)
(11) Huntington clearly melts managerialist ideology with an attempt to impose a post-Cold War dogma on developmental policies: “This book explores how culture in this subjective sense affects the extent to which and the ways in which societies achieve or fail to achieve progress in economic development and political democratisation. (…) The key issue thus is whether the political leadership can substitute for disaster in stimulating cultural change.” (Harrison, Huntington, 2000, XV)

(12) “In the social sciences, conceptual and technical innovations originating in one tradition are typically picked up and refashioned by other traditions, so as to convey an overall sense of history as multiple, partially intersecting trajectories. Indeed, just this cross-fertilization has historically given the social sciences an appearance of a field fraught with unresolvable ideological differences. However, from the social movement approach to knowledge production I advocate, this is a good thing. It means that the universal value represented by “science” starts to resemble that of ‘democracy’, in that both may flourish in a variety of social settings but, at the same time, must be actively maintained and renewed because of the ease with which the ideal can turn corrupt, especially as particular sciences or particular democracies become victims of their own success, e.g. governments whose mass popularity renders them authoritarian, sciences whose consensuality renders them dogmatic.” (Fuller, 2000, 418)

(13) ibid., pp. 258-9. Fuller duly notes that analogy between a Kuhnian scientific revolution initiated by followers of a new paradigm and Rostow’s concept of an economic “take-off” has already been pointed out by Pocock (cf. Pocock, 1973, 13 ff.). Comparing the two to Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis is Fuller’s contribution to the mapping of the hidden injuries of Cold War in science, political philosophy and ideology.

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