“A dollar love had good intentions, a clear conscience, and to hell with everybody.”
From Graham Greene’s *The Quiet American*, 1962, p. 62

This study is an exploration of the encroachment of an ideal typical worker of American industrial hegemony. It included the content analysis of management texts authored by former presidents of the Academy of Management up to the early 1960s, and archival material of the early Academy (1936-1960). We argue that the contributions and musings of these men of the early Academy reflected and reinforced a particular notion of the worker that emerged in post-World War II America. This ideal typical worker served the interests of an emergent military industrial complex and the elite of business and government, which manoeuvred labour union leadership into complicity. These interests counted on the compliance of a frightened American public in order to entrench an industrial hegemony that concentrated power in a corporatist elite. What resulted was a compliant, enculturated, and self-actualizing worker ready to take his place in the bureaucracies of the tripartite corporatism (government, business, and labour).

While largely constructed from pre-existing American values, this ideal typical worker was shaped by the Cold War discourse and the socio-political events at home and abroad, particularly in the period from the late 1940s to the early 1960s, but also during WW II and earlier. A conception of an autonomous worker was reinforced by economic theory that emphasized the superiority of the private enterprise economy, by behaviouralism that emphasized individual action, and by organization theory with its excessive emphasis on individualism and self-development. Individualism and autonomy encouraged a focus on what the individual could do to improve their own situation, removing the need to question the efficacy of the ‘system’ or to examine the possibility of collective solutions. In addition, real opposition or divergent opinion was suppressed with the repression of the American Communist Party and other more moderate elements in the labour movement, academia, the public service, and wherever it existed among the American citizenry. Collective action other than within the organizational setting became perceived as unnecessary or, more seriously, as anti-American and unlawful.

The Academy of Management’s ‘founding’ coincided with some of the greatest challenges of the 20th century beginning with its conception in the Great Depression, its ‘renaissance’ following WWII, and its truly formative period in the early Cold War. We argue that the words of the pioneers of the Academy should be examined in context since these seminal works were influential in the formative development of the burgeoning business academy, and of the students
and teachers, who would disseminate this world-view widely. The Academy’s scholars were inevitably affected by the swirl of events and by their personal experiences, themselves shaped by prior experience. Moreover, the ‘founders’ set the tone for the modern Academy, for the rapidly increasing numbers of business schools and for the management texts to follow at a time when to adopt anything but a free market, capitalist perspective – constructed on notions of democracy, individualism, universality and unity – was tantamount to subversion. As a result, the Academy became uncritically reproductive of the dominant power order characterizing American society in the early Cold War as demonstrated by their presentations and musings to each other, as well as by their texts which, in some cases were to be the foundational texts of management education for decades.

In *The Quiet American*, the protagonist is described as “impregnably armoured by his good intentions and his ignorance” (Greene, 1962). As with Pyle’s motives toward the young Vietnamese woman, we need not question the sincerity of the honestly stated objectives of those advocating a particular world-view during the polarized conflict of the Cold War. However, we should not stand aside when the outcome has been a limited rendering of the ideal worker which became, and remains, dominant, precluding other notions of the worker and his or her relation to work and organization, or questions of what the work does to the worker (Schumacker, 1979).

While *The Quiet American* was the literary and political superior, *The Ugly American* (Lederer & Burdick, 1958) which followed a year later, was the bestseller, read by the likes of Dwight Eisenhower and influential in the values of the Peace Corp. *The Ugly American* proposed small scale projects and non-interventionist support of indigenous people-led causes (Nashel, 2000) in which the protagonists went in to the field to show the natives how to do it and in which unexceptional proposals to improve the Foreign Service were offered. However, it displayed a naivety of the military context and the intensity of nationalist feelings (Whitfield, 1996). In retrospect, the novel revealed an ugly truth of American military, economic and cultural hegemony as the small-scale, non-interventionist support of the literary ideal gave way to large-scale military and economic intervention. Apparently, the Academy of Management was not immune to such manipulation. For instance, in 1965, Robert S. McNamara, “one of the greatest managers to ever come down the pike,” was a nominee for the first ever Academy of Management Award “for his theoretical and practical contributions to management” (Suojanen, 1965). In addition to his tenure at the Ford Motor Company, McNamara also held the position of Secretary of Defense, in which his faith in modernization was epitomized by his efforts to build an electronic barrier between North and South Vietnam. As a form of intervention into a developing nation, this high-tech fence was exactly the kind of large scale aggressive import that Lederer and Burdick (1958) opposed in *The Ugly American*. It represented the many cynical manipulations in which modernization projects to aid developing nations were turned to military ends (Nashel, 2000).

### The Early Academy of Management

The Academy of Management, humbly inaugurated by a small group of ten “university teachers of management” (Jamison, 1936), was envisioned to have a membership limited to not many more than the 30 or so names suggested in 1937 (Jamison, 1937b) and to only those men (sic) with “proven ability to make contributions of fundamental importance to the field of Management” (Davis, 1936). As the Academy entered the 1960s, it surpassed 400 members and became an international organization with its first members from Canada and behind the Iron Curtain. It had its own journal and a more tolerant position toward the behavioural sciences and management science, as these concepts and their possible contribution to management philosophy were introduced at the Academy’s Annual Meeting in 1960. Subsequently, it has become a lead-
An examination of Academy archival materials from its earliest days reveals a Depression-era vision of an objective body to carry out a long term plan to systematically create a “gospel of management” and to “foster the search for truth” (“Academy of Management Constitution,” 1952). Charles Jamison (1937c), founder of the Academy of Management, believed that an “academy of management” should “seek…the discovery of the controlling principles of management” because the “problems” of business management were misunderstood “by rank-and-file workers, by public servants and by the public in general”. He argued that the “mystery” must be taken out of what goes on at the upper levels of management in order to restore the confidence not only of the public and workers but also of the business leaders themselves. He claimed, that even they had growing doubt in the soundness of their judgement, that they had “lost their nerve…under the lash of ceaseless abuse for six or seven years,” and that this might be “one plausible explanation of the abrupt reversal of the business trend” (Jamison, 1937a). About the same time, Ralph Davis, in advocating the value of an “academy of management” to Alfred Sloan of the Sloan Foundation (Davis, 1938), said that “indoctrinating the people with sound economic truths” would establish public confidence in the ability of “private entrepreneurs to manage business in a manner satisfactory to everyone.” Furthermore, he declared that the “mistakes of management were not so numerous nor so serious that they [could] not be corrected.” Jamison wanted an “academy” which could carry out “a definite long term program—an outline of a complete doctrine of management” (Jamison, 1938). Jamison would say later that, “[i]t is conceivable that some time in the dim future the Academy may become a potent force” (Jamison, 1954).

In a letter to John Mee in 1953, Ralph Davis, one of the Academy’s strongest proponents and its President in 1948 summarized the objectives of the early Academy:
1. “A group of independent, objective thinkers in management whose attainments would inspire public confidence.”
2. “A philosophy of management, keyed directly to the objectives of customer and public service that would inspire public confidence in a competitive system of free enterprise…It was believed that our economic system would succumb eventually to Socialism, in the absence of such a philosophy. It was hoped that the Academy could sponsor the development of such a philosophy, and facilitate its acceptance by the public” (Davis, 1953).

Nonetheless, scholarly disinterest appeared in short supply, as demonstrated by reaction to a presentation by John Hoagland who had recently completed a dissertation on predecessors to Taylor. His presentation at the annual meeting in 1955, which included a “devastating attack on Taylor,” caused an “uproar” and rebellion that caused “one or two important members” to resign. Professor Schwenning, in his resignation letter, stated, “[i]f that is the most constructive thing the Academy can do, then it should go out of existence” (Schwenning, 1956). In addition, the professor claimed that the Academy had lowered its standards in that it had been “a highly selected group” but now “anybody [could] buy membership in the Academy if he [could] spare $5.00.”

The founders’ ideological preferences were clearly evident in the first annual meeting following the “renaissance” of the Academy when the invited speaker, T. M. Girdler, Chairman of the Board, Republic Steel Corporation, delivered the only paper of the afternoon entitled Management’s Leadership Responsibilities (Girdler, 1948). In it, Girdler recollects and advises,
“...a number of steel companies were involved in a strike. ...I pointed to Communist leadership of the strike. The term ‘Red Baiter’ assailed me from all sides. However, we continued with the charge... In the fight for freedom and democratic government throughout the world, management and employee must stand firmly together. If we do not, the days of free government are numbered. More of the world will turn to state control with its threat to personal freedom... We must combat...the trend toward a centralized federal control which has made so much progress even in the United States” (p.5, 6).

While Girdler insisted on a laissez-faire position toward business regulation, he had no problem with the centralized power of the ever more powerful corporation. It should be noted that, at that time, the Academy was a club of invited and vetted fellows only. Anyone in attendance would have undergone close scrutiny of credentials and ideals.

The value and need for another association was frequently debated. Those favoring such a group argued that the interests of management educators would be subordinated to the objectives of these other organizations. For instance, even though the Society for the Advancement of Management (SAM) had held separate sessions for management educators since 1927, it was the impression of the Academy’s founders that SAM’s membership was largely comprised of engineers with an interest in management (Davis, 1936). It was argued, since management teachers in universities came from either economics or engineering and the latter outnumbered the former, and since engineers were skeptical of a connection to economics, that an independent organization was desirable. Likewise, the founders believed that because the American Management Association (AMA) was a “practical group of business executives...more interested in methodology than in the development of fundamental philosophy of business operation” that it was not an appropriate forum for management scholars (Davis, 1936). In addition, Jamison felt that the Academy’s objectives were more “idealistic” (Jamison, 1939) than that of SAM or AMA and that their interest in theories of management ran much deeper even though the Academy would be an important “adjunct” to SAM. In spite of the foregoing, two early Academy presidents, Smiddy in 1962 and Brown in 1957, were “managers” who did become members.

In the years following World War II and after the Academy had reconstituted, the Academy was to be an “honorary body” of invited “fellows” restricted to fifty or one hundred scholars and business executives “who have made recognized, original contributions to the philosophy of management” (Newman, 1948). However, concern was growing and, by the early 1950s, it was suggested that if the Academy did not widen its “service scope...some competing organization will displace us in our objective” (Mee, 1953b). Ironically, the Academy, whose stated purpose was to create a “philosophy of management,” was apparently in danger of being left behind and seemed unable to do more than simply reflect and report the reality of management as it developed in practice within the large corporations. For instance, Ralph Davis observed that a philosophy of management “that would inspire public confidence in a competitive system of free enterprise” had “progressed to a considerable degree...without any assistance of an academy of management” (Davis, 1953). He recommended that the Academy of Management project in its then current guise - a “carefully selected membership of recognized scholars” - be dropped in favour of a more populist model in order to broaden and solidify its support as the pre-eminent representative of teachers of management. A committee struck to study the future of the Academy recommended in November, 1953 that the constitution be amended to allow the admission of professors of management. In addition, the new constitution created a rarefied “Fellows” membership in order to recognize “those who [had] made an outstanding original contribution” so that the original concept of the Academy, an elite group of contributors to “management philosophy,” would be perpetuated (Mee, 1953a).
Remarkably, in spite of its central and inescapable affect on American life, the Cold War was rarely referenced directly by Academy members. Ralph Davis, in “Management Problems in a Cold War Economy” in the proceedings of the Academy conference (Davis, 1952), was plainly an exception. In the paper, he claimed that a Cold War economy “must support psychological and economic warfare against an enemy” (p.1). While it is not clear what he means by psychological warfare, Davis seems to assert that the economy must sustain military procurement as well as maintain “concurrently the normal rate of improvement in the living standards of the population” (p. 1). In addition, however, it should be noted that a single-minded application to economic output served a strategic purpose in unifying Americans and in distinguishing resistance as subversion and anti-Americanism. Paradoxically, in hindsight, many would argue that it was Cold War spending that fueled economic growth, rather than the reverse and that the business academy opportunistically filled the demand created by the growth of liberal corporatism.

Davis also claimed that the major challenge to business was the uncertainty created by Cold War conflict. He believed that “the wisdom with which solutions of our economic problems are developed may determine the continuance of our free enterprise system” and “that business and industrial executives must accept the principal responsibility for such solutions, under a system of economic decentralism” (p. 7). He made no mention of collectivism and made only a passing nod to “minimal government intervention”. Ironically, Davis also noted adverse press about “executive malfeasance in office, publicity concerning labor management disputes, instances of attempts to influence legislators and governmental executives to gain special privileges that may not be in the public interest” but that “executive leadership” (p. 2) must be allowed its increasing importance.

A Particular “Fellow”

Keith Davis, in addition to being president of the Academy of Management in 1964, was, in many ways, the ideal typical notion of the American worker in the Cold War. He was a personnel officer in the U.S. Army Air Force until 1946 and returned to work in many of the large corporations that emerged more powerful from WWII, their position consolidated by the contributions of government war-time expenditures, including corporations like Motorola, Texaco, and Firestone. Of particular note, however, Davis was the sole author of one of the most successful management texts in its market both in the U.S. and internationally (Davis, 1984) beginning with Human Relations in Business (Davis, 1957) and extending through six editions until 1984 when the 7th edition was co-authored.

While credited with “adding human interest and warmth” and “establishing good human relations with his readers” (Various, 1959), Davis apparently wanted to reflect the reality and needs of liberal corporate interests in his texts. For instance, in a comment to the Academy’s fiftieth anniversary committee (Davis, 1984), he noted that “business people” want to “build cooperation between management and labor” (p. 10), that they more readily accept as “realistic and applicable” the “broad interpretive theories” (p.11), and that they think that “pure emphasis upon organizational science is of minimum use to them” (p. 10). Furthermore, he credits Maslow’s “needs hierarchy,” McGregor’s “Theory X and Y”, along with Herzberg, McClelland, Skinner, and Vroom with being “major contributors to [his] way of thinking about research and theory development” (p. 6) and that “cooperation with less conflict and stress, and more organizational effectiveness” (p. 9) have been major themes in the management field.

Davis, in a critique of a conference on business and government which he had attended, cites as a deficiency the lack of concern “with government as a source of injustice toward business and its participants” and that participants were not “prepared to deal with government as a
generator of injustice” (Davis, 1966). In particular, he asserted that the introduction of social programs, which provide desirable benefits, almost certainly bring undesirable side effects and are introduced without having been adequately considered. He explained his concern with government regulation in somewhat greater detail in a letter response to a graduate student investigating his “personal motivations and interests” for a class report (Jones, 1963). Jones asked Davis, “What do you feel is the single most pressing problem in management today?” Davis responded,

“The single problem pressing management the most today is the existence of political and economic systems which will permit a relatively free application of incentives in order to encourage people to get the job done. …there are so many political and social restrictions that it is almost impossible to apply incentives to encourage the initiative and self-development of people. They tend to become secure, complacent, and unmotivated” (Davis, 1963)

In addition, Davis expressed a belief that “socially competent managers” were the means to a “socially competent business system and the productivity and human fulfillment that successful business can bring” (Davis, 1967).

To his credit, Davis sponsored the first woman member, Rosemary Pledger, to the elite status of ‘Fellow.’ Pledger later went on to become the first female president of the Academy (Davis, 1984) in 1979 in spite of opinion to the contrary. Even years later, her qualifications for the office of president and her ascendance to the rarified ‘Fellows’ designation were questioned by conservative elements within the Academy including George J. Gore (1987), an editor of the Academy’s newsletter, The Management Oar. Interestingly, Gore (1984) had also previously been sharply critical of the new “Women in Management” division within the Academy as he expressed his concern that “energy which might be directed to the growth of Management theory and knowledge was being diluted” (p. 3). Davis’ portrayal of women in the organization in Human Relations in Business will be discussed later.

**Convergence, Need & Reproduction: The Making of the Cold War Worker**

“The exploitation of individuals can only be justified by the collective need, can’t it?"  
The Spy Who Came in from the Cold (Greene, 1962, p. 113)

Social, economic, organizational and theoretical developments converged and conspired to shape the American workplace and world view in the early Cold War period. Organization and management thought, theory, and text largely reproduced what it saw as good, right, inevitable, necessary, or prudent in the Cold War reality of organizational life, which then reinforced an emerging notion of the mainstream worker and workplace. In addition, businesses associated with the production of war materiel proliferated to such an extent that by 1960 it had become known as ‘the military industrial complex’ (President Eisenhower in Mills & Helms Hatfield, 1998, p. 38). In this section of the paper we sketch the configuration of events, actions and reactions that served to create a relatively narrow concept of the ideal-typical American worker.

At the close of WWII, and as the Cold War began to heat up, support for a national security policy to contain the spread of communism was needed. In addition to taking the battle abroad through the Truman Doctrine (1947), the Marshall Plan (1947), the development of military alliances (NATO, 1949) and in surrogate wars (Korea and Viet Nam), the Cold War was also fought at home. Some of the most direct assaults were on the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) but the effect was felt throughout academia, business, government,
labour unions, and abroad. The notion of the American worker that emerged from the Cold War, and arguably persists today, arose out of at least four not wholly independent developments in the period of America’s involvement in WWII and the Cold War, particularly from the late 1940s to the 1960s. The first development was the establishment of a massive war effort in WWII, which embraced government, business and labour, as well as the military, in what would later become the military-industrial complex (Mills & Helms Hatfield, 1998). The war effort was a collaboration of government and business that consolidated power in a ruling elite, which would extract peace from labour leaders. This effort coincided with the deployment of a multi-million man military force, which would return triumphantly to move back into the factories and offices of industry, government and academia following the war. Their military experience provided the model for the hierarchical, authoritarian enterprise of fully developed American capitalism in an economy that came to be dominated by the military-industrial complex.

The second development included that part of the Cold War fought at home, the “internal Cold War” (Kelley, Mills, & Cooke, 2003). It included a direct assault on the CPUSA and its affiliated unions. The labour unions were brought into conformity with America’s national security requirements (Vidich, Oakes, Hill, & Diamond, 1993) in a broad frontal attack by Congressional inquisitors on “un-American views” that directly or indirectly affected the lives of thousands in government, entertainment, education, and business (Caute, 1978). The third development was the rise of behaviouralism and modernization theory. The behaviouralist schools provided the training ground for the new faculty needed for growing business school enrollments, and a theoretical basis for the demonization of America’s enemies (Schrecker, 1994) and for the individualism and idealization of American society. The fourth was the development of organization and management theories, such as those of Maslow and McGregor, which, however inadvertently, reproduced the individualistic and hierarchical values of American society. These theories reflected the dominant power order and social norms of American society and institutionalized them through the burgeoning organizational literature and educational institutions (Rosen, 1984).

The notion of the American worker that emerged in the 1960s was that of the “organization man” (Whyte, 1956); white, autonomous, spiritual, self-actualizing (hierarchically oriented) and infused with the liberal values of freedom, liberty and self-development (Lethbridge, 1986). His image was fashioned from pre-existing American cultural values and as a direct result of the development of Cold War ideology that served the purposes of the powerful elite of the military-industrial complex. A climate of fear and foreboding was employed and reinforced in the conception of the American worker as the antithesis of the godless, materialist, collectivist worker of the communist state. While the collectivism of the Soviet Union was centred on the arbitrary notion of equality of outcome, the individualism of capitalism was premised on the equality of opportunity in the competition of a classless, yet hierarchical, free market, that everyone had the opportunity to become rich and successful through hard work and industry. In demonizing the West’s Cold War enemies, it was necessary to make it clear to the American public that communists were unlike us, captives of an irrational ideology and, therefore, not normal, perhaps even emotionally unbalanced (Robin, 2001).

Not surprisingly, many saw the need to soften the individualistic image that U.S. foreign policy had seized upon to differentiate America from Communist states and to delegitimize systematic analyses based on collectivities such as class. As Klein (2000) noted in her discussion of the struggle to favourably position America in Asia, terms such as “individualism”, “democracy”, “capitalism” and “private enterprise” that had become synonymous with “America”, did not translate well in many parts of the globe where there was a perceived need for popular support. “Teamwork” became that defining concept; it expressed a traditional American ideal of men joined together in common effort. While the individual had become an emblem of Western self-
ishness, “team work” continued the focus on the individual but broadened it “to mean the relationship between individuals rather than the solitary and self-interested actions of a single individual” (Klein, 2000, p. 42-43).

The Cold War worker’s values were already firmly embedded in American economic, political and social institutions. Since the birth of the American nation, its institutions had been dominated by the values of men who were propertyed, white, and Christian. These values were also dominant throughout society among the masses as well as the elite such that free enterprise was held to be “the American Way”, that the genius of American institutions had been imparted by the Anglo-Saxon race, and that the American mission had been blessed by God (Heale, 1990).

The development of the military industrial complex provided the opportunity for a far greater proportion realize a middle-class lifestyle in the relative peace of the post-war period (Whyte, 1956). It was in the large corporations of the military industrial complex that emerged from the war that “organization man” would feel most welcome, driven there by a “social ethic” that Whyte saw as based on three propositions: “a belief in the group as the source of creativity; a belief in ‘belongingness’ as the ultimate need of the individual; and a belief in the application of science to achieve the belongingness”. It was within the hierarchical structure of the new giant corporations that “organization man” could grow and compete to fulfill his potential. It was ironic that the autonomous, self-reliant man of American lore would turn to the collective of the organization for fulfillment. Fortunately, the military industrial complex, made the more powerful by the construction of the Cold War threat, had a voracious appetite for compliant, enculturated workers.

Return from the War

The development of a particular dominant notion of worker in the Cold War was enabled, at least in part, by the sheer force of numbers and patterned experience of millions of soldiers who returned from the war in Europe and the Pacific. As they arrived home, these men took their places in the military industrial complex that emerged from, and as a result of, the war, and in the military intellectual complex of academia (Robin, 2001). The war-related experience of a generation of young, white American men shaped attitudes to work, their own as well as generations to follow. They had experienced success in a hierarchical, authoritarian, planning- and management-oriented organization and they attributed much of that success to rational and scientific operational management, leadership, and organization. They moved back into the jobs they had left or that had been created in their absence, returning the women who had helped to build a production powerhouse in their absence to clerical and low-paying unskilled work or home (Runte & Mills, 2003). Within thirty days of the end of the war, 675,000 women lost their jobs. An immediate return to work was owed the servicemen, especially with the apparent evidence of over-employment, women in the workforce when they didn’t need to work (Lipsitz, 1981). They had sacrificed and bled for freedom and democracy. Ironically, the values they fought for, freedom and democracy, would be subverted in the ‘command and control’ organizations and the Cold War social climate in which individual freedoms were suspended with wide public support (Kelley et al., 2003). Having experienced the homogenous, rational life of a successful military organization, it was natural for them to be attracted to similar business organizations, or to create them in their own image, on their return.

These men also entered educational institutions where they influenced attitudes, curricula and others’ intentions on leaving those institutions. For instance, in the mid-1950s, Whyte (1956, p. 85) describes how college seniors had only corporate life in mind on leaving school:
“Seniors do not deny that the lone researcher or the entrepreneur can also serve others. But neither do they think much about it. Their impulses, their training, the whole climate of the times, incline them to work that is tangibly social. Whether as a member of a corporation, a group medicine clinic, or a law factory, they see the collective as the best vehicle for service. Like the young man of the Middle Ages who went off to join holy orders, he is off for the center of society.”

Business school enrollments also rose dramatically and, by 1955, business became the most popular undergraduate major (Chiet, 1985). With the growth of business schools came criticism that the curriculum was too vocational and that undergraduate business schools had “dispensed with the humanities” (Whyte, 1956). Business school faculties were often staffed with retired military officers and business executives who did not have doctorates and both pedagogy and scholarship tended to be non-theoretic and practice-driven (Cotton, McKenna, VanAuken, & Meuter, 2001). The criticism had become so widespread that both the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation released comprehensive reviews of business education in 1959 which pointed to the parochial nature of business education and the “trade school” orientation of business school research. The reports recommended raising standards through an increased number of academically-trained faculty, more rigorous course work, more graduate work, and less undergraduate specialization. Shortly thereafter the emphasis on academic scholarship increased, especially that related to basic scholarship and the blending of theory with practice (Cotton et al., 2001). Ironically, by the mid-1960s criticism had become “that business schools [were] too academic and not producing the managers needed by American business” to compete (Chiet, 1985).

The Military-Academic-Industrial Complex

Wars generally, and WWII in particular, serve to unite nations against a common foe, and create the impetus for large-scale mobilization and control of talent and resources. WWII permanently altered the economic and political power relations within American society, and produced a totalitarian oligarchy of the major interest groups (Lipsitz, 1981). Working class strategies of independence, notions of academic freedom, and the vitality of small business had to contend with the ways in which wartime spending created an elite among the executives of large corporations who exercised unprecedented control over government and the lives of ordinary citizens. Even economic theory became dominated by fundamentalist capitalism in the interest of differentiating the American way of life from communism (Fusfeld, 1998).

Lipsitz (1981) documented government wartime support and influence that created a radical shift in the American economy during WWII, to a relatively small number of giant corporations. Direct government military spending during the war provided large corporations with a steady source of capital, with secure and ever increasing markets, and with expanded facilities that made increased production profitable, irreversibly tilting the economy toward a relatively small number of powerful corporations. Between June 1940 and September 1944, the government paid $175 billion to over 18,000 businesses in the form of direct military contracts and two thirds of this went to just 100 companies. The top ten defense contractors received 30 percent of it. That concentration gave the largest firms enormous advantages over their competitors, particularly in view of the volume of military spending and its relation to the expansion of the economy as a whole. As a result, America’s 250 largest corporations operated 79 percent of all new, privately operated plant facilities built with Federal funds. By the end of the war, the production capacity of these few corporations equaled the production capacity of all corporations in 1939.

Following the war, leaders of American industry hoped for a continuation of the closer collaboration between business, government and labor union leaders that had protected the inter-
ests of capital during the war. The close collaboration ensured a successful transition of the state into a tool for making and securing profits for big business as long envisioned by key leaders of the business community (Lipsitz, 1981). In The New Industrial State, Galbraith (1967) had argued that industrial production in the modern technological society required such long-term planning and investment that the leaders of industry needed some way to ensure stable consumption and production at high levels. Waging a permanent Cold War proved to be a satisfactory strategy to justify centralized control of the production of war materiel. What had proved successful during the war became the model for the peacetime economy, as corporate liberals projected the short-term adjustments made during the war into the permanent outline of the future American economy (Lipsitz, 1981).

Economic theory was also well suited to the ideological needs of the Cold War. Oddly, despite the permanent institutional framework known as the military-industrial complex, the analysis of war remains only a minor part of mainstream economics (Horner & Martinez, 1997). Fusfeld (1998) discussed how fundamentalist capitalism, which had been current among political conservatives for generations, found new life in the Cold War, used as justification for the fundamentals of American capitalism and the private enterprise economy, in which individualism and competition were exalted. Economic freedom, associated with political democracy, was the counterpoint to communism and authoritarian government. Ideas critical of Western capitalism were excluded from the mainstream.

In the capitalism of the Cold War, entrepreneurs and risk takers were to have a free hand. Any government interference with market forces would lead to slowed growth and inefficiency, a return to Adam Smith without the qualifications and reservations (Fusfeld, 1998). Paradoxically, a large number of small businesses and their entrepreneurs failed or were absorbed by the increasingly powerful large corporations as true power in American democracy became ever more concentrated among the elite of government and big business. Corporate liberalism won gains for large corporations at the expense of citizens, consumers and workers who faced more powerful employers. However, it exacted a particular price from its traditional enemy: competitive small business.

Lipsitz (1981) outlined the virtual end of the place of small business in the US economy during the postwar period. Businesses with 10,000 or more employees accounted for 13 percent of total employment in 1939 but more than 31 percent in 1944. During the war more than half a million small retail service and construction companies went out of business. Psychologically, the ideal of small business ownership constituted a popular symbol of freedom and its increasing impracticality forced many Americans to face a life of working for others. Politically, the war experience and the decline of small business enabled the monopoly sector to complete its transition of economic wealth into political power and its transformation of government into the key instrument for asserting the hegemony of large corporations over American society.

During WWII, the need for government to direct national science policy to the war effort was not in question. Government intervention in scientific research was understood as a national security priority and, thereafter, “the quest for positivism became the very ideology on which the modern state controls the dissemination of knowledge” (Nodoushani, 2000). The war marked the beginning of the period during which the state dramatically increased its direct involvement in the academy. Big science, therefore, arose out of government wartime recruitment of academic scientists, use of their infrastructure, financial support of research projects with potential strategic benefits (Kurasawa, 2002), and was sustained by the Cold War military buildup.
By the 1950s, the academy had displaced other institutions as the locus of America’s intellectual life. Many of the ideas that shaped the way Americans perceived themselves and their society developed on the nation’s campuses. The men and women who articulated those ideas were not, however, isolated from the political repression that touched their institutions (Schrecker, 1994). Nodoushani (2000) noted that, “the Cold War had also opened up a hegemonic cultural discourse with an all-embracing influence over policy-makers as well as scientists”. McCarthyism employed the red scare to politicize campuses in pursuit of ideological conformity. Subsequently the military-industrial complex’s involvement in academic research tended to disproportionately orient the latter towards serving the imperial interests of pax Americana at home and abroad (Kurasawa, 2002).

The Rise of Behaviouralism and Modernization Theory

On January 15, 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued a periodic “Review of the Current World Situation” which called for “a large-scale program of psychological warfare…comparable in scope to the Manhattan District Project of WWII” (Robin, 2001, p. 42). The implication of this analogy was a large investment in research and access to the military-intellectual complex for the fledgling behavioural sciences previously only available to the physical sciences. The typical recipients of this largesse were think tanks where virtually every challenge was met by an intellectually limited recitation of the power of the individual, the advantages of open markets, the respect of property rights, and an unquestioning approval of laissez-faire. One in particular, the Rand Corporation, was especially influential in shaping the political views of scholars and the direction of government policy, principally through its interest in a rationale for both representative democracy and market capitalism as part of the country’s ideological conflict with communism (Amadae, 2003).

As a result, a new kind of social scientist emerged and prospered in the Cold War as the views of logical positivism converged closely with the rise of the behavioural science revolution and the redefinition of social science (Nodoushani, 2000). The behavioural scientist espoused a universal theory of human action, an organized quest for principles and theory, or even a series of behavioural laws of nature, that focused on the individual rather than the group or organizational level of analysis. In this new science the focus was on measurement and behaviour rather than on critique and ideas, on testable claims of reified concepts. Robin (2001) observed that, “relieved of ambiguity and the need to probe and question, the behaviouralist approached human experience as the sum of distinct, quantifiable and predictable combinations of sociological, psychological and biological reactions.” While the traditional branches of the social sciences more successfully resisted the adoption of positivist epistemology, in the emerging business disciplines “such a theory became synonymous with the only way of knowing” (Nodoushani, 2001).

Robin (2001) suggested that the creation of the behaviourist schools was shrouded in myth the most central of which was the notion that the “new” science arose spontaneously in research institutions throughout the country and that this was no accident. Its creation was a cultural as well as a scientific enterprise, an example of American exceptionalism credited to individual ingenuity rather than central planning. Curiously absent from the creation myth was the contribution of government funding, reference to the influence of émigrés in the 1930s, and the

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1 Conservatives used the term ‘Representative democracy,’ which was a limited version intended to exclude the ‘industrial democracy’ of the left which implied a redistribution of economic power (Wall, 2000, p. 107).
desire of academics to distance themselves from its social science beginnings since there was a widespread misperception of the difference between social science and socialism, particularly among politicians (Nodoushani, 2000).

During the early Cold War period, while the physicists and economists were working on theoretical scenarios, the behavioural scientist was creating working documents for management problems related to conventional warfare. Robin (2001) claimed that the behaviouralists portrayed the ideological positions of the “enemy” as manifestations of emotional dysfunction, which were invoked whenever political behaviour appeared to be irrational or different from the American norm, which was assumed to be value-free and rational. Project Iron Mountain, a paper that later turned out to be a hoax and a minor sensation, exposed the erroneous creation of the enemy that infused policy during the Cold War. In particular, it revealed the need for a powerful enemy to drive American policy and to fuel the growing ideological gulf. In addition, in the late 1950s, behavioural science was seen as a national security issue since the control of attitudes and beliefs of people could be a powerful weapon, and, if the communists developed such techniques first, America would need effective countermeasures (Nodoushani, 2000).

In a convergence with the Marxist notion of historical materialism, and in an attempt to rewrite Marxist theory, modernization theory assumed that the transformation of modernization was inevitable. Human society was said to be governed by a predictable path of development from traditional society to rational, economically driven social arrangements in which “consumer capitalism and not communism [was] the final utopian outcome” (Nashel, 2000, p. 153). As Robin (2001) noted, the theory posited a series of one-way transitions: from subsistence economies to technology-intensive, industrialized economies; from authoritarian to participant-oriented political systems; from religious to secular, scientifically based values. The biological determinism of Social Darwinism gave way to cultural determinism of modernization – purportedly a theory with no racist connotations – which employed the decidedly unscientific metaphors of growth, development, and progress (Robin, 2001).

Modernization was more than a theory. It was an ideology and a conceptual framework in which American society saw its ability to transform the world through progress and controlled, measured change. Modernization theory had important Cold War policy implications. It could assist the newly independent developing countries to adopt a capitalist system of free markets or, alternatively, it might prevent desperately poor countries from slipping into the communist sphere (Nashel, 2000).

Robin (2001) documented theories that explained how modernization might take hold and change society. McClelland (1963) and Inkeles (1974), in competing models, saw modernization working through diffusion in the population. McClelland (1963) believed that the values of modernity were best acquired in childhood through training for self-reliance. Alternatively, Inkeles (1974) thought that the factory could become the training ground for adults in that factory life was benign and offered opportunities for liberating man from the deadening forces of tradition. It was generally believed that personality, psychology and an open economy, not the redistribution of influence and power, were the keys to a more equitable and just society. Modernization was seen as synonymous with the nation state. Issues of class and gender were dismissed as politically biased and unscientific, and which “could only be seen as dangerous and subverting some natural development” (Robin, 2001, p. 224). In the end, becoming more America-like was the inevitable outcome of modernization, as the United States was understood to be the first modern state and, in which, differences would be assimilated in an industrial free-market economy.
Management Theory as Reproduction and Reinforcement - Maslow’s Hierarchy

Contradictions and ambiguities are apparent in the work of Maslow and are understandable when viewed as expressions and reflections of capitalistic ideology (Shaw & Colimore, 1988). While Maslow emphasizes “tolerance, pluralism and the sanctity of the individual” (Lethbridge, 1986), an unmistakable elitist value system emerges. “The elitist view of the self was derived from Maslow’s judgement that, in reality, there are better values than others, better ways of living than others, better people than others” (Buss, 1979 as cited in Lethbridge, 1986). That Maslow’s theory of self-actualization resembles the dominant ideology of the era is no coincidence. It is an accurate reflection of the contradiction between democratic theory and the reality of elitism in a capitalist society and is, therefore, “a case study on the power of ideology to surface in the form of social science theory… Maslow inadvertently took what existed in society and made it the basis of his psychological theories” (Shaw & Colimore, 1988).

Maslow’s theory of self-actualization, fixed in a particular historical period and infused with the liberal values of freedom, liberty and personal development, was easily co-opted by the liberal establishment (Shaw & Colimore, 1988). The rhetoric of self-development and self-actualization was appropriated by government, organizational and pop psychologists, and turned into the ideology necessary to maintain the status quo. “Excessive individualism in the doctrine of self-actualization serves to mask the larger social questions surrounding society’s structures… and works in favour of maintaining that social reality” (Buss, 1979 as cited in Lethbridge, 1986). Maslow’s self-actualization reflected the hierarchical, democratic elitism and liberal values of the time and, in turn, reinforced those same values.

Maslow insisted on the development of the autonomous individual over the development of society – “to give man ownership over his human potentials rather than arrogated by temporal non-human institutions which, at times, science, business, and the church have been” (Bennis, 1972 as cited in Shaw & Colimore, 1988). Maslow was critical of those who would neglect their own development to work for wider social reform. He contrasted those who would assign blame for troubles with those who would instead ask “What can I do to make the most of this situation?” and believed that the individual was responsible for their fate even if the problems they encounter were the result of processes and forces larger than themselves (Shaw & Colimore, 1988). “The fully actualized individual has ‘a quality of detachment and a sense of privacy’ and is ‘his own man, autonomous, relatively independent of his surroundings and highly resistant to enculturation’” (Lowry, 1973 as cited in Shaw & Colimore, 1988). Furthermore, he believed that individual self-interest merged with society’s interest in what he called ‘synergy’, something akin to Adam Smith’s notion of the ‘invisible hand’. Apparently, it did not occur to him that such a theory could be used to legitimate the actions of those in power or that leaders would exploit the less powerful (Shaw & Colimore, 1988).

Shaw and Colimore (1988) saw Maslow’s hierarchy of needs as the outline of a hierarchical social order that is more a description of values than a universal motivation theory. While claiming to tell us something about human nature, the hierarchy of needs is more a reification of the concept of hierarchical elitism and competition. While hierarchies are evident in all societies, capitalism especially needs the concept of hierarchies to sustain its overall ideology. The hierarchy of needs, while not the causative agent, inadvertently reproduced and reinforced the notion of a hierarchically-oriented society consistent with an elitist value system and competition, arguably, all necessary for capitalism to work. For a theory with little empirical support, it has remained a central concept in management texts.
Too Frightened to be Enlightened: Cold War Ideology and Cultural Hegemony

“Necessity is always the tyrant’s plea.”
Milton in Wright (2004, p. 90)

A key question seems to be, why has this seminal period been so influential in shaping the contours of the American workplace? It seems inevitable that socialism would be received suspiciously given Americans’ idealized image of a Christian republic of self-reliant white men. The Marxist vision of a classless, socialist society has never held much appeal for most Americans. Nevertheless, it has been a “divisive, painful sideshow of American politics, exploited by political and economic elites who characterized Marxism as a frightening threat to American ideals of boundless opportunities and riches” (Heale, 1990: Editor’s Note). Mainstream America has long held communism to be a foreign ideology and a threat to the unique experiment in republican freedom (Heale, 1990). Several times these perceptions have become so pervasive as to constitute a ’scare.’ For the several decades following WWII the United States made containment of communism abroad its primary global mission. For many, hostility to communism at home was like a statement of national purpose. From the Revolution onward, Americans have been warned about the fragility of republican institutions, and the belief that the US is vulnerable to subversion has persisted to the present. This belief has led to widespread conviction that the American republic is forever imperilled from within and that a challenge to the pre-eminence of a particular class or group could be presented as a form of insurrection (Heale, 1990).

American military personnel returned to a social climate that quickly became charged by a series of events that drove anticommunism to the ideological centre of American politics including the Soviet takeover of Czechoslovakia and blockade of Berlin in 1948, the “loss” of China and the Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb in 1949, the Korean War in 1950 (Schrecker, 1994), and the crushed revolution in Hungary in 1956. In 1953, the Soviet Union detonated its first hydrogen bomb only months after America’s first, an accomplishment which made the threat all the more palpable since it had been credited to internal espionage. An example of the heated rhetoric appeared in the JCS’s periodic “Review of the Current World Situation” which took on an uncharacteristically emotional tone in offering an apocalyptic vision of a nation “facing a crisis of religious proportions” the only solution of which was the “waging of a crusade” (Robin, 2001, p. 41). The challenge was described as a clash of civilizations rather than a conventional struggle for territory and hegemony. The enemy “could not be pinpointed spatially…occupied a threatening, incoherent domain…was sometimes Russian, occasionally Asian, and sometimes an invisible fifth column poised to attack even within the United States” (p. 42).

Anti-Communism permeated American society as never before as cultural institutions consistently delivered a message that an enemy lurked within, threatening to subvert the American Way of Life (Whitfield, 1996). That the threat was a foreign conspiracy became a useful image in fanning the flames. There had been other Red Scares in America but, in the Cold War, the domestic Communist movement had a powerful – now nuclear-capable – nation allied with it. In addition, Heale (1990) suggested that it took “the growth of a national economy and the strengthening of federal political institutions before anti-communism could impinge significantly on national politics” (p. xiii). Furthermore, Whitfield (1996) claimed that the failure of the Republican White House of the 1950s to achieve the kind of success against Communist expansion that Truman had, produced its own backlash against domestic subversives who, oddly enough, often were Anti-Communists themselves.

In the early Cold War, the period of greatest tension and repression (Mills & Helms Hatfield, 1998), communism was seen as the greatest threat to America’s survival. This period -
marked by fear and loathing of an enemy that advanced on the technological, global, and domestic fronts - produced a number of extraordinary contradictions. For instance, the antagonism between Communism and the West was frequently framed as a titanic struggle of two mutually exclusive religions. The materialism of a godless ideology was set against the Christianity and spirituality of America where, ironically, material plenty was boasted and the asceticism of the Protestant ethic had given way to consumerism. Paradoxically, the Western-form of capitalism, commonly equated with democracy and individualism in a mechanical recitation, became ever more concentrated in large corporations and in the dominant elite of a military industrial complex. The individualism of the frontier nation became homogenized by ‘organization man’s’ attraction to the social and rational perception of the large corporation. An elite ruling class seized on the opportunity to invoke national security and democracy’s very survival to distance the American way of life from the collectivism and centralization of the Soviet Union while denying the rights and freedoms of domestic Communists, sympathizers, and other dissenters.

Anti-communism as weapon

At the height of the second “red scare”, the American worldview was a dichotomous approach to conflict: either you were with America or you were against it (Kelley et al., 2003). Communism was portrayed as destructive of the fundamental nature of the “American way of life,” the principle of equality of opportunity, the right to private property, and economic development. Heale (1990) reasoned about the second red scare:

“The American polity operated so as to magnify the threat of red revolution, but the insecure elites and patriotic citizens who perceived it had not normally taken leave of their senses. Hardheaded calculations and coherent ideological perspectives were closer to the heart of red scare politics than was mindless hysteria. It usually needed both a conspicuous and indisputable presence of some radicals in the United States and communist successes abroad to give the anticommunist cause much buoyancy, particularly in turning the middle class and respectable working class people and elements of the intellectual community against those reform alignments that sometimes afforded radical minorities a little protection” (p xiv).

Gramsci (1978) believed a society’s ruling class fostered a belief system, an ideological hegemony, among the working class, which stressed order, authority and discipline, and was propagated through institutions such as family, school and workplace. In America, the Cold War both produced and was sustained by super-patriotism, religion (Horner & Martinez, 1997), intolerance and suspicion, and these pathologies infected all aspects of life in the 1950’s entertainment industry, churches, and schools (Whitfield, 1996). Patriotism provided the rationale for defense expenditures and the Cold War was used as an excuse to crush free association, to counteract pressure for social improvements, and to suspend civil liberties. It was also used as a means of social control to divert attention to contrived enemies, both internal and external, and away from social problems such as racism, sexism, and the unequal distribution of income (Horner & Martinez, 1997). In addition, as Whitfield (1996) noted, the United States was “unique among Western nations in experiencing so dramatic an upsurge of postwar piety.” The need to combat Godless communism intensified an innate tendency to equate faith with individual success and prosperity, and national well-being. Rising church membership, which reached 69 percent by the late 1950s from 49 percent in 1940, became an affirmation of the “American way of life”.

While many did oppose the anticommmunist message, it met with little resistance from a largely willing audience who experienced the benefits of a free market economy. In the decade
following WWII, young workers entering organizational life were motivated not so much by the accumulation of wealth or power as much as by the attainment of a comfortable middle-class lifestyle (Whyte, 1956). The economic recovery in the post-war boom years of America’s worldwide industrial hegemony, considerably aided by high levels of Cold War military spending, saw both blue and white-collar workers achieve middle-class status. The rapid expansion of the middle class ensured that the worker was bought off by a “system of affluence” and the satisfaction of contrived needs, and that workers then defended that system since it had “made these triumphs possible” (Sennett & Cobb, 1973, p. 5, 7). The middle class grew impressively until the early 1970s and became the largest and most affluent the world had ever seen. During this period, the use of the terms class and working class largely disappeared as most people went to good public schools and the sons of all classes mixed in their compulsory military service. The upper class, or truly affluent, were simply something to which the middle class could aspire.

By the mid-1960s, the Cold War had been assimilated into mainstream American life. The fear of Communist conspiracy ebbed and with it the intolerance for political dissent. While dissent and disloyalty had been too easily equated in the 1950s, narrow-minded anti-Communist fanaticism was no longer tolerated quite so readily in the 1960s. Nevertheless, it was in the earliest moments of the Cold War when the spread and infiltration of Communism caused the greatest fear, as much for its global form as for the perceived threat within the United States. At least in theory, the United States was more vulnerable than it ever had been.

The Internal Cold War: The CPUSA, Unions and Anti-Americanism

Anticommunism needed the conspicuous presence of some radicals in the United States and communist successes abroad to give the cause respectability, particularly in turning more moderate elements of American society against the little protection afforded radical minorities. It was the misfortune of the Left and the Communist Party (CPUSA) to be linked to international revolution and the Soviet Union, and “to be large enough to be noticed yet small enough to be crushed” (Heale, 1990, p. XX). In spite of the relatively small number of Stalinist supporters, the effort to crush domestic Communism was disproportionate in that civil liberties were ignored, legislation to protect civil liberties was made impossible, and other social and political reforms such as mandatory national health care became subversive and those who urged it were perceived as either communists or fellow travellers (Whitfield, 1996, 179).

Fear and the exaggerated threat of communism would turn what normally would have been considered serious breaches of individuals’ rights into actions justified in the name of national security that were tolerated by an American public scared into obliging acquiescence. Arguably it was the most extensive episode of political repression in American history (Schrecker, 1994). The CPUSA became the focus of law, the FBI, a Congressional inquisition, and a massive propaganda campaign, which eventually crushed the party. The CPUSA was essentially outlawed when, in 1948, President Truman embraced the idea that the Alien and Registration Act of 1940 be used against the Communist Party and its sympathizers as a means to outflank Republican rivals who accused the Democrats of being soft on Communism. In all more than 140 Communist Party leaders were indicted and the trials did not cease until 1957 when several Supreme Court decisions overturned convictions of second-tier leaders (Smith, 1998). The damage had been done, however, in that the Communist Party, and many organizations in which Communists had been active, was deprived of legitimacy by its subversive image, its momentum destroyed.

While the CPUSA reached a peak membership of 60,000 to 80,000 during and immediately after WWII, it had fallen to only about 10,000 by 1957 (Caute, 1978). By the end of the 1950s, just about every professor who had been a member of the CPUSA in the 1930s and 1940s
had left (Schrecker, 1986). In addition, there seemed to be growing support among Americans for the harassment of left-wing groups and the persecution of the CPUSA. Gallup polls showed that support for outlawing the Communist Party and legally prohibiting membership had risen from 44 percent in 1946 to 68 percent by 1949 (Caute, 1978).

To refer to this period as “McCarthyism” is to minimize the extent to which the witch hunts went deep into the American psyche and workplace and were institutionalized in the FBI’s Responsibilities Program, the Truman Doctrine and the loyalty-security oaths. During this period, there were thousands of unpublicized firings, FBI investigations, speaker’s bans, passport denials, all focused on the threat to the American way of life and its elimination. Although the American public and ruling elite were not all enamoured of these tactics, particularly the work of Senator McCarthy, they caused offence not so much by searching for communists as by reviving the arbitrariness of vigilante justice (Heale, 1990).

The Truman Doctrine, established to combat the spread of communism abroad, and the loyalty-security oath for federal employees at home, ordered by Truman in 1947 largely as a political gesture, established anticommunism as America’s official ideology and laid the foundation for McCarthyism (Schrecker, 1986). It transformed the CPUSA and its members, even non-members having only a “sympathetic association”, from an unpopular movement to a national security threat. It legitimized expeditions in search of suspected communists and undesirables throughout industry and academia, and was used to screen for almost everything from jobs to passports.

Schrecker (1986) argued that aggressive action against the most visible symbol of communism in America, the CPUSA, was not an altogether irrational response to what was perceived to be a real threat. While the threat may have been grossly exaggerated, it was not total fantasy largely because of the way the CPUSA operated. For instance, while the CPUSA leadership had been open about their affiliation, the rank-and-file, including many university professors, tended to maintain secrecy about their affiliation. This secrecy took on a more sinister look when the political climate changed after the war and made exposure of reluctant CP members the best weapon for opponents. The Party’s loyalty to the Soviet Union and the Comintern – the international organ of the Russian revolution from which the CPUSA took direction, identity and some funding -- was a source of hostility as was the Party’s rigidity and sudden policy changes (Schrecker, 1986). The CPUSA itself was dictatorial and undemocratic. In addition, there were huge swings in the Party’s policy bringing the CPUSA into line with American foreign policy for a period only to be abandoned when it didn’t suit the Soviet Union. When Soviet and American interests fit, Party liberals and moderates tolerated the party and its Soviet policy and protected it from right wing attacks. But when the Kremlin’s policy shifted most allies turned against the CPUSA in disgust leaving it unprotected (Schrecker, 1994).

While not intended to be a hostile act, the CPUSA’s attempts to create a broader movement also created suspicion. Membership in the Communist Party in America had been on the rise in the ‘30s growing from 7,500 to 55,000 by the end of the decade largely fuelled by the failure of capitalism during the Depression and the rise of fascism in Europe (Schrecker, 1994). Communism offered an alternative and the Party was active in the most important social movements of the day. Because of the Soviet Union’s successful resistance to Hitler and the transformation of the CPUSA into the “Communist Political Association” and a partner for capitalism, both enjoyed the admiration of all segments of American society (Goldstein, 1978).

Nevertheless, the major organizational gains, widespread influence, and public acceptance realized by the CPUSA during the War, would evaporate soon after. A wave of strikes in
1946, as well as Truman’s intervention in an oil workers’ strike in 1945, the packinghouse workers’ strike in 1946, and the seizure of the railroads later that year to ward off a nationwide strike, fuelled an anti-labour sentiment in Congress and the White House (Goldstein, 1978). The Taft-Hartley Act passed by Congress in 1947 was designed to curb the power of labour. Its primary intention was to regulate the labour movement in the interest of the general welfare, not to destroy it or roll back the Wagner Act. However, it did have the intent of removing communist influence from the labour movement (Goldstein, 1978).

**Image of the Cold War Worker in the Academy of Management Text**

The image of the worker that emerged is that of an autonomous and self-seeking, young man, hierarchically-oriented and upward looking, and motivated by status and an equal opportunity to succeed. He accepts responsibility for self-development and fitting in, and rejects the social and egalitarian purposes of his labour representative, preferring self-reliance and economic self-interest. He is more than likely to practice, or to at least observe some of the practices, of Christianity and believes that he can find spiritual fulfillment in self-actualization and material well-being.

Women, when they are present at all, may be an appendage of the manager, and either an asset or a liability. They are overly emotional and upset easily, as well as less objective, unpromotable, and passive. Blacks and other visible minorities are only portrayed as ‘special employment groups’ who are emotional, sensitive, and jealous of other groups special privileges.

**From Balanced Discourse to Dominant Ideology**

A surprisingly distinctive and balanced discourse may have existed within the Academy prior to, and only briefly after, WWII just as it had in other important management institutions of the time including the *Harvard Business Review* and *Advanced Management*, a publication of the Society for Advanced Management (SAM). It has been demonstrated, for instance, that the labour and managerial systems discourses existed as competing and mutually alternating forms of representation of the work world for a half a century beginning in the early 1920s (Landau, 2004). While the discourses were more or less balanced in the management literature, beginning about 1948 the labour discourse virtually disappeared from the literature while the managerial systems discourse rocketed into dominance. The Academy of Management Proceedings of 1939, which were edited by the president of the Academy, Jamison, seems to have reflected a distinctive discourse as well as demonstrated by the following:

“The ‘entrepreneur’ is characteristic of an individualistic society in which exploitation rather than collective good is the foremost consideration. As we approach greater collectivism management may take on more of the aspects of a profession” (Person, 1939).

Notwithstanding his aspirations for the profession of management, two of Person’s assertions deserve inspection. The entrepreneur and collectivism are portrayed as competing dualities, the former an exploitive agent and the latter an emerging reality. Paradoxically, the self-reliance of individualism and entrepreneurial spirit would become honoured principles. Nevertheless, it was not until 1948 or later that notions of, or even references to, collectivism, socialism, and communism would virtually disappear from the organizational discourse in the United States.

For instance, a remarkable passage with similar language appeared in a management text published by a future Academy president in 1948. In speculation on the likely emergence of a
particular form of government, Shuman (1948) stated that, “[i]t is possible that a form of collectivized government, such as some evolutionary Socialists hope for, could be as interested in the general welfare, quite as ‘democratic,’ as the state of regulated individualism found in the United States today.” As Cold War fear took hold in the American consciousness, acknowledgement of another possible social order was abandoned, a dominant managerialist (Burrell & Morgan, 1979) discourse (Landau, 2004) commenced, and free-market capitalism was made synonymous with democracy. As Mills and Hatfield (1998) argued, “a closed system model of organizations developed as a result of a generalized Cold War mentality” and that this “strengthened any tendency to avoid a concern with broader socio-political issues,” which “ensured that the evolving organization and management disciplines were confined to analyses which did not question the legitimacy of business in general or organizational power and control in particular” (p. 49).

Image of Labour

An image of labour stripped of its social and egalitarian purposes began to emerge in the late 1950’s management text. For instance, Davis (1957) played down the “social unionism” goals of labour unions by claiming that unions most appropriately serve the interests of their members through two broad goals: to provide “social satisfaction through group association and solidarity” and “social power and control in order to achieve benefits for its members.” The union “avoids utopian aims and seeks to exert pressure on the employer in order to gain higher wages and other concessions” (p. 123). Davis claimed by way of an example of a Mid-western union that union members were less satisfied with union political activity than with other activities such as collective bargaining and grievance handling.

In addition, Peter Drucker in “The Employee Society” (1959) made clear his intolerance for certain types of “individual rights” which apparently deny others their right to “equal opportunities.” For instance, on trade union security rights, Drucker said,

“...there are certainly many who believe that it is both legitimate and desirable to expand the right in the job to the point where the present incumbents control access to the trade, craft, or industry in such a way as to derive the maximum return from their jobs, regardless of the injury done to other citizens through denying them a livelihood or to society through restricting the number of trained people” (p. 6).

He asserted that union provisions that gave preference to individual promotions based strictly on seniority were “nothing but a demand that opportunities be feudalized,” and that this form of promotion would be only an “extension of the job” (p. 6) rather than a right of the individual in relation to a “strictly impersonal, strictly objective, strictly abstract thing, the ‘organization’” (p. 2).

In a footnote to his view on the place of organized labour in and “employee society,” Drucker (1959) compared management’s preference for the American Federation of Labor (AFL) over the Congress of Industrial O (CIO). The AFL “in emphasizing differentials, accepts management’s function; it only demands a share in it.” The CIO on the other hand, preferred egalitarianism “with their steady pressure toward elimination of pay differentials and toward one basic wage rate is a direct attack on management’s power to redistribute, which is the very root of management’s power altogether.” In addition, Drucker speculated on the significance of the “meteoric rise of the AF of L during the last few years - to where it now outnumbers the CIO 2 to 1.” He conjectured that the CIO’s egalitarianism accounted for the difference and that their relative positions might also account for “the tremendous recovery of management’s prestige and prominence in
American society during the last ten or twelve years” (p. 7-8), that American popular opinion had rejected an egalitarian ethic in favour of equality of opportunity.

**Notions of the individual**

A focus on the individual’s self-seeking behaviour became standard military psychological warfare doctrine following the Korean War, reconfirming what had become common practice in WWII and signalling a victory for behaviouralism. This self-seeking behaviour was characterized as the “corrosive force of ‘people in pursuit of their private ends’” (Robin, 2001, p. 96), which could be encouraged in the citizens of totalitarian enemy states, communist or otherwise, and remained the cornerstone of standard doctrine right to the 1991 Gulf War. Likewise, analysis in the Cold War text became limited to the organization as the unit of analysis, and on “how the individual can be motivated, led, [and otherwise] changed within the organization” (Mills & Helms Hatfield, 1998, p. 49) by appealing to their self-interest.

A notion of the self-reliant worker became apparent in the management discourse at least as much from what ‘he’ wasn’t as what he should and could be. Two examples from the Proceedings of the Academy’s annual meeting and a third from Readings in Human Relations (Davis & Scott, 1959) may illustrate the former view. In the first example, the opening paper of the conference expressed a need for awareness of the requirement for self-development among workers and noted a lack of will or desire for self-improvement among the “youth” and that they fail “to develop a marked degree of ambition” (Martindell, 1954). In the second, the writer advocated a belief in self-reliance which was “the antithesis of that held by the man in the gray flannel suit…a symbol of the conformity, lack of imagination, and reluctance to explore the unknown that distinguishes much of our business society” (Culley, 1959). Finally, Karsh (1959) quoted Adam Smith to buttress the belief that workers who are not interested in self-development are “stupid and ignorant.” According to Karsh, Smith says,

“The understandings of the greater part of men are necessarily formed by their ordinary employments. The man whose life is spent in performing a few simple operations…has no occasion to exert his understanding…He generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become” (p. 390).

Davis and Scott (1959) also chose somewhat contradictory notions of the worker for their reader. In the first of consecutive readings, Horace B. Drury (1959) employed Frederick Taylor’s use of the likeness of workers to different breeds of horses to “classify men” into distinct groups according to their ability and willingness to perform different “grades of work.” Drury expressed the sentiment that most workers would probably “prefer to avoid the trouble of systematically planning complicated work,” that they would need the guidance of a manager and that they would likely be “better off for remaining at one employment and confining themselves to a limited range of activities” (p. 46-47).

In virtually a complete contradiction of the first reading, Douglas McGregor (1959) explained the need for workers to receive the “fairest possible break” (p. 53). Equality of opportunity would secure Maslow’s security needs rather than guarantees, protection, and security. In outlining Theory Y, McGregor asserted that all workers possess an innate capacity; “[t]he motivation, the potential for development, the capacity for assuming responsibility, the readiness to direct behavior toward organizational goals are all present in people” and management is a process “of creating opportunities, releasing potential, removing obstacles, encouraging growth, providing guidance” (p. 56). He also claimed that,
“[t]he conditions imposed by conventional organization theory and by the approach of scientific management for the past half century have tied men to limited jobs which do not utilize their capabilities, have discouraged the acceptance of responsibility, have encouraged passivity, have eliminated meaning from work…” (p. 57).

In moving toward “the good society,” progress in the implementation would be slow, and would “require extensive modification of the attitudes of management and workers alike” (p. 57).

**Organization Man**

Organization man was made possible by the convergence of a protestant work ethic with the undeveloped frontier of the early nation, and with the emergence of the modern corporation. Paradoxically, a Puritan ideal (Jacques, 1996), a work ethic coupled with an ascetic way of life, led to capital accumulation and was the basis for both the economic and moral foundations for modern capitalism (Jackall, 1988). In time, a secular asceticism would emerge brought about by intensifying commercial activity which had been liberated from the feudal pre-industrial social structures of Europe (Jacques, 1996). This led both to the accumulation of economic capital in a new, elite class of capitalist farmers and merchants, and to a social myth that validated an upward-looking middle class’s attention, “a pragmatic bourgeois ethic, with its imperatives for self-reliance, hard work, frugality, and rational planning, and its clear definition of success and failure” (Jackall, 1988, p. 8) which continues to define the values of an American Dream under the corporate form of capitalism.

Jackall (1988) asserted that the protestant ethic, largely stripped of its religious basis in the early frontier America, became work ethic, rugged individualism, and, especially, success ethic. These values were coupled with a mass consumer society in the first half of the 20th century. While rugged individualism remained largely in myth, the original ethic was undermined by affluence that coincided with the emergence of a consumer society and by the bureaucratization of the economy. A “tide of bureaucratization” (p. 9), driven by the New Deal in the 1930s, by the militarization of American society in WWII, and by the rise of corporatism, and legislative and regulatory bodies in the military industrial complex, led to the decline of the old middle class of entrepreneurs, free professionals, independent farmers, and small independent businessmen, and to the ascendance of a new middle class of salaried employees with a dependence on the large organization.

Sennett (1973) explained the contradiction of the self-reliant, rugged individual of American mythology and the corporate, interdependent society of Cold War America as “the carving out of some social space in which the [worker] is alone” (p. 58) and has achieved a level of independence from social bonds and class. American ideals have frequently involved escape from the demands of social bonds. For instance, the self-reliant individual, often society’s dropout, is someone who can be respected and respect himself. To Sennett, even the poor man longed for “upward mobility” in order to establish respect and dignity in his own life which would allow him to achieve emotional distance and control in interacting with society, some escape from the demands of class. As an example, the “poor man” frequently sought independence by defining it in his own terms in sacrificing his own interests, immersing himself in work, so that his children could achieve their own “social space” through education and opportunity.

The self-reliant American worker encountered what Jackal (1988) found was a distinctive form of bureaucracy. It was not the rational-legal form articulated by Weber, rather, it was a “patrimonial bureaucracy…in which one survives and flourishes by currying favour with powerful officials up the line who stand close to the ruler” (p. 12), a curious melding of modern organi-
zation and “patrimonial bureaucracy” in which personal loyalty, favouritism, informality and non-legality are the norm. Furthermore, Jackall argued that managers have a transforming role in society. In the last 60 years, managers’ occupational beliefs and worldview have come to dominate, not only within organizational studies and practice, but throughout other white-collar occupational groups as well. As they exemplify the notion of the white-collar salaried employee, they are the “principal carriers of the bureaucratic ethic” (p. 12) and their particular worldview has frequently overshadowed other interests on a great number of public issues.

Jackall (1988) claimed that bureaucratic work shaped employee’s consciousness toward rational, socially approved, purposive action, and “brought them into daily proximity with and subordination to authority, creating in the process upward-looking stances that have decisive social and psychological consequences.” The “subtle measures of prestige” and “elaborate status hierarchy” foster “an intense competition for status” that make “the rules, procedures, social contexts, and protocol of an organization [the] paramount psychological and behavioural guides” (p. 5-6). A corporate morality, separate, distinct, and “bracketed” from “what is right in a man’s home or in his church” developed because, “[w]hat is right in the corporation is what the guy above you wants from you” (p.6). Of course, perceptions of “moral probity” would necessitate not admitting to such a practice even though recent events would suggest that bracketing, consciously or not, is commonplace.

It is not clear that scholars, perhaps as trapped in the Cold War rhetoric and posturing as any layperson, appreciated the fluid nature of norms expressed in this uniquely American form of bureaucracy. For instance, in his essay “The Employee Society” (1959), Drucker made clear his desire to shed the employer-employee relationship of the traditional American workplace to move toward the “strictly objective” relationships of modern hierarchical systems. He recognized that the worker had experienced a transition from working directly for an employer in the small to medium-sized entrepreneurial firm to working for a “boss” in the large organization. He claimed that it had resulted in a system in which relationships were mediated through a “strictly impersonal, strictly objective, strictly abstract thing,” the organization, and that this was a “society which [was] based on, and ruled by, status” (p. 2), that is, by virtue of relative position within the hierarchy. Drucker had appropriately recognized that this new social experience was a radically different society from the one in which our values and beliefs were first developed but that he could distinguish the emerging phenomena as “the employee society,” suggesting an employee-centric economic system, seems quite capricious.

**Spirituality and Self-Actualization**

In the early Cold War, Christianity became purposefully linked to “a blessed crusade of resistance,” such as in the letters to Italy campaign (Wall, 2000, p. 100), against the ‘horror’ of godless communism (see also Whitfield, 1996). Heale (1990) alleged that, while difficult to assess, religion has shaped American resistance to communism. “[M]ost Americans have been eager to avow a belief in god, and religious leaders have frequently denied atheistic socialism or communism a place in the United States” (p. xii). Americans were persuaded to have ‘faith’ in liberal capitalism and in the conviction that material well-being and self-realization would make spiritual happiness possible (Nashel, 2000).

Christianity was also employed against the spread of Communism in the ‘rehabilitation’ efforts of the re-education programs applied to Japanese and Korean POWs in the late 1940s and the early 1950s (Robin, 2001). General Douglas MacArthur was obsessed with christianizing Japan and believed that “through the embrace of the Christian faith, millions of ‘backward,’ fatalistic, and ‘therefore warlike’ Asians ‘might achieve a new spiritual strength through which
they would develop the opposite attributes”” (p. 157). Furthermore, strong ties were drawn between Christianity and democracy. MacArthur saw Christianity and Communism as mutually exclusive faiths one of which would fill the Asian “spiritual vacuum.” As an example of this ideology in action, in Korea, religious conversion and church attendance became the outward sign of successful re-education of the “spiritually blind and politically ignorant… [and]… by far the most common form of expressing anti-communism and pro-democratic leanings” (p. 158).

In a similar sense, spirituality became linked to self-actualization and worker satisfaction in the human relations movement of the 1950s. For instance, in discussing The Crisis in Human Relations, Cooper (1959) stated that “the major problem that our age faces is spiritual in nature” (p. 450). In concluding his thesis, Cooper implicitly - although perhaps not intentionally - drew a link between the spiritual nature of man (sic) and an externally-anchored notion of self-actualization in the hierarchical, status driven modern organization:

“All human relations endeavor must meet the test of what Peter Drucker calls the ‘whole man’… who is also... spiritual...No longer do we dare ‘utilize’ men, or level them down to the ‘average workload.’ Instead, we must motivate them by increasing, through higher demands, opportunities for challenge and growth” (p. 454-455).

In his seminal Human Relations in Business, Davis (1957) quoted John D. Rockefeller, III on the opening page, “We must feed the spirit too, not just the body” (p. 1). He then boiled down the third of three important goals of human relations to, “to gain satisfaction from their work,” and then defined the worker as the “unit of satisfaction” (p. 4). Although, satisfaction was never clearly defined, Davis provided a satisfaction checklist (p.448) and he referred to the satisfaction of needs in a discussion of Maslow’s “need priority” (p.40). Davis summarized the consequences of satisfaction of self-actualization in the following:

“… though self-realization dominates few people, it influences nearly all persons. They choose occupations which they like to do, and they get certain satisfactions from accomplishing their tasks. To the degree that the fifth need can be unleashed, after reasonably satisfying the first four needs, people then will like their work. This will accomplish a long-sought management goal” (p. 41).

Women and “Special Employment Groups” in the Cold War Text

In a content analysis of 107 widely used North American business texts, Mills and Hatfield (1998) found that little (65) or nothing (37) was said about women, gender, or sex differences. This same pattern seems to have been set early in the development of the Academy as well in that, of 37 texts analysed for this study, only Keith Davis (1957) discussed the issue of gender with any thoughtfulness. Davis may have been the first to discuss women and sex differences in a management text in his seminal Human Relations in Business (1957). Nevertheless, some remarkable and illuminating references to women, or their absence, appeared in the correspondence of Academy members and in some of the early texts.

For instance, in an ironic turn, Karl Reyer, in a November, 1945 letter to Lillian Gilbreth, asked if she would speak to his students. Reyer noted that “[a]fter five years’ military service, I have returned to find that the university chapter of the Society for the Advancement of Management (SAM) is largely composed of young women,” not surprising given that virtually all young men would have been in military service of some sort at this time. Less than three years later in a June, 1948 letter to Reyer, Ronald Shuman, who would become the Academy of Management president in 1955 and was author of The Management of Men (1948) asked Reyer, “[d]o you hap-
pen to know the whereabouts of a smart fellow in management, with an M.A. or M.B.A.? We shall have an assistant professorship open here effective with September, and I am in search of such a man. I would like one with some college teaching experience, preferably, good intelligence, and a stable personality.” Apparently, the qualifications were minimal but must include a “stable personality.” Perhaps this requirement ruled out available women candidates?

While women were virtually unrepresented in the Cold War texts, when they were, their organizational status was clear. For instance, the first, short reading from Davis and Scott’s *Readings in Human Relations* (1959), apparently set the tone for the remainder of the book. The writer, Edward C. Bursk, the editor of the Harvard Business Review in 1956, explained in “good human relations…”[s]ometimes, too, the whole organization is helped if you tell some troublemaker to ‘go to hell,’ or even fire him, instead of trying to solve his inferiority complex or compensate for his wife’s unfaithfulness” (p. 1).

An example of women’s status, as illustrated by their exclusion, appeared in Newman’s *Administrative Action: The Techniques of Organization and Management* (1958), which remained in print in the UK until at least 1961 after its first printing in the US in 1951. It contained a section on “man specifications” (p. 324). Newman recommended that, even though lists of qualities for the “specifications of a man” to fill executive positions were based “largely on personal opinion,” they were, nevertheless, “useful guides in appraising individuals” (p.329). Newman, in explaining that “administrators are often men who possess outstanding ability in the particular activity that they are directing,” claimed that the “merchandise manager of a department store may be a canny buyer of women’s gloves” (p.1). Apparently, he saw nothing ironic in his example. In addition, Newman tacitly endorsed military officers, virtually all white and male, as “business executives”, even though they would usually have no background in their new company or industry because they would have “a basic grasp of the process of management” (p. 2).

In *Human Relations in Business* (1957), Davis clearly wrote in a white, male voice for white, male managers in the chapter called *Human Problems with Special Employment Groups*. In the chapter, Davis depicted women and non-white employees as “special employment groups,” which he defined as “those groups whose employment is affected by non-job conditions…the term ‘minority group’ [having] been shunned because it is too narrow in scope” (p.403).

Davis acknowledged the significant presence of women employees at 30% of the workforce. Even so, perhaps unintentionally, he consigned them to gendered occupations in which they “predominate” such as “stenographer, office clerk, schoolteacher, telephone operator, bookkeeper, and cashier” (p.409). Davis failed to mention that women had lost better paying jobs in the monopolistic sector of the economy to the returning servicemen at the end of the war and had been shifted to the lower-paying white-collar clerical jobs (Lipsitz, 1981). To the male reader, this may seem an understandable outcome given the following examples:

“…women give more emphasis to good human relations, than to the technical aspects of their work. Many women are willing to attach themselves to a pleasant work situation, and not seek advancement because they do not want to risk losing their pleasant social working conditions” (p. 410); and

“…women display more emotion than men…their emotions appear to be more variable…and they appear to become more upset by work pressures than men. A wise supervisor assigns small work units to women when possible, rather then piling up several days work in a single assignment” (p. 410).
In addition, Davis asserted that managers have “fears and doubts about promoting women to management positions” since they wondered if women were “seriously interested in a work career.” He claimed that managers were “hesitant about how a woman supervisor [would] get along with their male fellow supervisors. After all men understand each other in the business world, but they do not understand women very well.” Managers, apparently, also had concern where important clients were involved:

“Some managers hesitate to promote a woman because they feel she is more emotional and sensitive and therefore cannot withstand the constant pressures of the management environment as well as men do. They also feel that emotionality causes some women to be less objective in decision making” (p. 412).

Moreover, Davis distanced the manager from the problems that “special employment groups” encountered in the workplace. For instance, where he provided examples of discrimination of special employment groups, it was typically unions or other workers who resisted employment or integration of these workers and rarely, if ever, the employer who was guilty of such behaviour. For instance the following example is typical of union resistance in Davis:

“In an oil refinery in Indiana an industrial union represented both office and refinery employees. Most of the 7,000 employees represented were men in the refinery, and for twenty years they had a clause in their bargaining contract requiring that women who marry must quit their jobs 30 days after marriage. Naturally, the women resented this clause. As explained by their attorney, if and when they get married, they might quit work - but they don’t want anybody saying they have to” (p.406).

He also marginalized and trivialized the concerns and differences of special employment groups. In response to his own rhetorical question, “Why are special employment problems so difficult to deal with?” he claimed that “these problems are primarily emotional and social, and attributes of this type are notoriously difficult to work with because they are so intangible” (p.406). Davis sidestepped management’s responsibility by blaming the special groups for their sensitivity and emotionality.

“When one age group or race is rejected in employment, another is favored. This establishes an ‘in-group’ and an ‘out-group’, and more or less encourages the in-group to protect its privileges. This sets one group against another. The result is conflict among groups, when the best approach would be to have all groups working together to reduce the problem. Each group acts defensively, tries to protect itself, and becomes sensitive and emotional about its rights and grievances” (p. 407).

Furthermore, he claimed that since there was usually at least a “grain of truth,” it made it possible “for the discriminator to give reasonable or logical arguments to support his case” and thereby dodge the discrimination charge. For instance, in the case of the married women in the oil refinery, “it is true that in some plant somewhere a woman non-breadwinner has taken a job and kept a man breadwinner from getting immediate employment, although he needed it much more than the woman” (p.407).

Finally, Davis (1957) devoted almost a full page to “the wives of management.” He claimed that wives of employees were an important company social group, especially of management. Davis described the wife’s role as:
“that of helping her husband progress upward in the corporation. She is expected to be a gracious hostess and social agent… gregarious and eager to make ‘constructive friendships’ appropriate to her husband’s place in the social structure at that time. As he moves upward in the corporation, she too should be easily mobile to new friends, new neighborhoods, and new modes of social life. She needs to be understanding of the stringent requirements, such as night work and travel, which the firm makes of her spouse” (p. 115).

As for the other “special employment groups,” anti-racism had a peculiarly incongruous status in Cold War American politics. Anti-racism had become a cornerstone of foreign policy largely as a result of international criticism of “America’s racial segregation, lynching, and insults to dark-skinned foreign dignitaries” (Klein, 2000) which invited allegations of imperialism at a time when the United States sought to curry favor with “nonwhite decolonizing nations whose allegiance [it] was trying to gain” (p. 54). For instance, musician Louis Armstrong was promoted as a “cultural ambassador… symbolizing the superiority of American life” and “embodying American racial harmony” (Von Eschehen, 2000, p. 110) to African audiences. Nonetheless, at home in the United States, anti-racist activity, as evidenced by organizations with names like the Civil Rights Congress, the National Negro Congress, and the Committee to Win the Peace which usually had no connection to communism whatsoever, was perceived as a sign of subversive beliefs and an implied adherence to pre-war radical politics (Klein, 2001) and, besides, gender and race differences had been made immaterial by Modernization Theory.

**Brave New World**

“Where do we come from? What are we? Where are we going?”

Paul Gaugin

A particular notion of worker became dominant in mainstream North American society in the second half of the 20th century. The essential values of this ‘worker’ have been central in American culture at least since the American Revolution and the birth of the Republic when the economic and political interests of propertied, white, Christian men became enshrined in the institutions and mythology of the new nation (Heale, 1990). However, the conception of this ‘worker’ was shaped and reinforced, and reached a new level of significance, in the forge of the Cold War, fine-tuned to the needs of liberal corporatism and presented as a direct challenge to the communist threat, both at home and abroad.

‘He’ served the needs of a Cold War elite bent on consolidating a collaborative management of the military-industrial complex and stemming the “red” tide of international communism. Just as the cannibal hacked to pieces and feasted on his defeated enemy to capture his strength, courage, and power, liberal corporatism and internal security demanded the appropriation of the worker’s power by disconnecting him from the labour collective, first individualizing and then absorbing him into the new collective of the hierarchical corporation.

‘He’ was both the foil to the godless, materialist, collectivist communist worker, and the compliant, enculturated worker needed for the expansion of American industrial hegemony, and his values reinforced the particular liberal, democratic values necessary for free-market capitalism to flourish. He was reproduced in management theory, such as Maslow’s, and in the proceedings and texts of the early Academy, which continued to reinforce and insist on the notion of an autonomous, white organization man. He was at home in a hierarchical and ‘rational’ labour market that reacted to and redeployed its resources as the ‘system’ adapted to a dynamic and competitive environment, governed by the dispassionate interests of capital. Not only dominant
in the workplace, dimensions of the ‘worker’ such as self-actualization, spirituality, an elitist
value system, and deference to authority have also become firmly entrenched cultural values.

A hegemonic ideal of the contemporary worker faced few challenges in America as its
citizens experienced increasing affluence as most were lifted on the rising tide of economic
growth. Goldstein (1978) argued that conditions were so good that the social climate simply was
not conducive to the development of radical ideas. All Western economies made apparently sub-
stantial economic and social progress in the second half of the 20th century. Women and minori-
ties entered mainstream organizational and economic life and human rights were given special
recognition. The GDP and consumption climbed, Americans felt the need to save less, and, until
the 1970s, the middle class, that now included both blue and white-collar workers, grew robustly.

Moreover, American foreign policy was oriented to create a world environment in which
American-style democracy, free-market economy, and free-trade system could be spread (Dupuy,
1995). In this post-Cold War climate, in which a single global economic hegemony exists, along
with its notion of the worker, and in which we face growing social, economic and environmental
challenge, it would be sensible to examine from where we have come to better see the way for-
ward and the alternatives which may be limited or excluded by the dominant discourse.

We seem to have been offered the reality of only two alternatives, the rational, economi-
cally driven life of modernity’s “supra-national totalitarianism”, or the traditional life of a “primit-
ive in an Indian village” (Huxley, 1960). In 1946, in the forward to a later edition of Brave New
World, Huxley admitted that he wished he had offered the ‘Savage’ a third alternative “[b]etween
the utopian and the primitive horns of his dilemma” in a community in which “economics would
be decentralist and Henry-Georgian, politics Kropotkinesque co-operative” (p. viii). Over half a
century later, we find middle-ground solutions to societal problems such as public health care,
culture and education facing increasing pressure to open up to competition and ‘consumer’
choice. As an example, an influential right-wing think tank recently implored governments to
“free workers” from “ossified” labour relations law and give them choice under right-to-work
laws so that labour markets can reach their “potential” (Mullins & Clemens, 2003). Inherent in
this argument is the notion of the self-reliant worker, no longer in need of protection.

Attacked by socialists for encouraging selfishness and social conflict, and by conserva-
tives who argue for the need for social cohesion and authority, liberalism was founded on the be-
lief in the sanctity of the individual and the individual conscience. Loyalty to the corporatist
structure requires the individual to deny herself the right to pool her strengths with those of other
citizens through public mechanisms of their own making. The individual is abandoned to social
isolation and to the whims of the corpora tion in the face of uncontrollable forces, the extent of our
interdependence, hidden by the individualism advanced by corporatism. In the corporatist form
of conformity, real expressions of individualism are not only discouraged but punished, the com-
mitted and candid citizen unlikely to have a successful corporatist career.

Half a century ago, John Kenneth Galbraith (1956) presciently warned of the danger in-
hherent in an economy so dominated by such a small number of corporations: “In principle the
American is controlled, livelihood and soul, by the large corporation; in practice he seems not to
be completely enslaved. Once again the danger is in the future…” (p. 109). Now, many of la-
bour’s safeguards, achieved in a different age, have been eroded in a continual assault on the left.
The result of ongoing submission to corporate hegemony is a growing number of disaffected and
underemployed, and increasing use of cheaper and more ‘flexible’ contingent workers who re-
quire ever-higher preparation just to ensure employability. Furthermore, the “bracketing” of cor-
porate ethics (Jackall, 1988) has resulted in the severance of corporate behaviour from social and
environmental consequences. The public grows increasingly acquiescent in the face of mass lay-offs and downsizing, done in a transparent effort to safeguard accumulated capital at the expense of labour. The individual is persuaded to take greater responsibility for self-development and fitting in, and portrayed as a contributing member of a unified team, or not at all. Furthermore, the business academy has become, to an ever-greater extent, only an adjunct to, and reinforcement of, managerialist thought (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). In response to market competition, business schools feel compelled to demonstrate mainstream legitimacy with AACSB membership, further entrenching curriculum in management orthodoxy (McKee, Weatherbee, & Mills, 2004; Weatherbee, McKee, & Mills, 2004).

Why do we cling to such a delusion? Perhaps it was the ‘victory’ for the Western capitalist way of life, for ‘free’ enterprise, over godless Communism and slavery a decade and a half in the past already. Perhaps it is the remarkable fit of the compliant, upward-looking worker with the need for contingent workers, whose availability fuels economic growth. The individualism of the Cold War worker has rapidly transformed into the required independence needed for self-actualization and self-development within the globalized corporation. This self-reliant worker must achieve ever greater levels of preparation before even entering the workforce, must continuously upgrade skills, and knows that it is he or she who must ‘fit in’ to the rapidly changing workplace. And yet, it is this same worker who is, more than ever, socially and economically bound to the corporation not having attained real independence or autonomy. In a world characterized by the competing dualities of hot and cold war, terrorism and civilization, good and evil, modernity and traditionalism, we might wonder what diverse perspectives and alternative methods have been lost. As we struggle to find solutions in the collective good we are persistently told that only demand-driven, private enterprises can provide rational solutions with the greatest efficiency. The organizations in which alternative values could be instituted as integral to the way of doing business are marginalized, afforded only passing acknowledgment, if at all.

References


