The dialectics of storytelling and storieselling: Sometimes the facts get in the way of the story

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Introduction

In the last decade or so, one can detect an ever increasing frustration and sense of despair within and with the fields of management and organisation studies. This frustration and despair is in relation to the apparent inability of these fields to provide clear, unambiguous guidance and advice to those who seek to manage and organise the workplace. On the one hand, this may be due to the ‘marketing’ of organisational studies. If so, for theorists and authors, success would follow the dictate of finding a ‘niche’ or a novel way of thinking and doing things. For instance, take the concept of storytelling in organisations. It too is a novel way of expressing what should and should not be done at work, thus reifying and even deifying corporate culture because “stories tell plots, scripts, scenarios, recipes and morals” (Boje, 2001, p. 27) that are determined by the master storyteller.

Through storytelling, we can sense the dangers of going the ‘Henry Ford way’ to seek non-pluralist perspectives that could lead back to authoritarian ways and means of managing and organising. Then, from an international perspective, we are also faced with consultants’ coaching using stories on managing business and people [e.g. Emerging cultural profile matrix that includes “village market” and “well oiled machine” managers (Schneider & Barsoux, 1997/2003)]. Gannon’s (1994) cultural metaphors tell us stories that the United States is “football” and “England, a traditional British house” (Francesco & Gold, 1998, p. 32), which is very confusing as global companies would then be managed as mixed metaphors or mixed stories. The more metaphors used, the more confusing and ambiguous the story’s message. But is this not the way we develop our conceptual skills -- by having to consider at least two sides to every story told? Part of this paper will show that the development of these skills is antithetical to egoistic predilections to form strict distinctions between theoretical comprehension and reasoning -- reasoning that is theoretical application or the instrumental use of theory such as is evident in the Kantian split:

One of Kant’s most productive moves is his analytical distinction between different mental powers, especially theoretical understanding and reason. The former relies on scientific rationality to gain understanding of the natural world of objects, which can then be mastered technologically, while the latter is a version of Kant’s practical reason which deliberates about the ends and purposes of instrumental action. Kant’s philosophical system aims at mediation between these two forms of reason, warning about the overextension of either into the domain of the other. (Simons, 2002, p. 17)
In the Kantian way, one of the first things we can do to better understand storytelling is to consider the domain of what it is not -- narrative. According to Gabriel (2004a, p. 2), narrative is a type of text that has a clear time sequence. In organisations, examples of narratives are found in the concept of formalisation or the extent to which rules, policies and procedures are documented in the workplace (Daft, 2001). This is similar to Clair, Chapman and Kunkel’s (1996) perspective that narratives are acts of “‘commodification, exchange, and consumption’” (p. 255, cited in Boje, 2001, p. 2). For Boje (2001), narrative comes after story to add plot and coherence to the story line (p. 1).

Stories are narratives with plots and characters, generating emotion in narrator and audience, through a poetic elaboration of symbolic material. This material may be a product of fantasy of experience, including an experience of earlier narratives. Story plots entail conflicts, predicaments, trials and crises, which call for choices, decisions, actions, and interactions, whose actual outcomes are often at odds with the characters’ intentions and purposes (Gabriel, 2000, p. 239 cited in Gabriel, 2004a, p. 2).

Stories can be an educational tool in confronting and dealing with life’s challenges. For instance, Bettleheim (1976) observed that for children, a story can provide “suggestions in symbolic form about how he may deal with these issues and grow safely into maturity (p. 9). According to Simons (2002), a Kantian view of story would have little import because “aesthetic production and appreciation do not serve the purposes of theoretical understanding and the moral reasoning” (p. 18). We also disagree with this pragmatic view and choose to evaluate storytelling in regard to motivation that is underscored by reason. We believe there is an art to storytelling that can only be explained by extension and even overextension into the sciences. For instance, within the scope of complexity theory, we find that:

A story is an account of a sequence of specific actions, feeling states and events while a narrative is a story line linked by reflections, comments upon, and categorizations of, elements of the story line. So, a narrative contains within it a story but is a more complex form of communication than a story because it involves some kind of evaluation. (Stacey, 1993/2003, p. 350)

We believe storytelling is characterised with a teller who is mature and who allows plot to emerge with the help of the listeners because the “human will imposes myths and metaphors on existence in order to give it a manageable form” (Simons, 2002, p. 18). However, maturity is a relative term, given that “Nietzsche’s radical critique of Kantian reason speaks of the immaturity humans have displayed by attributing the limits they have imposed on the world to reason instead of admitting that they invented those limits” (Simons, 2002, p. 17).

Consequently in storytelling, maturity is comprised of the willingness to tell more than one side of the story (i.e., that is both the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ of the experience), to allow listeners to question
the storyteller in a participative manner (i.e. low task or with low direction, see Hersey & Blanchard, 1969) thus forming high priority for interrelationships between storyteller and listener (i.e., high regard for relationship). The emergent property of the mutual causation of these characteristics is that the storyteller asks for permission to tell the story because the storyteller is not afraid of the listeners’ power to change the interpretation of the story.

On the other hand, a storyteller (Carr & Lapp, 2005a, 2005b) is immature because he or she tells only the part of the story that will elevate his or her status or power so that it is only one interpretation that is to be conveyed and believed. As such, the storyteller plots to have the audience agree unreflexively with the plot turned narrative. Therefore, the storyteller is high task oriented in that he or she must have the audience only listen rather than listen and question, thus relying on low priority of relationship with listeners. By applying Kaylynn TwoTrees’ (1997) argument, the storyteller would: a) minimise time; b) constrict place and space; and c) compartmentalise mind so as not to have to ask permission to tell the story. Storysellers take permission to sell a story, betting on the audience’s immaturity; and their inability to say ‘no’ according to time, space and mind that has been taken away by the storyteller. Whereas storytellers believe in the strength and wisdom of their audiences, storysellers wager on the audience’s proclivity to commiserate and feel guilt and shame so as to pity the storyteller. The storyteller is a story leader who allows the storied to emerge and the storyteller is a story manager. Thus, storytellers have as their opposites, storysellers who storify their audiences.

The consequences of being storified are that: a) paradigmatic change and organisational change do not occur; b) they occur for the wrong reasons; and or c) they establish negative change. In regard to using stories to effect emergence, it is not storytelling; but storyselling that fosters unambiguous guidance and provides poor advice to the storified -- those listeners whose paradigms become immutable fortifications of the storyteller’s worldview. One fact of story is that in the literature, there seems to be a preponderance of discussion about what is being told rather than what is being sold and to whom. This fact leads to another that along with that of the storied, it is the maturity of the storyteller that needs to be questioned. If the storyteller requires someone to be storified, there is then created a master slave relationship -- the dialectic inquiry of which needs to be understood so as to negate limitations to emergence. In this paper, we evaluate current praxes of storytelling and storyselling; the latter of which creates false closed rather than true open systems that are concomitant to exploration and emergence of complexity theory. Emergence is the distance between a wish and truth.
However, these aspects are hidden in the individual’s propensity to consider only, binary oppositions such that it is the ‘good me’ that is promoted over the ‘bad me’ and at the expense of the ‘bad others’ thus creating stories of and for a false self. The fact is the story we tell is then the story we first sell to our selves. If this is so, another fact is that we are not the open, transformative systems some theorists such as Argyris (1991, 1994), Brookfield (1987, 1990), Spielrein (1912/1994) and Stacey (2003a-b) believed humans can be. This indicates that accurate evaluative properties of story and storytelling are not necessarily ‘true’ and the “antenarrative” (Boje, 2001) becomes privileged over the narrative:

I give ‘antenarrative’ a double meaning; as being before and as a bet. First, story is ‘ante’ to narrative; it is antenarrative. A ‘narrative’ is something that is narrated, i.e. ‘story’. Story is an account of incidents or events, but narrative comes after and adds ‘plot’ and ‘coherence’ to the story line….Secondly, ante is a bet, something to do with gambling and speculation. (Boje, 2001, pp. 1-2)

In of itself, experiencing the antenarrative can be rich and rewarding because it allows the storyteller and the storied to emerge with the emerging story. On the other hand, when the bet of antenarrative is to have those storied accept the narrative and subsequent intrapersonal change using guilt and shame, there arises the anti-antenarrative that is used to storify. Such negative aspects from antenarrative stem from the unhappy beginnings, middles and endings of storyselling as guilt and shame can only diminish self-respect and self-love making the storified more susceptible to false hope and praise. Storyselling manufactures truth and as such it is autotelic because, like a snake swallowing its own tail, it gives its end to itself. In this paper our goal is to further explore this crisis of confidence we seem to have in current organisational discourse that deals specifically with facets of storytelling because each paradigm -- each story -- should be evaluated for ethical properties associated with the storyteller’s and storyseller’s experiences. We believe there is both potential and limits to the use of story in regard to how employees, without adequate self-reflection, are storysold to reach agreement, if not success, by simply introjecting the storyseller’s purpose, desire and experience -- her or his wish:

Instead of accepting all voices of experience as equally valid and equally worth of attention, I would argue that it is the job of researchers to interrogate experiences, seeking to examine not only their origins, but also those blind spots, illusions, and self-deceptions that crucially and legitimately make them up. Far from being an unqualified source of knowledge, experience must be treated with the same skepticism and suspicion with which we approach all other sources of authoritative knowledge. (Gabriel, 2004b, p. 29)

As such, the story used can be purposefully selected from experience and facilitates emergence either through storytelling or storyselling, the psychodynamics of which are curiously
absent from the literature. The fact is that it is the maturity-level of the storyteller that first determines how and why the storied will be affected by the story told or the story sold. We will demonstrate that without adequate psychodynamic analysis of one’s motivation for telling a story, there is greater likelihood that both teller and listener fall prey to storyselling. Concomitantly, the paper uses the notion of coaching as a metaphor for storytelling and storyselling to ground our explications in organisational studies. Before we delve into the theory, let us first supply the reader with a case study that can be used to illustrate our theoretical points.
It’s always a bad dream: A story of storytellings

At a conference that supports the use of story, there were in the audience a group of people comprised mainly of heterosexual male academics followed in number by heterosexual female academics. Other than being performance bound through ‘familial’ and friendly ways and means to provide critical review of presentations, audience members did not have a vested interest in any of the presenters or presentations, other than their own. Each person at the conference attended because the conference, regardless of the theme, was well known for highly intellectual presentations that through conference advertisings and mission, were ‘mandated’ to provoke highly intellectual dialogue and debate of practical examples analysed against suitable theoretical foundation.

This conference’s theme was on identity and gender. And, there were ample data showing how men were treated differently than women in and outside of the workplace. An individual whose introduction included the self-professed title of professional storyteller began his presentation by saying that he was gay and he did not like the previous Freudian account of feminism because Freud did not treat gay people well. He provided no Freudian theory or statements to support this one side of the story, yet the audience laughed at the remark even though the previous presenters was obviously being berated. When an audience member asked where the theory for this or any of the presentation was, the individual simply stated that he decided not to provide it. And, ironically, this statement against Freud was made immediately after the previous presentation stated, with commensurate verbatim citations that Freud (1905/1986, 1923/1986, 1940/1986) believed, psychologically, women developed differently than men and in comparison, were likely to be more complex than men. Consequently, one can infer that men with female characteristics were actually being complimented by Freud as were women in general. Notwithstanding, for this individual, the purpose was to ‘come out’ in front of this group of people, while at the same time taking both personal and audience time and energy to ‘dispense’ with the previous theoretical offering.

Before his presentation and by taking life experience examples from childhood to adulthood, the individual chose to write out his life story of not only of ‘being’ a homosexual but by ‘being’ differentiated and at times, isolated or ‘left out’ from lesbian and heterosexual female and male activities. The hard copy of his story was cut into 17 ‘bad news about homosexuality’ fragments. Each fragment was delivered to audience members who were invited to take one of the fragments if they wished. If not, audience members were to pass the fragments onto others in the audience, with the hope that all fragments would be ‘picked-up’. On the presenter’s cue, someone in the audience would hold up her or his fragment signalling the presenter that it was that snippet he should speak to next. Once the presenter refreshed his memory about the story within the fragment, he then expounded on it. Although there could not be enough time to listen to 17 ‘instigators’, out of the 8 or so narrated, none had a happy beginning, middle or ending. Actually, each story told was a pity-request account of how poorly gay males were treated in comparison to heterosexual men and in comparison to other majority and even minority groups. If one of the stories was meant to bring a smile, its telling did so with jokes, sardonic wit, sarcasm and implicit and explicit statements saying that the presenter and those like him were ‘always’ treated badly; and in a ‘funny’ manner. There was no empathy or consideration of or for those who ‘purportedly’ and ‘always’ mishandled the homosexual. When another of the more astute audience members asked where supporting theory could be found for such a presentation, the individual stated that he did not feel theory was appropriate. There was no awareness that perhaps, the homosexual had instigated and or interpreted situations that were perceived to be about homophobia but really were not. There was no theory to explicate the motivation or method of such storytelling so the audience received, perhaps, half of what they were expecting to get in regard to intellectual rigor -- a uncritical account of human relations by the presenter or at most, having been fed only one side of the story. Although listening to even the first few story fragments became tedious through restatements of repetitive theme, more and more people in the audience waved their pieces of paper so they could be regaled by more of the same stories of woe. At the end of the conference during the wrap-up session that included a strengths and weaknesses discussion, the presenter, despite not following ‘critical’ activities, sat and addressed the audience as the right-hand-man to the conference director.

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1 This case study is a compilation of a number of separate events and all names in the case study have been changed.
The psychodynamics of storytelling

By reviewing some of the works of Sigmund Freud and Melanie Klein, we come to understand the psychodynamics of storytelling, which consist of the dialectic relationship between projective identification and introjective identification that occur along with binding. It is to the discussion of these processes of the psyche to which we now turn. To set a foundation for evaluation of storytelling, we use the relationship between coach and protégé where applicable.

Arguably, Sigmund Freud’s greatest discovery has been that the realm of the mind called the “unconscious” is a source of motivation and a ‘place’ where certain thoughts and desires are hidden from the individual’s awareness. This conception of the unconscious stood in stark contrast to his contemporaries who, in the main, considered the unconscious a messy collection of ideas, desires, mental residue and or impulses that were beyond analysis and largely inconsequential to ‘normal’ human behaviour (see for example, Hewett, 1889, pp 32-33). Some of his contemporaries thought the unconscious might be some kind of paranormal or spiritual repository or entity. In an early work, Freud (1916/1991) wrote:

‘Unconscious’ is no longer the name of what is latent at the moment; the unconscious is a particular realm of the mind with its own wishful impulses, its own mode of expression and its peculiar mental mechanisms which are not in force elsewhere. (p. 249)

Freud was to discover that, like the proverbial iceberg, much of mental activity responsible for human interaction lay below the “surface”, hidden from our conscious awareness. In the now familiar typography, Freud (1923/1984; 1933/1988a-b) suggested the mind consisted of three hypothetical mental provinces: a) the id -- various biological urges, drives or instincts; b) the ego -- the part of the mind that uses logic, memory and judgment in its endeavor to satisfy the demands of the id; and, c) the super-ego -- the province of the mind whose concern is for obeying society’s ‘rules of conduct’, (i.e., morality and social norms) and reminds the ego of these social realities. Freud argued that the id operated entirely hidden from our conscious awareness and that also, in the realm of the unconscious, were aspects of the ego and super-ego (see Carr & Lapp, 2006, p. 28). Freud called particular attention to the manner in which certain ideas, feelings, desires and urges emanating from the id were held back by the ego and repressed from conscious thought. In the id, positive tension is associated with Eros, the class of life, self-preservation and sex instincts and Thanatos, a purely destructive class of urges (Carr & Lapp, 2006; Freud, 1920/1984, 1923/1984). Eros and Thanatos are “fused, blended, and alloyed with each other” (Freud, 1923/1984, p. 381) to keep each other at bay and cancel each other’s energy; and are dialectical opposites that when combined affect and effect quantity an quality of emerging relationships such that positive or negative change results occur (Guest, 1939; Hegel,
1807/1977; Wallace, 1975). In processes that operate at an unconscious level, the ego employs a variety of defence mechanisms, including the aforementioned repression, in an effort to protect the integrity of the psyche from what the ego recognizes as potentially, a reoccurrence of aspects of previous painful experiences or negative anxiety producing situations. These defences are also used by the ego, often in response to reminders from the super-ego about social realities and constraints, to delay or postpone desires of the id to a time and location that is deemed more appropriate. Origins of these reminders are residuals of the oral stage -- in the infant's first 18 months -- that is the first stage of libidinal development (Freud, 1905/1986; Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973).

The oral stage is chiefly characterised by the activities of sucking that create experiences of satisfaction and which “furnishes the prototype for the fixation of the wish to a specific object, [this] is an oral experience; one may therefore advance the hypothesis that desire and satisfaction are forever marked by this first experience” (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 288). However, years later, was Freud's (1924/1991) subsequent discovery of the second libidinal stage, the anal-sadistic stage. In the anal-sadistic stage, the two to four year old comes to realise release of feces is associated with sadism projected toward a chosen object, which then creates bipolar opposites of this ‘activity’ that is different from non-defecation or anal-eroticism, that are indicative of ‘passivity’ (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 35). The transitive property is that the release of negative anxiety through sadism is pleasurable. Those who accept such sadistic acts perpetuate sadism that become the means toward the end of inflicting power and perhaps even unpleasure, over the other.

Pleasurable feelings and positive anxiety (e.g. In the Wizard of Oz, feeling relief when the wicked witch is finally overthrown by the ‘good’ Dorothy) occur when the ego appraises rules of social acceptance posed by the super-ego or outside world and successfully (i.e., provokes positive recognition from aspects in the outside world and especially authority figures) suppresses, satisfies or postpones the id’s demands. Although constantly seeking expression Eros and Thanatos are subject to repression -- they are coached by the super-ego -- so that neither does harm to self or others. Within a specific context, when the ‘best’ accepted standards for living life are introjected by the ego, through the process of identification, the ego may form an impression of an ego-ideal or a set of optimal values and beliefs to follow. It is no wonder then that libido or life force loyalties to the ego-ideal are extremely strong:

it is a matter of general observation that people never willingly abandon a libidinal position, not even, indeed, when a substitute is already beckoning to them. This opposition can be so intense that turning away from reality takes place and a clinging to the object through the medium of a hallucinatory wishful psychosis. (Freud, 1917/1984, p. 253)
To minimise confusion from coetaneous life affirming and threatening affects posed by the outside world, the ego fortifies its paradigmatic stronghold by employing transference to insert known parental prototypes into relevant, more powerful authority figures or change agents:

Freud reveals how it is the subject’s relationship to parental figures that is once again lived out in the transference – a relationship still characterized, notably, by instinctual ambivalence. (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 458)

Through transference, the ego can be duped into reconciling unstable interpersonal relationships with strategies and processes already experienced, regardless of previous effectiveness. Counter-transference is the power individual’s (i.e., read coach) need to identify with the less powerful other’s ego (i.e., read protégé). The transference counter-transference relationship between two individuals is arguably the strongest bind in human relations because the individuals become each other’s super-egos and perhaps even ego-ideals. Concomitantly, a break in this relationship is one of the most powerful anxiety producers because it is a disruption in self-love.

Competing values and goal incongruity among various aspects of the external world create ambiguity and ambivalence. The result is the ego’s inability to meet all super-ego demands simultaneously. For the sake of efficiency, principles are adjusted too quickly, so reflexivity is sacrificed and the consequence is internalization of substandard best worst and worst best principles in a poor exchange for what is perceived to be ideal. Such instances of synchronistic failure establish the self in a state of compromise that is generally ameliorated in favour of the contextual ego-ideal, while causing guilt and shame or intrapersonal moral anxiety (Badcock, 1988).

Guilt effects inwardly turned aggression that is masochism. Masochism erodes self-efficacy, self-esteem and therefore self-concept. The erosion of self-concept is also the erosion of self-love or narcissism. The degree of narcissism one demonstrates is the degree to which one feels protected from others’ ideas and beliefs. Narcissism creates perceptions of confidence, knowledge and righteous experience, the process of which can falsely convince the storyteller that he or she is an authority on the subject. Because the individual does not want to feel badly; does not want to feel losses of self-concept and narcissism, the antithesis of the masochistic thesis is sadism, the projection of unpleasure onto others that are demonstrations of behaviours ranging from the subliminal to the overt; from avoidance to aggressive physical acts. For example, the storyteller uses this false manufactured authority to legitimise the experience being relayed to the audience. This means storytelling has as its operative opposite, storytelling where storytelling means that the individual has ‘bought’ into the story told. What is the reason for the buy-in? It is because the individual wants
to emerge as the ‘not me’ -- the ‘I want to identify with the person, the thing, the whatever that did not harm the storyteller’. The individual wants to be emancipated from that which embodies the ‘it was just like me’ or the opposing and oppressing other. It is not surprising then that with the development of the super-ego, sadism is introjected as aggression toward the ego in the form of guilt that may appear to defy any logical explanation or basis such as when the homophobe treats the homosexual ‘better’ than heterosexuals. The fact is that through projection of what is ‘bad’ both storyteller and storified become victims of their own insecurities.

Therefore, the dialectic relationship between masochism and sadism forms and their cycling evolves into persecutorial syntheses of identification and transference and perhaps counter-transference. The importance of Freud’s originating work on narcissism, identification, projection, introjection and transference is so potent that it initiated and formed the basis for the works of Melanie Klein: “The Kleinian Technique is psychoanalytical and strictly based on Freudian psychoanalytic concepts” (Segal, 1981/1990, p. 3).

In her interpretation of object relations, Melanie Klein (1975a-d) believed that projection was underscored by a process called splitting. Splitting occurs when the individual remembers feeling badly and feeling losses when in infancy, he or she was separated from sustenance that parallels the Mother’s or super-ego’s reassurance. When the baby does not get what he or she wants, when he or she wants it, there follows Thanatic regressive feeling states of hatred, envy and spite. The child hates the Mother for not continuing with the feeding and in retaliation cries or even bites the mother (Suttie, 1935). Specifically, it was from Freud’s (1905/1986) oral stage in libidinal development that Klein co-established (see Karl Abraham, 1927) the oral-sadistic stage. Whereas Abraham (1927) viewed sucking as the preambivalent stage, Klein (1952) believed: “the libidinal desire to suck is accompanied by the destructive aim of sucking out, scooping out, emptying, exhausting” (Heimann & Isaacs, 1952, pp. 185-186 cited in Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 289). During splitting, one feels either hate or love -- hate must be speared into the other and love must be taken from the other.

The child hates the Mother because it does not understand that it is really the absence of the breast that causes anxiety and helplessness -- it is the intermediate object that triggers Eros and Thanatos. Regardless of whether the intermediate sustenance providing object is breast or bottle, the child hates it during unwanted periods of separation and loves it during attachment. Because the child cannot yet understand ambiguity and mutual causation of the intermediate object being both a source of pleasure and unpleasure, the child changes its mind about the object depending upon
whether the object provides pleasure or unpleasure; not pleasure and unpleasure. Such decisive splits are also derisive: to eliminate ambiguity, the infant uses the process of splitting to exaggerate differences between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ aspects of the object. It is the ‘bad’ part of the object that is projected into an other or, as Alford (1994) would say, projected into another psychic container. Projection works when the other introjects the ‘bad’, feels badly, and in turn changes her or his behaviour into what she or he perceives will be all ‘good’ for the projector, the infant: “…the persecutory character of the anxiety and … the schizoid nature of the mechanisms at work” (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 298) is what Klein termed the paranoid-schizoid position. It is in the oral sadistic stage that Klein (1952, 1975a-d) transforms projection and introjection into motivational processes of projective identification and introjective identification. By applying this Kleinian anxiety theory, one can see how storytelling is effected by the ego’s determination to split off and project aggressive impulses, thereby recreating the experience of the persecutory ‘bad breast’ in and around the storyteller. In the Kleinian sense, projection is to injure or control the other so as not to be persecuted by memories of the mother’s body which hold good and bad object memories. The important issue is ‘motivation’ because Klein is not using the word projection in the normal way of psychoanalytic thought in as much as to mean most generally, the idea of expelling parts of oneself onto others that might include objects and often includes a denial that oneself has these attributes and ascribing them to others.

On introjective-identification, it is both defence and a developmental process. For example, Freud talked about introjection of parental figures values in the super-ego. The motivation for acceptance is the punishment that would result if it were not accepted. Without context, it says nothing about what is being transferred or incorporated; just the process. When the object is a human being, then the behaviour of this human being defines what has occurred.

Additionally, setting boundaries around the ‘bad’ object or ensuring that the ‘bad’ cannot act as a magnetic force for the ‘good’ of the infant is meant to develop the ‘good’ object. However, development cannot and does not occur when the child is also envious of the Mother’s power over whether the infant will or will not be separated from any aspect of the life force. Learning to be ‘good’ or to be ‘better’ than the enviable, is a way to protect narcissism at the expense of the enviable. Those who are envied are those containers in which ‘bad’ projections are placed. Envy is an especially damaging force because it seeks to destroy the ‘good’ objects around which the ego attempts to develop. Because the enviable become ‘bad’, they are also perceived by the projector and introjector to destroy hope. Once hope is destroyed, there is no longer a need to learn to overcome the
projective-identifier so acquiescence ensues and the storyseller continues to construct partial and therefore, false truths. Thus the storyseller is also competitor.

As the child matures, it transitions to what Klein labels the *depressive position* or the understanding that it both hates and loves the same breast. Klein (1952) believed in the mutual causation of feeling love and hate; *Eros* and *Thanatos* at the same time. The infant feels shame for hating a loved object “toward whom the child feels deep gratitude and concern” (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 95). In another defensive effort, the child may seek to deny or disavow (Freud, 1940/1986) the reality of the persecutory object. This process emphasizes the ‘good breast’ as the core around which the ego can sustain itself or develop “as if it were the grain of sand that yields the pearl” (Klein, 1975c, pp. 178-180) while simultaneously allowing the repression of ‘bad breast’ memories. It is important to note that the paranoid-schizoid position and the depressive position are dialectically opposed, so that if the former accedes over the latter, negative synthesis occurs that can include storyselling through coaching and vice versa. Storyselling is particularly dangerous because it uses splitting to establish ‘false’ depressive positions that are false closed systems.

When feelings toward the intermediary object change, as when one is able to master the intermediary object or its representations, feelings toward the Mother change. The Mother and child become a **effective storytellers** when they are able to show each other love and reassurance even during separations from the breast and when they are able to help each other introject positive aspects of the separation -- even if that which is introjected competes with the individual’s needs and wants. The child and Mother are storytellers when the modus operandi is to make each other feel guilty and shameful, inadequate and unloved, in order to get what he or she wants during separations and especially when they collude to motivate others in the same way. When coach and protégé reinforce self-love at the expense of an other, it is storyselling that is at work.

At the same time, the child also envies the Mother for having control over that which provides life to the baby. Coaching through masochism means guilt is projected onto the other, and the other or introject consciously or unconsciously allows guilt to penetrate. The introjector feels shame for not ‘believing’; not demonstrating the same feelings as the projector. It is out of shame that introjectors allow the projector’s ego to turn on their super-egos. Successful coaching through projection of guilt so as to effect shame of any deficiency is called projective-identification, a process that is initiated by ‘master’ (Hegel, 1807/1977). Projective-identification’s opposite is introjective-identification (i.e., by the introjective-identifier, the slave), the willingness to absorb the other’s guilt
and to reward that other by feeling shame about the other’s predicament. It is the willingness, the desire, of introjective-identification that transforms projection into projective-identification: projective-identification works because it has as its opposite, introjective-identification. Dialectically, these psych-process opposites affect and are affected by the quality and quantity of the relationships they create. For development and at least change to occur, the negation of the negated synthesis is also required (Guest, 1939; Hegel, 1807/1977).

Projective-identification effects and affects introjective identification and vice versa -- the more the projective-identifier gets away with the other’s ability to introjectively-identify, the deeper and the more projective-identification is used. Negative synthesis from the projective-identification and introjective-identification relationship is the ‘false’ transference counter-transference relationship where self and other believe each other’s stories through guilt and shame. Thus storytelling is the manufacture of false empathy and sympathy that further strengthens projective-identification and introjective-identification between master and slave that fortifies a negative transference counter-transference relationship. As in the case study above, it is through projective identification of only ‘pity’ stories that the storyteller convinces others that he is a professional storyteller when he is not because he does not know the theory; and the differences between storytelling and storytelling. Pity stories are one way to cause introjective identification. But to “call” the presenter’s bluff is shameful and so, introjective-identification is effected once more and generates more splitting that reinforces the paranoid-schizoid positions of self and other that propagates more pity stories and the un-reflexive belief in them. By supporting the presenter and by being similarly swayed by the pity stories, the conference director is also a storyteller so the transference counter-transference relationship between them is very strong.

Positive synthesis from projective-identification and introjective-identification is a ‘truer’ transference counter-transference relationship where self and other believe each other’s stories through guilt and shame but for the purpose of using projective-identification to convince the other that he or she is better than he or she believes (i.e. from feeling guilty about feeling guilty). Projective-identification and introjective-identification can be used to motivate the other to stop feeling guilty; stop feeling shame as through the telling of jokes and or using sarcasm to help the guilty find a place to project their unpleasurable feelings.

As such, through Eros’ accedence over Thanatos and vice versa, the synthesis of the ego, super-ego and ego-ideal are shaped by culture and they shape culture. To ensure that behaviours --
associated with coaching through storyselling -- are not detrimental to others, there needs to be enacted a negation of the negation of the negative synthesis from guilt and shame. Negation of the negation could occur if the projective-identifier storyseller, the presenter, realises he does not have to make audience feel guilty by using only pity stories and stories that degrade others (i.e. does not have to use splitting to create “all bad” characters) to make his point that he was and is feeling separated from the ‘life force’, which is simultaneously eroding narcissism. The projective-identifier is negated when the introjective-identifier, the slave, asks for more than one side of the story. When this occurs, each slave works through introjected feelings, does not feel guilty and or tells the presenter he is ‘full of it’. Therefore, the presenter cannot re-enact the oral or anal-sadistic phases of development by trying to manipulate the audience that includes the conference director (i.e., formation of another unity of opposites).

In the case study, it was mentioned that some of the audience indeed ‘called’ the presenter on his ignorance of theory and on the refusal to fulfil the conference’s mandate for critical theory. Thus, in this case, the presenter was acting as ‘oral-sadistic’ master only to those who allowed the pity-stories to act as sole foundation for the presentation. Yet, even for the more astute audience members, some introjective-identification remained as no audience member actually walked out on the presentation. It can be said that when dealing with the dialectics of motivational process, some remnants of the opposites will remain.

Further and in specific regard to storytelling theory, there needs to be understanding that the presenter’s pity stories violate, at least, the second and fifth ‘rules’ of antenarrative: “Secondly, antenarrative gives attention to the speculative, the ambiguity of sensemaking and guessing as to what is happening in the flow of experience. It answers the question ‘what is going on here’” (Boje, 2001, p. 3). The case study clearly shows the presenter’s motivation and perhaps ability to only be able to speak to the ‘black’ of the experience and as such, splitting is privileged over ambiguity, mutual causation and the more mature depressive position. When leaders of storysellers reward storyselling in this manner, both leader and follower engage in storyselling that becomes the anti-antenarrative. The new depressive position is now a false centring of ‘truth’ because it is based only on one-side of the story. The violation of rule #2 of antenarrative is extremely dangerous because it strengthens rule #5 of antenarrative: “Fifthly, antenarrative is collective memory before it becomes reified into the story, the consensual narrative. It is before the plots have been agreed to; it is still in a state of coming to be, still in flux” (Boje, 2004, p. 4). As mentioned, above, had the negation of the negation truly occurred, there would have been evidence that at least some audience members would
have vacated the presentation, by physically leaving the room or that many more of the audience would have stated they psychically ‘switched-off’ the presentation: attending to it as if it were a mere amusement. The majority of the audience did not and remnants of introjective identification remained, forming collective memory that when established through storyselling is negative synthesis that then becomes reified. Thus, quality and quantity of relationships are effected and affected that further reinforce the dialectic and therefore negate the ambiguous nature of storytelling. Storyselling is anti-antenarrative that violates all antenarrative rules because these rules fall under *mutual causation: they are not incommensurable*. Transitivity speaking, because of their mutually co-dependent relationship, the presenter *storysold* that which was allowed and wished by the master storyteller, the conference director. Otherwise, why was the narrative of having to be critical at the conference mandated in the first place?

To negate shame means never having had introjected that which was projected in the first place. One can project onto anything, which means introjection does not necessarily take place. Thus, projection and introjection are not dialectic opposites as are projective-identification and introjective-identification. However, projective-identification and introjective-identification are based in the dialectics of ethical and unethical; moral and immoral foundations of maturity such that receivers are treated as simply means to the storyteller’s ends. Ultimately, it is the negation of splitting that is the negation of projective-identification. On the other hand, the paradox of splitting is our inherent need for it because in its absence, the same depressive position space is propagated (Carr & Lapp, 2005c, in press; Ogden, 1989). Positive transformation from the dialectic relationship between the paranoid-schizoid position and depressive position in storytelling is nicely summarized by Kaylynn TwoTrees:

> According to TwoTrees (1997), stories have three properties: time, place and mind. I believe that many narratologies currently being applied in the field of organizational analysis and the social sciences more broadly *marginalize* these three properties. In effect, narratology marginalizes *story*. In what follows, I will critically review common narratologies and suggest some ways in which the idea of story can be returned to analysis.

Stories, TwoTrees (1997) suggests, have:

1. A *time*, ‘You tell a story at a certain time of the year, a season, or time of the day. There are Fall and Spring stories.’ [i.e. read time(s) of life for teller and audience];

2. A *place*, ‘You recount stories at this place, and places have their own story.’ [i.e. read place and space of the unconscious vs. the conscious, of being a storyteller and audience member];

3. A *mind*, ‘Every creation, even a story has a life of its own. We create a story and it has a life. The stories have origins. *You MUST tell a story with permission* [i.e.,
read teller needs audience’s permission to keep listening. (cited in Boje, 2001, pp. 5-6)

We agree with TwoTrees’ (1997) arguments because they bring forward the consideration of psychodynamic processes, which are not addressed in much of the literature. It is from a psychodynamic point of view that storyselling becomes a clear process that needs to be recognised -- especially because storyselling is telling a story without permission! The case study is a clear cut case of storyselling because it was also told without giving the audience the permission of exploring at least two sides to the presenter’s story, even if the other side was narrative in the form of theory that was his-tory that his-torified many in the audience.

The contrariety of storytelling and storyselling: Time, place, space and mind

Story, narrative, ante-narrative, storytelling and storyselling -- what do these terms have in common? What they share is themselves. That is, all are supposed to work together to co-create praxis for working in complexity. But with all the time and energy that working in complexity no longer affords, we forget or ignore the potential of their interrelationships and instead, exaggerate their unique qualities. These lapses turn non-linear emergent systems into linear, self-replicating systems. The mores of hard sciences’ reductionism or the linear, thesis antithesis approach carries on to generate findings that were and are based upon additive properties and diluted opportunities for mutual causation and synthesis:

the Galilean research philosophy tends to fail in the study of complexity which cannot be broken down into parts and then ‘added’ again into a whole. The reason that the complexity related to living organization cannot be broken down is that it exists only when all of its components are in proper relationship to one another. (Argyris, 1960, p. 4)

When story management becomes the defining paradigm we lose sight of that which is also important -- all of the other relationships included and necessary for development. The fact is that we get caught in the cross-hairs of positivism that albeit important, is only one facet of knowledge in complexity.

The origins of non-linear systems have been derived from the philosophy, paradigm, and praxis of linear systems theory. Take for instance, Aristotle’s (circa 384-322 BC, 1925/1998) discussions of opposing physical forces in the sciences. Within the same spatial plane of reference, the correct opposite would fit the context, thus winding the context in and around the opposites. The greater the contrariety between opposites, the farther apart and the more defined and independent is each
contrary. As long as contraries, such as art and science, could be reasonably related or contextually connected, one could define what was, by knowing what it was not and *by how much more one was not like the other* (Aristotle, circa 384-322, 1956/1961).

Positivism has within it the paradox of *long linearity*: the greater the contrariety between opposites, the less complex each contrary. And, the lesser the complexity, the less anxiety generated due to ambiguities forged when contraries become too close. Extremes are extremes because they cannot become any more or less of themselves. But, the plane in which extremes reside becomes more or less of each contrary depending upon the direction in which the intermediary moves. It is not therefore, only the contraries that have the intermediary, but also the plane or space the contraries construct. Thus, every plane or space has varying degrees of ambiguity and ambivalence. In regard to story, it is time, space and mind between contraries that defines each contrary -- providing we allow their degrees of ambiguity and ambivalence to co-construct emerging relationships between contraries and practise the negation of negation that translates into development.

One aspect of time, space and mind between the opposites of storytelling and storieselling is maturity of the storyteller. The closer maturity comes to storytelling, the more likely it is that at least two sides of every story will be told as is characteristic of the depressive position. This also means maturity moves away from storieselling thus establishing storieselling within the plane of immaturity and the paranoid-schizoid position of the story being all ‘bad’ as is evidenced in the case study. Storytelling falls toward positivistic aspects of demonstrating wisdom whereas storieselling does not.

Within Aristotle’s (1927/1993) system of nicomachean ethics, scientific knowledge was the means to demonstration (i.e., praxis), while art, science’s contrary, was concerned with making and demonstrating. However, because art consists of chance or invariability (i.e., whereas science does not) one was either an art maker or an art demonstrator. This had to be because, ostensibly, one is only wise about certain things, and therefore, valued only for this wisdom:

no one deliberates about things that are invariable, or about things that it is impossible for him to do. Therefore, since scientific knowledge involves demonstration, but there is no demonstration of things whose first principles are variable (for all such things might actually be otherwise), and since it is impossible to deliberate about things that are of necessity, practical wisdom cannot be scientific knowledge or art; not science because that which can be done is capable of being otherwise, not art because action and making are different kinds of thing. (Aristotle, 1925/1998, p. 142)
What Aristotle basically speaks to is the anxiety, fear, and fright of being unwise. What we believe is that story management, such as that through storytelling, has as much and perhaps more to do with keeping one from becoming unwise. Hegel (1807/1977), turned around the paradox of long linearity by introducing the philosophy of dialectics that with the integration of co-consciousness, transcends the thesis-antithesis-synthesis construct into a recursive process of three laws: a) the unity of opposites; b) the quality of relationships of this unity affects quantity and vice versa; and c) there is a turning of these relationships on themselves, which results in a negation of that which was negated in introducing the opposite in the first place (Guest, 1939, pp. 41-46).

By borrowing from the hard sciences and by establishing mutual causation, from Hegel's (1807/1977) work are derived three laws of this inherent subjectivity that had as its intermediary self-and other consciousness or co-consciousness. It is self-consciousness that makes self and other aware of being wise or not, thus, by turning subjectivity onto itself, it brings a round the negation of, in knowledge emergence, the self and other-organisation learning paradigm.

In such a case when antenarrative is privileged over narrative, there is lost ‘truth-value’ because the audience is not allowed to or does not feel free to question the authority of the storyseller. The negation of such fear or of becoming less wise also does not occur, which curbs emancipation, development and self-organisation. Storyselling reinforces the paranoid-schizoid position in group dynamics.

Without progression to the depressive position, aggressive impulses push the individual toward eventual and complete dissolution, as remembered from childhood. While in normal development we build reflexivity and wisdom to pass through this phase, the paranoid-schizoid position is a constant threat because, through memory, it is always available to us and so can never be truly transcended in adulthood. Adults are non-reflexive and unable to maintain a depressive position when they suffer degradations of self-concept. These perceptions of persecution may become such that others are experienced as only reminders of the ‘bad breast’ rather than as ‘whole’ individuals: “The regression (to babyhood) under fantasy leads to a great deal of infantility of character in adult life …” (Suttie, 1935, p. 32).

On the one hand, transference and counter-transference such as that which can occur between coach and protégé is a productive, efficient and effective change agent. On the other, if the coach projects or sells a story that breaks transference or does not allow transference to occur, change does not occur. If the coach breaks the relationship, the protégé will stop learning from that coach.
However, if the protégé breaks the transference counter-transference, he or she is in grave danger of being further coerced by the storyseller because the storyseller will not be able to manage the anxiety of eroded narcissism. The storyseller and storified’s relationship is an example of negative synthesis from the dialectic opposites of projective-identification and introjective-identification. Additionally, this negative synthesis is the result of the storyseller’s splitting and reinforcement of only one side of the story. The more the storyseller sells, the more the protégé becomes storified and learns to change only through feeling guilty and shame until all learning can become associated with this sadistic-masochistic process and the protégé and coach become encapsulated:

According to Tustin (1972) and Hopper (1991), encapsulation is “a defence against annihilation anxiety through which a person attempts to enclose, encase and to seal-off the sensations, affects and representations associated with it” (p. 607). (Lapp & Carr, in press)

Storieselling plays a great role in the concepts of expectancy theory of motivation (Vroom, 1964) and organisational behaviours relating to the self-fulfilling prophecy (Eden & Shani, 1982). The problem with storieselling is that if the storified coach has a wide, unsuspecting audience, each story sold equates to multiple experiences of guilt and shame that equate to multiple experiences of the same vicious paradigm. From the case study in this paper, one can infer that those who determine the presenter’s motivation in storieselling should not continue to ‘listen’ to those stories. On the other hand, if that presenter shows those storified that he is in league with other storifieds and especially his contextually powerful leaders, it could be virtually impossible to stop him and his cohort.

Melanie Klein adopted Freud’s conceptualisations of the instrumentality of persecution and showed that the super-ego and ego-ideal begin formulation in infancy. Most importantly, without the ability, the memory, of residing in the depressive position, the same dialectical relationship between the ego and the super-ego or the ego and the ego-ideal from infancy are carried through to adulthood. If the super-ego and ego-ideal do not change, then neither does the ego. Coaching serves as an intermediate object, albeit process, that helps change the ego for better and for worse. And, the higher the degree of narcissism, the less effective is coaching by other; and the more narcissistic the coach, through coaching, the more narcissistic the protégé becomes. The higher the degree of narcissism; the lower the chance of change that is not conducive to the coach’s wishes. Consequently, coaching through storified storieselling is its own paradox -- it is inherently, highly narcissistic and if effective, highly Thanatic or persecutorial because change continues to occur around the storified but they cannot and do not change. The remedy for Thanatic projection and introjection is awareness that projective identification occurs through storified and its metaphors of coaching, mentoring, teaching, consulting or presenting.
Storieselling: Using daydreams to mitigate nightmares

It was through a variety of techniques such as ‘free association’, the analysis of dreams, jokes, ‘accidental’ behaviours, slips of the tongue, and the use of language that Freud believed he could gain access to ‘contents’ of the unconscious, in which the instincts that effect these behaviours reside. Instinct theory makes a “constant claim on the mind and urges the individual to take certain actions” (Anna Freud, 1952/1992, p. 58) and so it is applicable to egoistic and psychological inquiry.

As instinctual beings, humans’ basic needs are to maximise pleasure and minimise displeasure (Freud, 1900/1988, 1920/1984, 1923/1984). This “pleasure principle” acts as a guide for the psyche’s unconscious to satisfy basic needs symbolising pleasure as well as using energy to eliminate ‘real’ or ‘perceptual’ elements of unpleasure (i.e. to satisfy thirst; to satisfy hunger). It is at the same time that one actively (i.e., instinctually) seeks pleasurable experiences and avoids unpleasurable ones. Energy or cathexis is used to maintain or return to the state of pleasure so it is at the point of believing displeasure will ensue that reactions begin to formulate. Whereas experiences with pleasure have a tendency to produce less excitation or positive tension, experiences with displeasure have the opposite effect and cause increased negative energy flows. Positive tension is associated with Eros; and negative tension, with Thanatos. Moral stability and equilibrium within a specific context are signals that for that context, the psyche has reached Nirvana, the state of non-excitation that includes elimination of both positive and negative anxiety.

In the Interpretation of Dreams, Freud suggested that when there was time to react to displeasure, the energy or cathexis used to mitigate ‘real’ or perceived negative consequences was such that one would “wish” for return to a pleasurable state:

A current of this kind in the apparatus, starting from displeasure and aiming at pleasure, we have termed a ‘wish’, and we have asserted that only a wish is able to set the apparatus in motion and that the course of the excitation in it is automatically regulated by feelings of pleasure and displeasure. (1900/1988, p. 757)

Wish fulfillment constitutes indirect attendance to the pleasure principle in that it provides a substitute or symbolic gratification of needs. In regard to coaching, the protégé is willing to introject the coach’s projections because the coaching situation is not the ‘real’ situation but a reasonable facsimile. When one is being coached, one should feel as though he or she is being appropriately reassured by ‘the Mother’, regardless of also having to work through the ‘bad’ of a situation.
However, reassurance cannot be achieved if the protégé uses projective-identification to have the coach introjectively-identify with what the protégé wants, when he or she wants it. To do so means the protégé is not learning and therefore, uses coaching only to further narcissistic needs. Thus, effecting organizational change through the application of learning styles questions whether learning is actually taking place and if not, change mastery is negated.

The existence of a wish indicates that the individual is in a state of anxiety rather than fear or fright. Whereas anxiety is caused by a perceived object that is predicted to cause unpleasure, fear requires something of definite substance, an object, of which to be afraid. Associated with anxiety and fear, is a degree of preparedness from which calculated and perhaps, moral behavioural reactions can ensue and, although based on the strength of anxiety or fear, this is not guaranteed. In contrast, fright has no preparedness linked to it; it is the state of being surprised by danger (Freud, 1920/1984, p. 282). While negative anxiety is predictive of negative consequences, fear is a realisation of what negative consequences may be and fright is the state of realising those negative consequences. From this, we can say that people are most anxious about being frightened, which is ameliorated in dreams as compared to real life experiences:

\[ I \text{ am not aware, however, that patients suffering from traumatic neurosis are much occupied in their waking lives with memories of their accident. Perhaps they are more concerned with not thinking of it.} \text{ (Freud, 1920/1984, p. 282)} \]

Yet, what remained unanswered was why, in dreams, individuals regularly revisited traumatic situations that frightened them and more importantly, even after recognising and remembering that they awoke in a state of fright:

\[ \text{Now dreams occurring in traumatic neuroses have the characteristic of repeatedly bringing back into the situation of his accident, a situation from which he wakes up in a fright. This astonishes people far too little.} \text{ (Freud, 1920/1984, p. 282)} \]

Given that wish fulfillment and dreams provided the preparedness to avoid fright, Freud came to the conclusion that revisits to frightening, traumatic experiences in dreams were forms of recursive unpleasure management. That is, in dreams, people were looking, were wishing for the ways and means to avoid fright in real life but at the expense of feeling some fright, more fear, and mostly, anxiety. It must be understood, however, that since people do not wish for unpleasure, they also do not revisit their dreams to re-experience the tragedy. They do, however, revisit them to seek what is pleasurable that is the removal of the sources of unpleasure:

\[ \text{Anyone who accepts it as something self-evident that their dreams should put them back at night into the situation that caused them to fall ill has misunderstood the nature of dreams. It would be more in harmony with their nature if they showed the patient pictures from his healthy past or of the cure for which he hopes.} \text{ (Freud, 1920/1984, p. 283)} \]
Since, in real life, fright has yet to have a recurring substance or a specific object attached to it, there is a linking-up from fright to the removal of fear, to residence in a state of anxiety, to a point of low or no excitation, as the means to eliminate fright. At the point where positive and negative excitations cancel each other’s energies, is the tensionless state of Nirvana, in which there are no wants or needs to be fulfilled:

In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920), Freud adopts the expression suggested by the English psycho-analyst Barbara Low and formulates the Nirvana principle as a tendency expressing ‘the effort to reduce, to keep constant or to remove the internal tension due to stimuli. (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 272)

The state of Nirvana is reached through an ability to “bind” (Freud, 1920/1984, p. 276). Binding helps in the cancellation of excitations by linking one idea to another to form a foundation that ameliorates anxiety. Whereas one unpleasurable event could be disastrous, binding allows the individual to work through ways and means of decreasing excitation by thinking about, wishing for and perhaps, effecting pleasurable events. It should be noted that there is not a 1: 1 relationship between the quality or quantity of unpleasurable to pleasurable tensions. Rather, the bridging of these opposites has to do with the affects of quality on quantity and vice versa that are mediated by a “given period of time” (Freud, 1920/1984, p. 276). The more time available, the more likely it is that what could have been “untamed” (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p 50) unregulated reactions of high excitation, become bound by the ability to remember and integrate better ways to respond to the source of unpleasure. Similar to creating preparedness as during the dream state, binding affords the individual with alternatives that “link-up” from unpleasure to pleasure. The effects of binding are the creation of intermediaries that symbolise and define what caused fright, fear, anxiety, and then Nirvana for the individual. Conversions of quality and quantity of inter-relationships between unpleasure and pleasure can be thought of as ‘slow-up’. There is no guarantee that the end of the binding process will provide the best solution; only that it will have time to better minimise the feelings of unpleasure in a calculative and perhaps, moral way.

Unbinding is also time determined. When little or no time is allowed to pass before discharges of energy from excitation, there is no ‘linking-down’. Instead, one falls from pleasure to unpleasure because there has been no time to create intermediaries and slow the process. Unbinding affects quality and quantity of the pleasure-unpleasure relationship by being ‘fast-down’. Here, there is no guarantee that such a free-fall will automatically lead to disastrous results. Given the readings on the differences among Nirvana, anxiety, fear, and fright, unbinding means that the individual is experiencing minimum quality and maximum quantity of what were “linked-up” events. In the stage
of fright, the reaction is to release negative energy (i.e., maintenance of masochistic position and or masochism in the form of sadism) from high amounts of excitation that are to efficiently, but not necessarily effectively, (i.e. morally) bring forward pleasurable feelings. It can also be that in repeatedly enacting the process, (i.e. the intermediary of unbinding) itself, that binding results. That is, the end result is ‘always’ efficient and effective enough.

The introjector, the protégé, may allow introjective-identification to occur as the way to bind the fright of being changed by the coach and or of not being able to do what the coach wants. In storieselling, we thus find the paradox of binding; the more different the coach’s and protégé’s paradigms, the closer they become through binding that leads to the transference and perhaps, transference counter-transference relationship. Negative transference counter-transference relationships are characterised by storieselling between the coach and protégé and they are reinforced when coach and protégé perceive that because they are acting in unison, they get what they want, when they want it -- but at the expense of others. Storysellers are afraid protégés and others will say “no” and therefore, will not engage in introjection or introjective identification. Storysellers take what they need without asking. They ask for forgiveness later, instead of first, asking for permission. And when they ask for permission, they do so in the form of asking other’s for their input, but after the coaching has been completed. Storieselling is coaching that siphons the ‘good’ out of the protégé and others. The worst storiesellers are aware of the process. However, because much of this process occurs unconsciously, both storiesellers and others in their audience can remain largely unaware they are being ‘sold-out’. Psychologically, the purchase of storieselling is the protégé’s and others feelings of losing the coach’s recognition and love -- the price of storieselling is the unreflective need to be included in the storieseller’s story.

In its most insidious form, storieselling helps the storified complete the binding process. As such, storieselling is projective identification of what is the storyteller’s ‘bad’ into the storified’s, the audience’s, ‘good’ containers, thus turning the audience toward the storyteller’s wishes. These wishes are likely to be diametrically opposed to those of the storified -- otherwise, there would be no reason to use story as the ways and means to manipulate others’ thinking. Storieselling then, is the recognition of other only if other agrees with what the storyteller wants to tell. That which the storyteller or storieseller wishes to tell is actually what he or she wishes to have interpreted. Thus, the storieseller erodes the storified’s ability to keep from being interpreted and to keep being interpreted by the storieseller. The storieseller as coach creates paradigmatic strongholds, the boundaries from which the storified cannot escape without the risk of losing the coach’s, the super-ego’s or more drastically, the ego-
ideal’s reassurance. Storyseller’s use such recognition to build power at the expense of the storified so that the end of the coaching story is that the protégé must conform to the ‘bigger’ paradigm, else he or she is left behind.

**Despair and frustration from a crisis of confidence OR Why my paradigm is better than yours**

Lex Donaldson (1995), in his book, *American anti-management theories of organisation: A critique of paradigm proliferation*, charged United States academics with pursuing novelty in organisation theory because it enhances their individual career prospects. He argued that such a pursuit has left us with a proliferation of paradigms and a fragmentation of the field such that “there is now no unified, coherent view of organisations which can be offered to students or to managers to guide their endeavors” (p. 1). Donaldson deepened his critique of why the field is in such a ‘mess’ by suggesting that editorial boards of journals have welcomed novelty to champion over “genuine intellectual grounding” (1995, p. 1). Moreover, practitioners (i.e., managers) have moved away from the distilled wisdom of academics not only because of the contradictory ‘advice’ and guidance that discourse is providing; but also because much of this discourse casts managers in a negative light and so gives the appearance of being “anti-management”.

For Donaldson (1995), the ‘rescue’ for the field is to resurrect structural contingency theory as the core ingredient to which he seeks to add elements from four of the fifteen competing paradigms he identified, notwithstanding the fact that these four paradigms themselves, appear to be incommensurable with structural contingency theory. Donaldson’s solution has been described as “a discourse of the myopic” (Carr, 1996) for the fact he has to *cannibalise* some of the paradigms’ ‘antagonistic’ and ‘competing’ insights to accord his own synthesis. It is the reducible whole that practitioner’s crave as the means to effect pragmatism and feelings and perceptions that finally! something is working. The pragmatism of Donaldson’s (1995) model does not seem to cause him to produce a reflexive moment about the creation of his own broader ideological prism. In what appears to be an appeal to practitioners, instead of supplying and monitoring the application of a reasoned intellectual argument, Donaldson informed his ‘audience’ that “structural contingency theory views management in a positive way as the controllers who orchestrate the adaptation of the organisation to its environment through implementing better-fitting structures” (1995, p. 13). Putting his ‘sales pitch’ to one side, what follows from such a position is that the research agenda within this paradigm is to discover *what* contingencies must be addressed through aspects of structure -- it is mainly these that
will ultimately enhance performance of the organisation. In his work, Pine e Cunha (2005) determined that organisations that wanted to work independently of their environments were more likely to use reflection: that is, first thinking of ways and means to differentiate themselves, before employing action. Conversely, “the ‘dependent’ strategic orientation posits the rule of the environment. It claims that the major role of manager is to adapt organisations to their environments” (Pine e Cunha, 2005, p. 3). Obviously, Donaldson’s (1995) tactics have caught on.

The transitive property of Pine e Cunha’s (2005) work is that individuals who want to work independently of their environments (i.e., without attempting to become aware of and then meet others’ needs) are prone to storyselling that can be cleverly disguised as storytelling: “The very act of saying what narrative is or what it is not, is to engage in systems change. ‘The very act of learning to speak efficiently, is an act of learning to do as someone else considers to be correct.’” (McKenzie & James, 2004, p. 37 cited in Carr & Lapp, 2005b, p. 96). However, if we apply Pine e Cunha’s (2005) findings specifically, it is that the storyseller purposefully; and not by accident or because of unawareness, plots to have people accept change or even change their minds because the storyseller makes them feel unnecessarily empathetic and sympathetic:

*Storytelling and storyselling* are two phases in the process of storying. Storytelling is a projection of what the storyteller wants to tell….On the other hand, storyselling is based on the dialectic of projective identification and introjective identification. It is meant to trigger some type of wanted behavior through “cues to manage how much of the story is told, how much is left to the imagination, and what interpretation is applied” (Boje, 1991, p. 124, cited in Carr & Lapp, 2005b, pp. 96-97). Storyselling is a tool that facilitates the dialectical pairing of projective identification and introjective identification to maintain normal narcissism. (Carr & Lapp, 2005b, p. 97)

However, when storyselling is used to enact the wishes of the overly narcissistic storyteller, that storyteller injects storyselling as an innocuous way of achieving the ends of persuasive manipulation by making the storified feel guilty and ashamed: “Storyselling, or “systemic story making not only elaborates a manager’s ability to engage a situation, it increased the resources a manager has for manipulating others” (Barge, 2004, p. 116). The storyseller wishes and needs to fulfill overly narcissistic desires to have the best; and the ‘biggest’ paradigm. Such an isolationist position is one in which some rejoice and allow themselves “to inoculate themselves from each other under the cloak of incommensurability” (Gabriel, 1999, p. 397). It is our view that storytelling and storyselling use story, antenarrative and narrative to bridge the dialectical gap between the antithesis of having a wish and the synthesis of ‘truth’.
In support of development of the depressive position, there are also those who insist upon acknowledging that organisations are full of paradox, contradictions and irony to claim that we inhabit a world in which two or more opposing perspectives on the same issue can be ‘true’ simultaneously. These authors, the dialectical theorists, firmly draw upon Hegel and the Frankfurt School’s rendering of dialectical thinking and, in so doing, dismiss incommensurability as part of an inability to understand -- and work with -- complexity and the inherent dialectic tensions in the lifeworld of organisations (Carr & Lapp, 2005a, 2005b, 2006a; Lapp & Carr, 2006a, 2006b; Stacey, 2003a, 2003b; Stacey, Griffin & Shaw, 2000/2002).

In most recent times, postmodern arguments have been advanced to state that it is not a case of establishing a new or alternative Archimedean point with which to ground our understanding. Postmodernists -- in an extreme form of relativism -- argue that there are no Archimedean points, but only local narratives in which reason has a problematic status because the practical solution, the truth, is really unstable:

Authors (and we all tell narratives) select those events that they feel are sufficient to elicit the necessary sense of continuum. But, of course, a narrative can never be totally ‘complete’. An interesting point about narrative existents (the characters) in drama is that they must remain the same from one event to the next. If they do not, some explanation (overt or covert) must occur. In drama, it seems that some principle of coherence must operate, there must be some sense that the identity of the existents is fixed and continuing. (Sarup, 1996, p. 17)

Both the dialectical and postmodernist camps further the notion that coaching for the depressive position, however painful the ‘bad’ of the situation might be, helps to negate the storyteller’s splitting that leads to negation of projective and introjective-identification. Thus, there is in existence the paranoid-schizoid paradox -- to enact the depressive position, there must first occur splitting to be able to determine the opposites required for negation. At the end of the storyteller’s drama, there is no paradox; there is only her or his version of what is ‘good’ and what is ‘bad’. The storyteller as coach dangerously omits the paranoid-schizoid paradox to ensure it is only her or his interpretations of the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ of life are taught, is introjected by the protégé. Without paradox, there becomes more of the same coaches; more of the same storytellers who impede and can eliminate motivation to change. It is through dialectic inquiry that the protégé is coached to introject not only one but at least two sides to every story. The effective and dare we say, the ethical coach creates a dialectical environment so to allow the protégé to choose. The unethical coach, the storyteller, has the protégé believe there are choices when really, the storyteller has eliminated them for the protégé. Storysellers are the most dangerous when they knowingly use this process to take what they need, rather than ask for what they need -- they believe it is ‘always’ better, ‘always’ easier
to take for forgiveness later than to ask for permission, first. Postmodern storytellers are those who use positivistic means to deny the other, truth; and the ‘real’ moral of the story (Lapp & Carr, 2006c).

Now, while many will be familiar with these contrasting positions and will be very aware that the discussion above is but a crude summary (see Carr, 2000, 2004), it remains the case that the variety of positions has caused a crisis of confidence in the fields of management and organisation studies. For some, perhaps many, these fields are struggling to maintain credibility and there is a need for rescue before they get dismissed as a bewildering collection of ‘bric-a-brac’. Such was the state of the field of organisation studies that Burrell (1997) saw little to be optimistic about and summarized his view to other theorists in the following manner: "To put it crudely folks, ... we’re swimming in deep shit" (p. 4).

The negative fecundity which Burrell (1997) described does, within its realm, share a commonality. This is the lack of individual responsibility to be reflexive such that there is a never-ending need to go elsewhere for answers. The need is for individual reflexivity, which should be but is not always taught and or rewarded in business education, MBA and PhD programs (Argyris, 1991; Meuser & Lapp, 2004). Because of this need to rely on others, the fallback is to become others as through the paradigm of metaphor. As such, we can fall prey to incorporating others’ stories as the ways and means for learning or creating awareness. The paradox of this consciousness is that there lies within storytelling what has been and therefore what is propagated by the unconscious.

While sharing a similar sentiment to that of Burrell (1997), Robert Brunner (1998) also noted that some had already turned their head away from current fashion, faddism and paradigm wars that were now characteristic of the field and were looking for guidance, historically:

Many of those who are in positions of responsibility within firms have become tired of management textbooks and fashionable trends, and turn instead to a “supposed subject of knowing”: the coach.

The manager and her coach: what a strange couple! Is the coach the Mephistopheles to the manager’s Faust, the Sganarelle of Dom Juan, the Sancho Panza of Don Quixote, the man Matti of Herr Puntila, or Friday to the manager’s Robinson? Is the coach a jester an eminence grise, a scapegoat, a confessor, a confident, an intellectual guide, a mentor, a maternal figure, a severe father, a therapist? The avatars of the transference are manifold. It is necessary for the subject to pass via the other in order to have access to his or her truth: and the manager does not escape this law. Would coaching thus be the modern version of the Socratic dialogue? Yet, coaching takes many forms, from technical counseling to the psychological domination that flirts with suggestion, for this is a domain devoid of any fixed deontology. (pp. 515-516)
The notion of “the coach”, and “coaching”, would appear to be a possible avenue of escape and a more ‘down-to-earth’ approach to providing guidance to those who organise and manage, yet, as Brunner (1998) stated above, the notion of coaching is one that has been ‘borrowed’ from other discourses and practices. One cannot understand ‘both sides of the story’ on coaching until one understands storyselling.

**Storyselling can be coaching**

Clearly, in organisation studies, management of learning and development through coaching is something that needs handling with care. For instance, the irony of the last sentence in the previous section is that it is indeed an example of storyselling if the reader feels guilt or shame at not knowing all there is to know about coaching. Metaphor for learning and development such as coaching demand our attention for what they represent and what they do. It is not that we need to try to curb the use of metaphor per se, for metaphor is the crux of language, of human experience; and of social evaluation. It is the *un-reflexive* deployment of metaphors in organisation studies that is the danger to the field. In line with this thinking begs the question of “what is a coach”? and or “what does a coach do, when, how and why”? and especially because of coaching’s prevalence in the field. In 2003, it was estimated that there were some 15,000 full-time and part-time management coaches world-wide and growing at a rate of about 40% per year (Arnaud, 2003, p. 1133). Yet, what eludes us is a concrete definition of what coaching really is, which of course, impacts what the coach does, how and for what reasons. For instance, in the course of making a distinction between psychoanalysis that occurs on the couch with management coaching, Arnaud (2003) stated:

> To put it another way, the horizon of executive coaching is rather one of a pragmatics of the Ego, which can in theory refine or enrich its operating patterns (to make up for its shortcomings, etc.). In this perspective, any eventual resurgence of the unconscious can only be assimilated to a failure, which one must learn to better master. (p. 1137)

In other words, in terms of egoism, coaching automatically conveys that some improvement can and or must be made -- right now, the person or group is not as good as one can be but through therapy -- through coaching that can be counseling and *vice versa* -- the individual can become better:

Coaching is similar but not synonymous with counseling. They both have the same objective: to improve the employee’s performance, but coaching deals with ability issues while counseling deals with personal problems (Hunsaker, 2001, p. 433).

In coaching, managers pass along advice and information or set standards to help subordinates improve their work skills. In counseling, managers help subordinates
recognize and address problems involving their state of mind, emotions, or personalities. Thus, coaching focuses on abilities, counseling on attitudes. (Whetton & Cameron, 1998/2002, p. 221)

At the same time, these theorists are saying different things about coaching and counseling such that in combination, they mean yet other things for individuals and groups. Which one is true? And more importantly, why? Further, Whetton and Cameron (1998/2002) stated that coaching requires no more and no less than eight attributes of supportive communication that is to be:

1. problem oriented, not person oriented (i.e., focus on what can be changed; not who can be changed);
2. congruent, not incongruent (i.e., honest messages that match thoughts and feelings);
3. descriptive, not evaluative (i.e., focus on objective occurrence, its effects and offer solution);
4. validating, not invalidating (i.e., focus on statements that communicate respect, flexibility, collaboration, and areas of agreement);
5. specific, not global (i.e., focus on specific events or behaviors, avoiding extremes or either-or statements);
6. conjunctive, not disjunctive (i.e., focus on statements that flow from what has been said previously and facilitating interaction);
7. owned, not disowned (i.e., taking responsibility for your own statements by using personal “I” words); and
8. supportive listening, not one-way listening (i.e., using a variety of appropriate responses with a bias toward reflective responses). (p. 220)

Not only have these authors determined boundaries between coaching and counseling, they have also mapped out the directions to facilitate both practices in the shape of binary opposites, which may or may not be accurate. For instance, supportive listening’s opposite might be ineffective two-way listening (Argyris, 1994), which means supportive listening could also be a metaphor and even a simile for two-way communication. Obviously, this is not necessarily true -- especially when in a different context of a different textbook, effective two-way communication is labeled “active listening” (Robbins & Hunsaker, 1989/2003). Further, Robbins and Hunsaker’s (1998/2003) “TIPS” (i.e. Training in InterPersonal Skills) volume is an all encompassing work of six parts comprised of 17 similar and different behaviours an effective manager would use, ostensibly, to be a better coach to be a better manager. O.K., so now to whom do we turn -- especially when one of the author’s has written two works that are at odds with one another (Hunsaker, 1989/2003; Robbins & Hunsaker, 1998/2003). This is so confusing; yet, this is what is being taught to managers in undergraduate, MBA, and PhD programs.

Beardwell and Holden (1994/2001) used Torrington, Weightman and Johns’ (1994) definition of coaching to be “improving the performance of somebody who is already competent rather than
establishing competence in the first place” (p. 432). Yet, on the other hand, Beardwell and Holden (1994/2001) also said that coaching is:

analogous to the sports coach who is seeking to improve performance by continually analysing and offering constructive criticism and guidance to an athlete or player. The coach (boss) must be willing to share tasks and assignments with the individual. Each task must have scope, responsibility and authority to challenge and test the individual. Coaching usually begins with a period of instruction and ‘shadowing’ to grasp the essential aspects of the tasks. There is then a transfer of responsibility for the task. Throughout the process there is a dialogue, with regular feedback on performance in the form of constructive criticism and comments. The effectiveness of this feedback is dependent upon a sound working relationship.

In most organisations, coaching is done on an informal basis and dependent on the boss having the inclination, time and motivation to do it, as well as possessing the necessary expertise and judgement for it to succeed. (p. 397)

One can only ask how it is that the individual is already competent when there is a double call for constructive criticism. Yet, there it is in a ‘nut-shell’. Between North America and the United Kingdom, the same publisher, Prentice Hall, used four different perspectives on coaching (i.e., five, with the inclusion of Schneider and Barsoux’s 1997/2003 volume) to fill niches that when taken together, confound the practitioner and the researcher -- one can only imagine the state of dismay for the manager in the company’s organisational and human resources development departments! All of these definitions point to evidence of storyselling -- coaching is for the incompetent; and therefore, coaching is metaphor for incompetence.

And now, we have also made a direct linkage between coaching and teaching. But is a teacher a coach? And, is a coach, inherently a teacher? In the first case, if teaching is ‘telling’, the answer seems to be “no”:

all of coaching falls under the sphere of drawing out the strengths that are already there, starting with the pre-supposition that the person already has the strengths that they need. And it’s really a matter of drawing those strengths out and helping them to discover, rather than you as a teacher/trainer presenting and giving. (Clegg, Rhodes, Kornberger & Stilin, 2005, p. 221)

Coaching is not teaching. Teaching is usually one-way communication. Managers can teach their subordinates to do or not to do things, but subordinates may not understand or act completely as their managers expect. Coaching is more of a two-way communication process. When learners, who are expected to be coached, deliver results, coaches will give feedback and let learners adjust their actions again. (Champathes, 2006, p. 17)
Teaching is usually one-way communication -- but what if it is two-way communication? Does teaching then become a metaphor for coaching or vice versa? And how is it that a manager is suddenly equated to being a teacher? Or perhaps the question is: “how can managers ever be teachers?” Argyris’ (1991) views were that the ‘smartest’ people in the organisation have difficulty learning, ostensibly, because through what seems to be coaching that is not teaching, failure is not recognised. When failures are not allowed to occur, there is then no need for self-initiated problem-solving that requires individual reflexivity:

People at all levels of the organization must combine the mastery of some highly specialized technical expertise with the ability to work effectively in teams, form productive relationships with clients and customers, and critically reflect on and then change their own organizational practices. (Argyris, 1991, p. 100).

Argyris’ (1991) plea is for the self-coach who does not define learning as the means to conquer some external force. Effective results of coaching are that there becomes no need for other-coaching because the individual learns how to question assumptions, evaluate alternatives and employ reflection with action, a concept that seems to escape some managers (Pine e Cunha, 2005). One-way communication such as that evidenced in the case study presented early in this paper, has the storytelling process stop at introjective-identification that was reinforced through transference and counter-transference.

Contemporary adult educators, who for many years have been advocating and teaching learner-teacher interactionism of which one component is coaching, would cringe at Champathes’ (2006) definition from epistemological, methodological and ontological perspectives -- and especially, when in this field, formative rather than only summative feedback is lauded and practiced (Brookfield, 1987, 1990; Cranton, 1994; Cross, 1988; Garrison, 1997). Yet, if all classes and programs are to be collaborative on the side of the coach, the teacher, who is it that decides what should be learned in the first place? Further, in light of learning itself, if the learner refuses to learn something new and different is he or she also negating the general purpose of learning and teaching and coaching? Notwithstanding who is making the decision of what to learn when, the need for getting and for giving coaching in all of its forms, supports the notion that there must be some deficiency that requires ‘fixing’ and improvement and the selection of the correct choices to incorporate. If ‘effective’ teaching and coaching are metaphors, is it also fair to say that counseling is their metaphor such that the coach must also be qualified as counselor? If so, from what field do these credentials come? From business education discourse? From psychoanalysis? Coaching then, provides another egoistic satisficer of being able to select from competing alternatives that implies a need to remove both intrapersonal and interpersonal conflict (Carr & Lapp, 2005c) between the subject who does not yet
know and the coach or “the knowing” (Brunner, 1998). The storyseller is the individual who ‘wins’ from the anxiety, fear and fright he or she generates in the protégé, who ultimately, will feel learning challenged.

The qualities of metaphor tells us about the carry-over effect whereas the image it conveys may go beyond drawing attention to one element, but instead, when taken literally, imply unintended meanings. The earlier quote from Brunner (1998) and the remarks by Arnaud (2003) and Beardwell and Holden (1994/2001), call our attention to how the metaphor of the coach may infer a connection to the world of sports. On his paper on intercultural integration, Brown (2000) firmly believed that behaviour analysts should be encouraged to:

seek to enter other cultures and bring about change to adopt the metaphor of coach:
By using behavioral principles and technique to teach behavioral principles and techniques, behavior analysts model the very behaviors that will help people in positions of leadership and influence (p. 1)

Some of the organisation discourse that has adopted the terms coach and coaching has done so assuming a likeness to the manner in which those terms are used in sports. Indeed, from a period even before the ‘paradigm wars’ we find some in the organisation discourse talk of the coach and coaching and assume, or overtly argue, that:

the world of sport mirrors the world of work, that game or play structures parallel work structures. …

Baseball is a metaphor for the autonomy of organisational parts, football, for hierarchical control over the parts, and basketball, for voluntary cooperation among parts. (Keidel, 1987, p. 591 & p. 592).

For Keidel (1987), management could do well to look to the world of sport as offering a “unifying conceptual framework” (p. 591). With the passage of time, Arnaud (2003), in the context of advocacy for coaching, suggested “what remains of the sports metaphor is the competitive dimension, which is, in fact, more bitter, individualistic and prevalent in the workplace now than ever before” (p. 1132). Indeed, Arnaud (2003) argued that the context, or matrix (our preferred terminology), in which the activity of coaching is embedded, i.e., the world of sport, is something that is “diametrically opposed” (p. 1132) for example, with “psychoanalytically inspired executive coaching” (Ibid).

Do we associate the notion of a coach and coaching as being connected to a vision of the organisation as a team involved in a competition? Is such a comparison just one of many that are appropriate between sport and business? Spitzer and Evans (1997) questioned the ‘transfer’ (i.e., in
this context read transference counter-transference) of ideas from the world of sport to the world of business, stating that in relation to leadership:

Best selling books by Don Shula, Pat Riley and others trumpet the characteristics that make winners in sport and -- so say the authors -- will also make winners in business. Today’s managers, however, rarely find a similar dynamic because, unlike sport, business for the most part has left the command and control model. (p. 4; see also Weinberg & McDermott, 2002, p. 285)

The question is “in what part of business has the command and control model been vacated”? Certainly, it is not always the case when one considers the dynamics of projective-identification and introjective-identification in management education discourse and especially when behavioural modification seems to be the focus. Further, we can see that there is now a link among coaching, counseling, conflict and competition such that effective managers should be able to use coaching and or counseling and or teaching (i.e. we still have not ascertained if there is a difference among these three) to minimise intra-organisational conflict that will increase an employee’s and groups of employees’ abilities to be more competitive inter-organisationally. This type of coaching sounds like command and control to us and to others, it is more a case of winning a war in the marketplace (Hendon, 1986). Thankfully, Gabriel, Fineman and Sims (1992/2000) do say it is what it is -- competition is conflict. Competition is “a form of conflict, in which different parties are vying for the same resources and rewards, while usually agreeing to abide by a set of rules” (p. 286). So, when we expand the metaphor of coaching for competition, we can also be saying that coaching is also instrumental in causing conflict in the first place (Carr & Lapp, 2006b). Then, more coaching is required to eliminate the conflict of losses the ‘not-winning’ organisation is experiencing and the still ever pursued ‘betterment’ the ‘winning’ organisation wants. Arnaud (2003) stated that: “While coaching remains a polysemous notion, the question may well be asked if it might not also potentially serve, for this very reason, as a Trojan Horse for psychoanalysis” (p. 1133). We believe that mismanagement by the metaphor of coaching is a Trojan Horse for adult education about and for organisational change when it is used to uphold storyselling. Storyselling is used as a ‘nice’ way to inform employees that they are deficient at helping the organisation become more competitive and implicates the individual in her or his inability to be usefully competitive, thus putting their jobs in jeopardy. In both scenarios, it is the protégé who is at risk of being engulfed by the more powerful other’s metaphor: “the commercial and the personal may indeed mingle, even fuse” (Taylor, 2006, p. 106). In other words, it is the brand on the Trojan Horse that determines from whom and how the coaching is given. And, it is the type of branding consistent with projective-identification and introjective-identification in the transference counter-transference relationship that is storyselling.
The paradox of coaching is that it is one metaphor that ‘competes’ with other metaphors (i.e. one or many paradigms) to extricate an internal locus of control from an external source. Yet, if incommensurability is not the pragmatic, winning way, then why has management a tendency to internalize or to buy into another’s paradigm? The potential of effecting change; of learning theory and practise through coaching as storytelling, becomes its own potential limitation of ‘true’ self-organised emergence thus creating crises of confidence. The fact is that the worst stories sold are those we sell best to ourselves.
References


